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Introduction  
Relevance of the problem  
In recent years, financial markets worldwide became highly integrated, 
overcoming national borders. The problem of developing adequate tools and 
comprehensive approaches for achieving higher security and stability in the EU 
financial sector is on the agenda. Key issues and challenges for the formation and 
development of the single European financial market, driven by the new realities, are 
considered in this thesis. The need for transformation of the European banking 
market is analyzed regarding the challenges, which the crisis broth to the banking 
system - especially in terms of its social function as a key intermediary in the 
economy. In this context, innovative approaches are proposed in the dissertation for 
aŶalǇsisà aŶdà ƌegulatioŶà ofà theà ďaŶkiŶgà ŵaƌketsà aiŵiŶgà toà iŵpƌoǀeà theà sǇsteŵ͛sà
stability and efficiency. 
Goal and objectives of the thesis 
The goal of this thesis is to propose and develop analyses able to contribute to 
the transformation of the banking system. The current state of the system is a 
structure with delayed-in-time management. In this system, the impact of the 
regulatory measures and interventions in response to a particular problem is delayed 
in the time due to the structure of the market and the periodicity of information 
gathering. The Aim of this dissertation is to transform the system into an operational 
self-regulating system (system of systems) operating in near real-time. This 
transformation would allow sharp increase in stability and operability of the system. 
The so defined goal implies the following more specific objectives: 
- to analyze the banking market through the network perspective in order to 
reveal some aspects of the system, not typical to the particular institutions, regarded 
This document is made available in accordance with 
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as separate entities, and for contributing to the solution of the major problems in the 
banking sector; 
- to analyze the regulatory and supervisory architectures for discovering the 
current control structure of the banking system; 
- to explore and develop the architecture of the banking system as a separate 
critical infrastructure, which could enable the application of network-centric 
approach as an opportunity for achieving stability and efficiency (operability) in the 
financial sector, directly related to national and international security. 
 
To achieve the main goal, the following practical approaches have been 
proposed: 
- an analysis of the Bulgarian banking market development and its integration 
in the process of transition to a single European financial market. We apply at this 
stage an unconventional but effective parametric frontier method DEA (Data 
Envelopment Analysis); 
- a comparative analysis of national supervisory and regulatory architecture in 
the EU, and an analysis of the opportunities of their institutional development in 
relation to the construction of the single European financial market in times of crisis; 
- a mathematical modeling and simulation study of the behavior of the banking 
system as a network infrastructure under financial stress and the distribution of this 
shock in the system; 
- an extension of the scope of the critical infrastructure in the financial markets 
by considering the banking system as a separate high-level critical infrastructure, 
which builds on the concept of traditional critical infrastructures (predominantly 
mechanical/communicational infrastructures) by combining them using economic 
models; 
This document is made available in accordance with 
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- the development of innovative tools to transform the banking system and for 
achieve high level of stability and efficiency of the economic and financial system as a 
whole; 
- the inclusion of bank regulation and supervision, as a key element in a self-
synchronizing network on a supranational level. 
Research thesis 
The research thesis of this dissertation is the need and the possibility of 
transformation of the banking system for achieving decisive operability and stability 
based on the introduction of concepts related to the network approach and treating 
the system as a critical infrastructure. 
Approaches and methods 
In connection with the defined goal and for solving the research thesis, in the 
dissertation is applied theoretical methods like mathematical models, simulation 
modeling and systemic approach under which the analyzed object is regarded as a 
system with defined elements and internal and external connections, which influence 
the functioning of the system. The systemic approach is deemed as the most robust 
foundation for management of complex interconnected activities, which allows the 
discovery and analysis of the different elements and their dependence.  
The dissertation employs also and architectural approach, which allows the 
representation of a clear picture of an object or a system, such as of a specific 
function of a system. This approach gives a fixed description of the functional 
interdependencies in the system under the form of models. The main goal of the 
architectural approach is to optimize the interdependencies and internal interactions 
in the system by creating an appropriate infrastructure.  
A comparative and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), are employed also. The 
use of network-centric and multi-agent approaches is proposed for protection of the 
This document is made available in accordance with 
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critical banking infrastructure and the creation of a supranational network 
supervisory architecture.  
The network-centric concept is based on the principle of self-synchronization 
specific to the theory of complex systems. The essence is that complex phenomena 
and structures are best organized bottom-up. The agent-based modeling is a 
powerful simulation modeling technique that has seen a number of applications in 
the last few years, including applications to real-world business problems (Bonabeau, 
2002). It is a method for studying systems, which are composed of interacting agents 
and which shows properties, stemming from the interactions of the agents that 
ĐaŶŶotàďeàďƌaǁŶàsiŵplǇàďǇàaggƌegatiŶgàtheàiŶdiǀidualàageŶts͛àpƌopeƌties. 
Practical application 
The results of the practical realizations and theoretical concepts in the thesis 
can be useful for both bank managers and the supervisory and regulatory authorities 
in their efforts for improving the financial and banking activities. 
Based on the developed mathematical modeling and simulation of the banking 
system, a software has been realized for testing the behavior of the banking system 
in a state of financial stress and its distribution between interconnected banks. 
Main results 
Key practical and theoretical contributions in the thesis: 
•àTheàŵaiŶàpƌopositioŶàofàtheàthesisàisàtheàĐƌeatioŶàofàaàŶeǁàtǇpeàofàŶetwork 
supervisory architecture as an alternative to the current supervisory models in order 
to respond to the modern structure of the financial markets. 
•àOtheƌàpƌopositioŶsàĐoŶĐeƌŶàŵethodologǇ.àTheàthesisàiŶŶoǀatesàiŶàpƌoposiŶg:à 
- an extension of the scope and the means for action in Crisis response 
operations  (CRO) with operations for stabilizing the banking system in times of 
This document is made available in accordance with 
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financial crisis with the establishment of integrated (internationally) joint financial 
supervisory structures; 
- an application of critical infrastructures paradigm while accounting for the 
vulnerability of the banking system; 
- an introduction of simulation modeling for achieving network-centric multi-
agent architecture for critical interdependent banking structures; 
- a conceptual dynamic model of the banking system as part of the overall 
system for security and stability. 
•à“oftǁaƌeàŵodulesàaƌeàdeǀelopedàfoƌàsiŵulatioŶàŵodeliŶgàofàtheàďehaǀioƌàofà
the banking system as a network structure, in which financial stress is spreading. 
• It is applied an unconventional but effective approach to assess and compare 
the efficiency of Bulgarian and foreign banks based on the DEA method (Data 
Envelopment Analysis). 
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Actualité du problème 
CesàdeƌŶiğƌesàaŶŶĠes,àl͛iŶtĠgƌatioŶàdesàŵaƌĐhĠsàfiŶaŶĐieƌsàs͛estàaĐĐƌueàdaŶsàleà
ŵoŶdeàeŶtieƌ.àCesàŵaƌĐhĠsàdĠpasseŶtàdĠsoƌŵaisà lesà fƌoŶtiğƌesàŶatioŶales.àáà l͛oƌdƌeà
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duà jouƌ,à à laà ĐƌĠatioŶà d͛iŶstƌuŵeŶtsà fiŶaŶĐieƌsà adĠƋuatsà età uŶeà dĠŵaƌĐheà Ŷouǀelle,à
destiŶĠeàăàaŵĠlioƌeƌàlaàsĠĐuƌitĠàetàlaàstaďilitĠàduàseĐteuƌàfiŶaŶĐieƌàdeàl͛Uй.àL͛oďjetàdeà
Đetteàthğseàestàd͛appƌĠheŶdeƌà lesàpƌiŶĐipauǆàpƌoďlğŵesàposĠsàpaƌà laàĐoŶstitutioŶàetà
leàdĠǀeloppeŵeŶtàduàŵaƌĐhĠàďaŶĐaiƌeàeuƌopĠeŶ,àetàd͛ideŶtifieƌà lesàdĠfisàeŶgeŶdƌĠsà
paƌàlesàŶouǀellesàƌĠalitĠsàƋuiàluiàsoŶtàassoĐiĠes.àCeàtƌaǀailàeǆaŵiŶeàlaàtƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶà
duà ŵaƌĐhĠà ďaŶĐaiƌeà euƌopĠeŶ,à iŵpaĐtĠà paƌà laà Đƌise,à eŶà ŵettaŶtà l͛aĐĐeŶtà suƌà saà
foŶĐtioŶà deà ĐooƌdiŶatioŶà daŶsà l͛ĠĐoŶoŵie. Lesà ŵĠthodesà eŵploǇĠesà soŶtà ăà laà foisà
diǀeƌsifiĠesàetàiŶŶoǀaŶtes,àadaptĠesàăàuŶàoďjetàƋueàlesàphasesàd͛iŶstaďilitĠàfiŶaŶĐiğƌeà
de laàdeƌŶiğƌeàdĠĐeŶŶieàoŶtàƌeŶduàpeƌtiŶeŶt.  
Objectifs de la thèse 
L͛oďjeĐtifà deà laà thğseà està d͛aŶalǇseƌà laà tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶà duà sǇstğŵeà ďaŶĐaiƌe,à
d͛uŶeàstƌuĐtuƌeàăàeffetsàdiffĠƌĠs,à- Đ͛estàăàdiƌeàtelleàƋueàlesàŵesuƌesàdeàƌĠgulatioŶàetà
lesà iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶsà eŶà ƌĠpoŶseà ăà uŶà pƌoďlğŵeà soŶtà diffĠƌĠesà daŶsà leà teŵpsà -, en un 
sǇstğŵeà opĠƌatioŶŶelà d͛autoƌĠgulatioŶà foŶĐtioŶŶaŶtà eŶà teŵpsà ƌĠel.à Cetteà
tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶàaŵĠlioƌeƌaità ƌadiĐaleŵeŶtà laà staďilitĠàetà l͛effiĐaĐitĠàduà sǇstğŵeàdaŶsà
son ensemble. 
CetàoďjeĐtifàgĠŶĠƌalàĐoŶduitàauǆàĠtapesàsuiǀaŶtes : 
 aŶalǇseƌà leà ŵaƌĐhĠà ďaŶĐaiƌeà ăà tƌaǀeƌsà uŶeà aŶalǇseà duà ƌĠseauà pouƌà
ŵettƌeàeŶàĠǀideŶĐeàĐeƌtaiŶesàspĠĐifiĐitĠsàdesàlieŶsà institutionnels, et contribuer ainsi 
ăàl͛analyse de la transformation du secteur bancaire ; 
 ideŶtifieƌà lesà aƌĐhiteĐtuƌesà deà ƌĠgulatioŶà età deà ĐoŶtƌƀleà duà sǇstğŵeà
ďaŶĐaiƌeàpouƌàŵieuǆàideŶtifieƌàsaàstƌuĐtuƌeàaĐtuelleàdeàgestioŶàetàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleà; 
 appƌĠheŶdeƌà le sǇstğŵeà ďaŶĐaiƌeà Đoŵŵeà uŶeà iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌeà ĐƌitiƋueà
relevant d͛uŶeàappƌoĐheàeŶàteƌŵesàdeàƌĠseau,àetàaŶalǇseƌàsesàpƌopƌiĠtĠsàdeàstaďilitĠà
et d͛effiĐaĐitĠà daŶsà leà doŵaiŶeà fiŶaŶĐieƌà ;ďaŶĐaiƌeͿ,à d͛un point de vue national et 
international. 
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Les approches suivaŶtesàseƌoŶtàŵeŶĠes : 
 uŶeà Ġtudeà duà dĠǀeloppeŵeŶtà duàŵaƌĐhĠà fiŶaŶĐieƌà ďulgaƌeà età deà soŶà
iŶtĠgƌatioŶàdaŶsàleàpƌoĐessusàdeàtƌaŶsitioŶàǀeƌsàleàŵaƌĐhĠàfiŶaŶĐieƌàeuƌopĠeŶàuŶiƋue,à
soŶtà ƌĠalisĠsàpaƌà leà ďiaisà d͛une approche non-paƌaŵĠtƌiƋueàdeàdĠteƌŵiŶatioŶàdeà laà
froŶtiğƌeà d͛effiĐieŶĐeà ;aŶalǇseà d͛eŶǀeloppeŵeŶtà desà doŶŶĠsͿà non conventionnelle 
mais efficace –  laàŵĠthodeàDйáà;DataàйŶǀelopŵeŶtàáŶalǇsisͿ ; 
 uŶeàaŶalǇseàĐoŵpaƌatiǀeàdesàaƌĐhiteĐtuƌesàŶatioŶalesàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleàetàdeà
ƌĠgulatioŶàdaŶsàl͛UE, et de leur mise au point dans le cadre d͛aŶalǇseàdesàpƌoďlğŵesà
deàĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶàduàŵaƌĐhĠàfiŶaŶĐieƌàeuƌopĠeŶàuŶiƋueàeŶàteŵpsàdeàĐƌise 
 uŶeà ŵodĠlisatioŶà ŵathĠŵatiƋueà età paƌà siŵulatioŶà ŶuŵĠƌiƋueà aǀeĐà
l͛objectif d͛Ġtudieƌà leà ĐoŵpoƌteŵeŶtàduà sǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌeà eŶà taŶtàƋu͛infrastructure 
deàƌĠseau,àsuďissaŶtàl͛influence de chocs financiers qu͛il diffuse dans l͛ĠĐoŶoŵie ; 
 leà tƌaiteŵeŶtà duà sǇstğŵeà ďaŶĐaiƌeà Đoŵŵeà uŶeà iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌeà ĐƌitiƋueà
iŶdĠpeŶdaŶte,à deà plusà hautà Ŷiǀeau,à ĐoŶstƌuiteà suƌà laà ďaseà d͛une conception des 
infrastructures critiƋuesà tƌaditioŶŶellesà ;aǀaŶtà toutàdesà iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌesàŵĠĐaŶiƋues/à
deàĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶͿ,àeŶàlesàĐoŵďiŶaŶtàetàeŶàutilisaŶtàdesàŵodğlesàĠĐoŶoŵiƋues ; 
 uŶeà ƌĠfleǆioŶà suƌà lesàŵoǇeŶsà ăàŵettƌeà eŶàœuǀƌeà pouƌà tƌaŶsfoƌŵeƌà leà
sǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌeà età aŵĠlioƌeƌà laà staďilitĠà et l͛effiĐaĐitĠà duà sǇstğŵeà ĠĐoŶoŵiƋueà età
financier ; 
 la prise en compte d͛ĠlĠŵeŶtsà deà ƌĠgulatioŶà età deà ĐoŶtƌƀleà ďaŶĐaiƌesà
par le biais d͛uŶàƌĠseauàiŶteƌŶatioŶalàauto-sǇŶĐhƌoŶisĠ 
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L’idée défendue 
Laà thğseà ŵetà eŶà ĠǀideŶĐeà laà ŶĠĐessitĠà ŵaisà aussià laà possiďilitĠà d͛une 
tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶàduàsǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌe,àdaŶsàuŶàoďjeĐtifàd͛effiĐaĐitĠàetàdeàstaďilitĠ.àLesà
ĠlĠŵeŶtsà deà Đetteà tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶà soŶtà appoƌtĠsà paƌà uŶeà appƌoĐheà eŶà teƌŵesà deà
ƌĠseauàetàpaƌàuŶàtƌaiteŵeŶtàduàsǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌeàeŶàtaŶtàƋu͛infrastructure critique. 
Les approches utilisées 
En relation avec l͛oďjeĐtifà fiǆĠ,à laà thğseà ƌeĐouƌtà ăà uŶeà laà ŵodĠlisatioŶà
ŵathĠŵatiƋue,à laà siŵulatioŶà ŶuŵĠƌiƋue,à l͛appƌoĐheà sǇstĠŵiƋue.à L͛approche 
sǇstĠŵiƋueà està uŶeà appƌoĐheà peƌŵettaŶtà d͛identifier les invariants d͛aĐtiǀitĠsà
complexes etàiŶteƌdĠpeŶdaŶtsàetàdeàdĠĐouǀƌiƌàouàd͛aŶalǇseƌàlesàdiffĠƌeŶtsàteƌŵesàdeà
leurs relations. 
L͛analyse comparative et l͛aŶalǇseàDйáàsoŶtàaussiàappliƋuĠes.àDesàappƌoĐhesà
ƌĠseau-centrique ou du type multi-ageŶtsà soŶtà pƌoposĠesà aussi,à daŶsà l͛objectif de 
pƌotĠger l͛iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌeàďaŶĐaiƌeàĐƌitiƋueàetàdeàĐƌĠeƌàuŶeàaƌĐhiteĐtuƌeàdeàsuƌǀeillaŶĐeà
ƌĠseau-centrique supranationale. 
L͛aŶalǇseà eŶà teƌŵesà deà ƌĠseauǆà està ďasĠeà suƌà leà pƌiŶĐipeà d͛auto-
sǇŶĐhƌoŶisatioŶ,à spĠĐifiƋueà ăà laà thĠoƌieà desà sǇstğŵesà Đoŵpleǆes.à “eloŶà Đette 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ,à lesà phĠŶoŵğŶesà età lesà stƌuĐtuƌesà Đoŵpleǆesà soŶtàŵieuǆà oƌgaŶisĠsà paƌà
uŶeà appƌoĐheà desĐeŶdaŶte.à Laà ŵodĠlisatioŶà ŵulti-agents est une technique de 
simulation dont la pertinence est aujourd͛huiàƌeĐoŶŶueàeŶàĠĐoŶoŵie.àйlleàs͛applique 
ŶotaŵŵeŶtàăàl͛Ġtude de contextes dans lesquels les interactions sont essentielles, de 
telle sorte qu͛uŶeàsiŵpleàagƌĠgatioŶàdesàpƌopƌiĠtĠsàdesàdiffĠƌeŶtsàageŶtsàŶeàsauƌaità
suffiƌeàăàlesàappƌoĐheƌ. 
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Les applications pratiques 
Lesà ƌĠsultatsà desà deà laà thğseà fouƌŶisseŶtà desà ĠlĠŵeŶtsà deà ƌĠfleǆioŶà auǆà
pƌofessioŶŶelsà deà laà ďaŶƋue,à auǆà autoƌitĠsà deà ƌĠgulatioŶà età deà ĐoŶtƌƀle,à auǆà
dĠĐideuƌsàpuďliĐs.àà 
Un logiciel d͛Ġtudeà duà ĐoŵpoƌteŵeŶtà duà sǇstğŵeà ďaŶĐaiƌeà eŶà situatioŶà deà
diffusion d͛uŶàĐhoĐàfiŶaŶĐieƌàeŶtƌeàďaŶƋuesàeŶàiŶteƌaĐtioŶàaàĠtĠàƌĠalisĠàdaŶsàleàĐadƌeà
deà laà thğse,à pƌoduità joiŶtà deà laà ŵodĠlisatioŶà ŵathĠŵatiƋueà età deà l͛Ġtudeà deà
siŵulatioŶàduàƌĠseauàďaŶĐaiƌe. 
Les résultats principaux de la thèse 
 L͛appoƌtàpƌiŶĐipalàdeà laàthğseàestàdeàfouƌŶiƌàuŶàŵodğleàdeàsuƌǀeillaŶĐeà
eŶàteƌŵesàdeàƌĠseaux, ce qui constitue un nouveau type d͛aƌĐhiteĐtuƌeàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleàduà
ƌĠseauàfiŶaŶĐieƌ.àCeàŵodğleàfouƌŶitàuŶeàalteƌŶatiǀeàauǆàŵodğlesàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleàaĐtuels,à
dans l͛objectif d͛appƌĠheŶdeƌàlaàstƌuĐtuƌeàĐoŶteŵpoƌaiŶeàdesàŵaƌĐhĠsàfiŶaŶĐieƌs. 
 Les autres contributioŶsà oŶtà uŶà ĐaƌaĐtğƌeà ŵĠthodologiƋue.à Laà thğseà
utilise des approches innovatrices. Comme, 
- l͛extension du champ d'application et les moyens d'action dans les 
opĠƌatioŶsà deà ƌĠpoŶseà auǆà Đƌisesà aǀeĐà lesà opĠƌatioŶsà deà staďilisatioŶà duà sǇstğŵeà
bancaire en temps deàĐƌiseàfiŶaŶĐiğƌeàaǀeĐàlaàŵiseàeŶàplaĐeàdesàstƌuĐtuƌesàiŶtĠgƌĠes 
(internationalementͿàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleàfiŶaŶĐieƌàĐoŶjoiŶtes; 
- l͛application du paradigme de l͛infrastructure critique lors de la 
dĠteƌŵiŶatioŶàdeàlaàǀulŶĠƌaďilitĠàduàsǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌe ; 
- l͛introductioŶà deà laà ŵodĠlisatioŶà età deà laà siŵulatioŶà ŶuŵĠƌiƋueà pouƌà
appƌĠheŶdeƌà uŶeà aƌĐhiteĐtuƌeà eŶà teƌŵesà deà ƌĠseauǆà pouƌà lesà stƌuĐtuƌesà ďaŶĐaiƌesà
ĐƌitiƋuesàiŶteƌdĠpeŶdaŶtes ; 
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- l͛ĠlaďoƌatioŶà d͛uŶà ŵodğleà dǇŶaŵiƋueà duà sǇstğŵeà ďaŶĐaiƌeà Đoŵŵeà
ĠlĠŵeŶtà opĠƌatioŶŶelà daŶsà le cadre de la recherche d͛uŶeà ŵeilleuƌeà sĠĐuƌitĠà età
staďilitĠàdeàĐeàsǇstğŵe ; 
- laà ƌĠfleǆioŶà suƌà laà ŵiseà eŶàœuǀƌeà pƌatiƋueà deà laà suƌǀeillaŶĐeà ƌĠseau-
centrique. 
 Des modules de programme oŶtàĠtĠ dĠǀeloppĠsàpouƌàlaàŵodĠlisatioŶàetà
la simulation du comportement duàsǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌeàeŶàtaŶtàƋueàstƌuĐtuƌeàdeàƌĠseauà
daŶsàlaƋuelleàleàĐhoĐàfiŶaŶĐieƌàestàdiffusĠ. 
 Une approche non-ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶŶelleàestàappliƋuĠeàpouƌàĠǀalueƌàetàpouƌà
comparer l͛effiĐaĐitĠàdesàďaŶƋuesàďulgaƌesàetàdesàďaŶƋuesàĠtƌaŶgğƌes,àďasĠeàsuƌà laà
ŵĠthode DEA. 
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Chapter I - OBJECTIVES AND PROBLEMS IN THE BANKING 
SPHERE, RELATING TO REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, IN THE 
PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A SINGLE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET 
DURING THE CRISIS. 
1.1. Improving the regulatory framework and the supervision of the 
financial sector in the EU.  Supervisory architectures 
The topicality of the issue of the structure of the supervisory processes always 
increases during crises, even more so as that is the time when most allocations of 
supervisory responsibilities at the institutional level are carried out. At the current 
stage, in contrast to previous financial crises, the discussion is of global nature. The 
coordination at the international level is raised as a priority, given that internationally 
active financial institutions (mainly banks) have a global reach through their 
subsidiaries and an international branch network. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the national supervisory structures in EU 
Member States in recent years, as well as their institutional development. The 
emphasis has been placed on the most common types of supervisory architectures, 
taking into account their positive and negative sides. A number of factors determine 
their varied structure across countries. Experience shows that we almost never come 
across systems that are fully complying with a single theoretical model. The economic 
structure often does not play a significant role in the allocation of supervisory 
responsibilities; a decisive role is played by the established traditions, historical 
development, and sometimes purely non-economic factors. In recent years, however, 
the tendency is for a more intense involvement of Central banks in the supervision 
process at the micro- and macro-level, where this is accomplished mainly by 
returning the function of banking supervision on a consolidated basis to the Central 
bank, which is dictated by the importance of these institutions as regards the 
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systemic risk and the role of the Central bank in maintaining financial stability 
(Masciandaro et al., 2009; Masciandro & Quintyn, 2009). 
The development of supervisory processes at the European level is directly 
related to the priority to establish the Single European Financial Market, raised in 
1999. The financial crisis forced a reconsideration of the structure of financial 
supervision and regulation at the European level, by boosting initiatives for its 
improvement. The leaders of the G-20 agreed on the need to transform the financial 
institutions and in particular to increase the regulation of the financial system. That 
transformation opens up new opportunities for prevention based on early warning 
systems, and for ensuring the sustainability and viability of the financial institutions 
system. 
The issues related to institutional development of supervisory architectures in 
EU Member States are determined by the need for faster overcoming of the crisis in 
the financial sector. 
The current financial crisis has accelerated the activities to improve the 
financial supervision in the EU. In October 2008 the European Commission (EC) 
mandated a group of high-leǀelà eǆpeƌts,à Đhaiƌedà ďǇà щaĐƋuesà deà Laƌosiğƌe1, to 
formulate recommendations for the future of European financial regulation and 
supervision. 
Theà fiŶalà ƌepoƌtà suďŵittedà ďǇà theà deà Laƌosiğƌeà gƌoupà oŶà нeďƌuaƌǇà Ϯϱ,à ϮϬϬϵ,à
contains formulations to achieve greater efficiency in a new system of European 
financial supervision. Proposals have been laid out for new approaches to enhance 
cooperation and coordination between national supervisory authorities, including by 
establishing new European supervisory authorities, and for the first time – by 
                                                   
1
 щaĐƋuesàdeà Laƌosiğƌeà isà ChaiƌŵaŶàofà theà “tƌategiĐàCoŵŵitteeàofà theà нƌeŶĐhàTƌeasuƌǇ.àрeàhasàheldà
leadership positions, more important of which are: Managing Director in the International Monetary Fund 
(1978 - 1987); Governor of Banque de France (1987 -1993); President of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (1993 - in 1998). In 1992 he became a member of the influential Washington-based advisory 
ďodǇà͞GƌoupàofàThiƌtǇ͟.àщaĐƋuesàdeàLaƌosiğƌeàpƌeseŶtedàaàƌepoƌtàtoàtheàйuƌopeaŶàCoŵŵissioŶ,àǁhiĐh defends 
the establishment of a European Financial Stability Board to monitor the state of financial stability. 
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establishing an authority at the European level which will be given the task of 
overseeing the risks in the European financial system as a whole. 
BasedàoŶàtheàƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶsàiŶàtheàdeàLaƌosiğƌeà‘epoƌt,àaŶàaĐtioŶàplaŶàǁasà
prepared aiming to reform the regulatory and supervisory practices in the financial 
markets, as well as an accelerated timetable for its implementation. The discussions 
held in the European Council, the EU Council and the European Parliament 
demonstrated a broad consensus on the need for reforms and on the objectives to be 
achieved in accordance ǁithàtheàdeàLaƌosiğƌeà‘epoƌtàaŶdàtheàйuƌopeaŶàCoŵŵissioŶ'sà
proposals for necessary future measures.  
The development of a modern network approach for solving the basic 
problems related to the global crisis provides opportunities for security and stability 
in the financial system, by including the authorities for banking and financial 
supervision and regulation as major components. The aim is to achieve an effective 
organizational and functional transformation. 
At the summit meeting in June 2012 the European Union agreed to create a 
new Centralized European banking supervision (as a step towards the establishment 
of a European Banking Union) to oversee banking reconstruction and recapitalization. 
This authority will provide direct assistance to banks, not governments, so that their 
debt does not increase further.  
According to the governor of the French Central bank, Christian Noyer, all 
European banks, not just the most important, should be included in the supervision, 
in view of the experience from the Eurozone debt crisis. 
The information material from the European Commission (EC, 2012) contains 
the statement that the European Commission also wants to create a new 
management framework, by entrusting national supervisors with additional powers 
to monitor more closely the banks and to take possible restrictive actions upon 
identification of risks. 
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In connection with the above we are carrying out a comparative analysis of 
national supervisory and regulatory architectures within the EU, and of opportunities 
for their institutional development in relation to problems solving upon the 
establishment of the Single European Market during crisis. 
1.2. Types of supervisory architectures and their advantages and 
disadvantages 
The supervisory process includes micro-level activities on individual bank and 
non-bank financial institutions and the function of maintaining the financial stability 
at the macro-level. The micro-level supervision has two functions – supervision and 
regulation of the stability of individual financial institutions and the so-called 
supervision of the business practices of financial institutions. The process of 
supervision and regulation of the stability of financial institutions seeks to ensure the 
solvency and viability of individual financial institutions, which is achieved by 
stimulating rational behavior on the part of the executives of the financial 
institutions, primarily through supervising the capital adequacy, liquidity, 
maintenance of certain risk management systems, limitations on large exposures, etc. 
The supervision of business practices includes supervision of the transparency and 
disclosure of information by financial institutions, fair attitude towards their 
customers and consumer protection. 
Types of supervisory architectures 
 Several models of organization of supervisory structures can be identified on a 
global scale: vertical model (sectoral model), horizontal model ("twin peaks" model) 
and the unified model (a single supervisor). 
The vertical model follows the boundaries of the financial system in the 
different economic sectors, and each sector is governed by a different institution. 
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The horizontal model is structured by taking into account the different 
orientations of the regulatory and supervisory process, where an individual 
institution is responsible for each orientation. A variant is the so-called "twin peaks" 
model in which the regular supervision of individual financial institutions (micro-level 
supervision) and the function of maintaining financial stability (macro-level 
supervision) is performed by one institution, and the supervision of business practices 
– by another.  
In the case of the unified model, one institution integrates the supervision of 
all sectors of the financial market and all regulatory purposes. It should be noted, 
however, that in this case the regulatory activities are performed by separate 
institutions – the Central bank or the Ministry of Finance2. 
Some of the key factors affecting the shaping of the supervisory architecture in 
a country are the structure of the financial markets, the weight of individual sectors, 
the degree of their integration and their significance in terms of system stability. In 
fact, few countries implement one of the models exclusively. In most cases it is a 
combination to varying degrees and in the respective proportions of characteristics of 
the above three models. 
Main characteristics of the supervisory models 
The vertical model is most effective for a financial market where individual 
sectors (banking market, insurance market and securities market) are relatively 
independent of each other. The supervisory activity is carried out for the different 
sectors by the institution that has the power to do so for that particular sector. 
The unified model applies mainly when the banking, insurance and securities 
markets are fully integrated. This model is based on a single institution that has a 
monopoly on the supervision of the entire financial market. Considering this, it is 
                                                   
2
 Only in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the uniform supervisory authority performs a regulatory 
function, as the supervisory powers in these countries are consolidated in the central bank. 
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necessary to achieve conformity between the institutional supervisory structure and 
the market structure (Abrams & Taylor, 2000). 
The Horizontal and the Unified model gained popularity with the increase of 
integration between the individual markets through the so-called financial 
conglomerates, but the current global crisis suggested that the integration of 
supervisory authorities does not lead to increased efficiency, and in some 
countries
3
 with such supervisory architectures a review of the current structures 
was launched. 
Supervisory architectures in practice 
The institutional structure of financial supervision is the subject of 
considerable attention, resulting from the attempt to draw lessons from the crisis. 
The analysis shows that most common worldwide are the vertical and the unified 
model (where the regulatory function and the supervision of business practices are 
performed by separate institutions), while the horizontal model has limited use. 
Numerous studies name the financial conglomerates as an important reason 
for the integration of supervisory authorities. While part of the evidence supports 
this claim, there are exceptions: some financial systems with complex conglomerates 
are still applying the classic vertical model
4
. 
In practice, most common are combinations of the said models, where in some 
countries certain institutions supervise several sectors of the financial market and in 
others – only one sector. In this context, the allocation of supervisory responsibilities 
often is determined mainly by the historical development of the respective financial 
                                                   
3
 France, Germany, England and Belgium 
4
 One example of sustainable supervisory structure is that of the U.S., where the existing model with a 
large number of supervisors practically has not changed in decades. Currently, the discussion there is not to 
change the model, but to reduce the supervisors. The U.S. government officials are well aware of the cost of a 
restructuring and its eventual failure. That is why we do not witness significant changes in the structure of this 
oversight, despite the large number of financial institutions and conglomerates. 
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market and the traditions and political relations, rather than by a definite economic 
model. 
Studies indicate that, regardless of the different structures, the effectiveness 
of the supervisory activity is closely related to the independence of the supervisory 
institutions (Arnone et al., 2007; Masciandaro et al., 2008).  
Supervision of financial groups 
One of the most cited reasons for the establishment of a unified supervision is 
the need for a unified supervision of financial conglomerates that operate in more 
than one sector of the financial market. With the expansion and ever growing 
complexity of the banks' activities the banks may include in their organizational 
structure financial companies that are related to other sectors of the financial 
market. With separate supervisors, the financial group could position certain financial 
services in that part of the conglomerate where the supervisory burden is minimized 
and the supervision is the most liberal. This in turn would lead to a restructuring of 
the financial institutions to avoid supervision costs. 
In reality, in the case of the unified supervisory structures, the integration of 
the different areas often is superficial. The internal separation remains, thus 
preventing the increase of effectiveness of the supervisory process and creating 
opportunities for inconsistent policy of the institution as a whole. 
Compatibility between the activities of financial institutions 
The practice of consolidation in recent years shows that the integration of 
supervisory structures does not contribute to the desired efficiency, since only banks 
and investment companies have overlapping activities, while the activities of 
insurance companies and pension funds are subject to disparate models (their risk 
lies on the liabilities side, unlike banks and investment companies). Besides, the 
control of the pension and insurance activity in many Member States is performed by 
an institution which is completely different from the micro- and macro-supervisors. 
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From a procedural perspective, the transformation itself and the 
synchronization into a new unified structure creates a period of inefficiency and a 
potential supervisory vacuum in certain sectors, which can lead to a decrease or loss 
of trust in supervisors and thus in the supervised institutions. This process is 
prolonged because of the necessary clarification of the rights and responsibilities of 
the new institution and its manner of interaction with the industry and other 
supervisory and regulatory authorities. Of importance for the future success of the 
new structure upon such transformations is the issue of maintaining the quality and 
the accumulated expertise of the personnel in the relevant supervisory authorities 
(Goodhart, 2000; Podpieraà &à CihĄk,à ϮϬϬϲͿ.à IŶà theà NetheƌlaŶds,à theà pƌoĐessà ofà
restructuring the supervisors lasted for more than two years. 
átà theà saŵeà tiŵe,à ̌à ĐoŶsolidatioŶà ofà theà ƌegulatoƌǇà fuŶĐtioŶ,à ďaŶkiŶgà
supervision and maintenance of financial stability within the Central bank occurs in 
smaller countries, as the predominant share of the assets of the financial system is 
held precisely by the bank institutions (European Central bank, 2006). 
Furthermore, the need to strengthen international cooperation in this field 
should also be taken into account. 
Insufficient flexibility and conservatism of the unified model 
It can be assumed that a single supervisor logically will have less flexible tools 
to solve supervisory problems. Its monopoly presents risks for biased treatment of 
market participants. Moreover, a single supervisory authority without responsibilities 
for supervision at the macro level would be more inclined to pursue a policy of 
excessive regulation and impede market innovations. In this case, the competition 
between the separate specialized supervisory institutions would be beneficial for the 
market development in terms of improved quality of supervisory policies and 
practices. In developed economies (France, Germany, Italy, USA, etc.), irrespective 
of which supervisory architectures have been adopted, there never is just one 
institution to consolidate all regulatory and supervisory powers. 
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The effectiveness of the integration of supervisory institutions into a single 
authority is threatened by the creation of a very large and complicated administrative 
apparatus, which would impede the smooth running of the supervisory process. 
Various studies have shown that the integration of supervisory structures does not 
actually lead to savings in personnel and resources. On the other hand, individual 
supervisory institutions with less bureaucracy have the advantage of greater 
flexibility and faster decision making. 
Regulatory Activities 
Another particularly strong disadvantage which manifests itself especially in 
the case of consolidated supervision outside the Central bank is that such 
supervisory institutions lack the power to issue regulations. So they cannot fulfill their 
role as independent regulators, and this further reduces the dynamics of the 
supervisory process and the ability to react quickly according to the market situation. 
1.3. Laying the foundations of modern regulatory and supervisory 
processes at EU level since the Lamfalussy report 
The establishment of a single financial market – a political priority 
Over the last decade, a priority at the European level was the establishment 
of a single financial market. The development of supervisory architectures was left 
to the decision of individual countries. This is the reason for the wide range of 
supervisory configurations. 
The main contribution to the harmonization of market structures was made by 
the guidance document drafted by the European Commission – Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) adopted in 1999 – providing a framework for establishing a single 
financial market. 
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The Lamfalussy structure 
 The ECOFIN Council (the economic and financial affairs council) decided in July 
2000 to prioritize the establishment of a Single European Capital Market. The Wise 
Men Committee, chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy
5
, recommended a decision-
making procedure relating mainly to the securities markets, which was adopted by 
the EU Council meeting in Lisbon. In 2002, the process of financial market regulation 
in the EU countries accelerated dramatically with the introduction of the developed 
Lamfalussy model. In December 2002 the ECOFIN Council developed an initiative for 
the expansion of the application range of the Lamfalussy process (model) from the 
field of securities to the field of banking and insurance. Chart. 1.1 shows the structure 
of the model: 
                                                   
5
 Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy is a prominent economist and banker. He has held leadership positions, 
more important of which are: founder and president of the European Monetary Institute in Frankfurt – 
forerunner of the European Central bank (1994 - 1997); chair of the Committee of Wise Men for regulation of 
the European securities market (2000 – 2001), whose recommendations were adopted by the EU Council in 
March 2001. As Chairman of the Committee, he led the creation of the "Lamfalussy" model for development of 
regulations in the field of financial services. 
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Chart. 1.1 
The essence of the Lamfalussy model (process)  
The model consists of four levels; on the first (political) level the framework 
regulations of the EU are accepted in the form of directives and other regulations 
proposed by the European Commission after consultation with the interested parties. 
They are based on a principal framework and determine the powers of the European 
Commission, related to their implementation. 
On the second level, after coordination with the Committees of the second 
level (the European Banking Committee, the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Committee, the European Securities Committee and the European Financial 
Conglomerates Committee), the European Commission submitted to the third-level 
committees a request for technical opinions on the specific proposals for regulatory 
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measures (the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators). These technical opinions are also based on 
consultations with market participants. The regulatory acts are subject to a vote in 
the European Banking Committee, European Securities Committee and the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee, and a qualified majority is needed 
for their approval.   
On the third level – the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, and the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators assist the ongoing implementation of 
the adopted regulations into the national legislations. These bodies may issue 
guidelines and uniform standards (optional) to the national supervisory authorities 
and market participants, and make comparisons and reviews of national regulatory 
practices. 
On the fourth level – the European Commission examines the compatibility of 
the legislation of Member States with the common European legislation. 
1.4. Institutional development of the supervisory architectures in the 
EU Member States 
Historical perspective 
In recent years there have been significant changes in the structure of 
institutions responsible for supervision of the financial system. Given the 
predominantly strong influence of the banking markets in Europe in historical 
perspective, the development of financial markets over the past two decades leading 
to increased importance of insurance companies and investment and pension funds 
raised the issue of supervision of non-bank financial institutions and investor 
protection. As a result of these changes the current supervisory architectures are 
increasingly more diverse. In some countries there is the classic vertical model with 
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separate supervisory bodies for banking, insurance and securities markets (Spain, 
Italy, Greece). In some cases, a unified supervision outside the Central bank has been 
established (example: England, Germany, Hungary), while in other countries (Czech 
Republic, Ireland and Slovakia) the Central bank is the unified supervisory authority. 
Among EU countries only the Netherlands has adopted the horizontal "twin peaks" 
model. 
A survey conducted by the European Central bank in 2003 highlights some 
similarities in the reforms of the national supervisory authorities: a stronger 
commitment of the Central banks to the supervisory process, even when they are not 
directly assigned such powers; an increased tendency for interaction between 
supervisors, contributing to financial stability. 
At the European level, the period 2003-2006 was characterized by enhanced 
interaction between supervisors. In particular, the Lamfalussy structure was 
extended to cover not only the securities market, but also the banking and insurance 
sectors: the third level of the structure includes three sectoral committees with 
representatives of the national supervisory authorities, where the objective is to 
intensify the supervisory and regulatory convergence in the EU. These committees 
have an advisory role under the European Commission. It should be noted that all 
Central banks participate in the third-level committee responsible for the banking 
sector (CEBS), whether or not they perform banking supervision function. 
According to the same survey by the ECB, the national supervisory 
architectures depend mainly on local peculiarities such as: historical development of 
the financial markets, established traditions, structure of the financial sector, 
structure of the national government, etc. 
In recent years, thirteen countries have undertaken reforms, moving from the 
vertical (sectoral) model to one of the other two. However, the vertical model 
remains one of the most popular, existing in six countries: Greece, Spain, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania. In other countries, the vertical model exists with 
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certain modifications: France (before 2010), Portugal, Finland (before 2009) and 
Luxembourg. As a variation of this model, in Finland and Luxembourg the supervision 
of banking and securities markets is integrated into a single institution. Bulgaria may 
also be placed under the vertical model of allocation of supervisory responsibilities. 
The horizontal model, where the supervisory activities and the control of 
business practices are performed by different institutions (the "twin peaks" model), is 
fully recognized by the Netherlands
6
, while in other Member States (Italy) only 
certain supervisory responsibilities constitute an implementation of the principle of 
the horizontal model. Elements of such allocation are also present in the supervisory 
structures in France and Portugal. 
The general conclusion is that a clear trend towards a specific type of 
supervisory architecture could not be identified until recently. Every single choice 
was a result of historical factors, specifics of the financial and legal framework or 
other factors such as political opposition (Poland). As the financial crisis unfolded, a 
new trend emerged towards increase of the supervisory powers of the Central 
banks in terms of systemic risk and financial stability and in terms of banking 
supervision. 
The role of the Central banks ďefore the de Larosière report 
The 2003 analysis by the ECB (ECB, 2003) confirmed that the Central banks 
participate intensively in the regulatory and supervisory activities in EU countries. 
In essence, since 2003 the number of countries where the Central bank has 
supervisory powers increased. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have transformed 
their Central banks into unified supervisory institutions. Some of the main reasons for 
this are independence, reliability and expert training of the personnel of the Central 
bank. 
                                                   
6
 In the Netherlands, the supervision of financial institutions and the risk management is the 
responsibility of Central bank and the supervision of business practices is performed by a separate authority. In 
Ireland, for example, the function of supervision of business practices is integrated with Central bank. 
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In almost all Member States where the Central bank is not responsible for 
making financial decisions in the area of supervision, there are arrangements which 
secure its active participation in the supervisory process. In Germany and Austria, 
where the uniform supervisors are BaFin (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
– Germany) and FMA (the Austrian Financial Market Authority), the Central banks are 
authorized by law to perform important supervisory tasks related to credit 
institutions. There is a wide range of institutional arrangements with different 
conditions, which include: sharing personnel (Belgium, France, Ireland, Latvia), 
sharing financial budgetary resources (Belgium, France, Latvia) or other resources 
such as IT infrastructure and databases (Belgium, Estonia, France, Ireland, Latvia, 
Finland, England). Three Central banks have been directly mandated to perform 
certain supervisory tasks (Ireland, Latvia, Hungary). In France, Estonia, Finland and 
Ireland the supervisory institution, although being an independent structure, is part 
of the Central bank in an organizational and administrative aspect. 
In nine countries (Belgium, Estonia, France, Latvia, Austria, Poland, Finland, 
Sweden and England) the Central banks participate in the management of the 
banking supervisory activity, even though they do not have direct supervisory powers 
over banking institutions. This is accomplished through the participation of 
representatives of the Central banks in the governing bodies of the supervisory 
institutions. The representatives of Central banks are, by right, leading members of 
the banking supervisory authorities in Belgium, Estonia, England and Sweden.   
The experience from the current crisis highlights the need to monitor the 
systemic risks arising from both the macroeconomic processes in the economy and 
the global financial markets. There is a growing consensus that the Central banks are 
in the best position to collect and analyze such information, given their activity in the 
conduct of monetary policy and serving as a lender of last resort, as well as their 
powerful statistical infrastructure. 
This document is made available in accordance with 
the Creative Commons license "CC BY-NC-ND" 31 
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of the 27 EU countries (before July 2013) 
according to the adopted supervisory architecture: 
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sectoral 
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The role of securities regulators 
There is a diametrical positioning of responsibilities relating to the functions of 
regulating the securities market. In ten Member States (France, Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Cyprus, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia) there are separate 
institutions which supervise investment companies. In eleven cases (Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Sweden, 
England) this function is part of the unified supervisory authority. In almost all 
countries the supervision of issuers and issues of securities (the supervision of 
business practices) is concentrated in a separate institution. In the Czech Republic, 
Ireland and Slovakia the supervision of investment companies is carried out by the 
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Central banks. In Bulgaria these powers are assigned to a mixed institution covering 
the non-bank part of the financial market, and Bulgaria is one of the few countries 
where the supervision of non-bank financial institutions and of business practices are 
entrusted to a single body. In Luxembourg the supervision of banking activities and 
investment companies is fused. In Finland, the uniform supervisory authority 
regulating the securities market is part of the organizational structure of the Central 
bank. 
The supervisory architecture in Bulgaria 
Upon the establishment of the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC) in 
Bulgaria in 2003, a vertical model of separation of supervisory structures was 
adopted. This commission is a specialized government body for regulation and 
supervision of non-bank financial sectors, independent of the Executive branch and 
accountable only to the National Assembly. It succeeded the then existing State 
Securities Commission, State Social Security Supervision Agency and Insurance 
Supervision Agency, which were under the Government. The banking supervision is 
carried out by the Bulgarian National Bank. The purpose of such supervisory 
allocation is determined by the specific structure of the financial market, which is 
heavily dominated by the banking sector. 
Although the supervision of bank and non-bank financial institutions is 
performed by different authorities, the coordination and dialogue between them is 
carried out through a number of channels, the highest level being the Financial 
Stability Advisory Council. This is an advisory body that helps to pursue a common 
policy for supervision of financial institutions. This council provides the exchange of 
information between participants and promotes security, stability and development 
of the financial markets in Bulgaria. The Financial Stability Advisory Council consists of 
representatives of the FSC and the BNB, and the Minister of Finance. At the invitation 
of the Council its meetings may be attended by the chairmen of the Budget and 
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Finance Committee and the Economic Policy Committee under the National 
Assembly, as well as by others. 
It is characteristic for Bulgaria that the structure of the financial market is not 
integrated across its separate segments, but is influenced by the dominant presence 
of large European bank and financial groups. The total volume of bank assets is about 
70 billion BGN, while the share of the other financial institutions is about 8 billion 
BGN. 
From the perspective of maintaining financial stability it is a priority that the 
Bulgarian supervisory architecture be synchronized vertically with the supervisory 
structures at the European level. At the present stage, the supervisory architecture 
in Bulgaria is consistent with the Lamfalussy model and with the new structure 
proposed in the de Larosière report, aŶd a key faĐtor for future deǀelopŵeŶt is the 
maximum facilitation of the interaction of Bulgarian supervisors with the new 
European structures – the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the three 
supervisors
7
 in the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). 
1.5. Framework for financial regulation and supervision in the EU 
The financial crisis and the supervisory architectures 
The financial crisis has forced a reconsideration of the structure of financial 
supervision and regulation at the European level, by boosting initiatives for the 
improvement of the structure. The attempts to strengthen international coordination 
and interaction through the underlying principles of consolidated supervision, as well 
as through bilateral and multilateral memoranda of cooperation signed between 
supeƌǀisoƌǇà authoƌities,à pƌoǀedà iŶeffeĐtiǀe.à Thisà ledà toà theà йuƌopeaŶà CoŵŵissioŶ͛sà
proposal to build a new system of European financial supervision, with the task to 
coordinate and facilitate the activities of national supervisory and regulatory 
                                                   
7
 European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
and European Securities Authority (ESA) 
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authorities. On 27 May 2009 the European Commission published its proposal for the 
future structure of European financial supervision (based on the recommendations of 
the expert de Laƌosièƌe group) (European Commission, 2009), which was adopted by 
the European Council on 18-19 June 2009. 
The accepted framework introduced: 
- supervision at the macro-level (financial stability supervision) through the 
creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
8
 under the European 
Central bank and 
- supervision at the micro-level, performed by the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS)
9
 consisting of three independent European 
supervisory authorities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and a 
European Securities Authority (ESA). 
These three bodies supersede the previous committees on the third level of 
the Lamfalussy structure, which also follow the vertical model of allocation of 
supervisory responsibilities. The European Commission acknowledges that some 
Member States have different supervisory architectures, but states that at the 
European level this vertical model is the most appropriate and provides continuity 
from the previous Lamfalussy structure. This continuity is shown in Chart. 1.2: 
                                                   
8
 ESRB – European Systemic Risk Board, chaired by the President of the European Central bank and 
including the governors of the 27 national central banks and the European Commission. It is envisaged that this 
structure will monitor the emergence of macro-level risks, and make recommendations for measures to be 
taken by the Member States. 
9
 ESFS - European System of Financial Supervision – a decentralized structure consisting of three 
coordination bodies at European level – for banks, insurance companies and investment companies – with the 
participation of national supervisory authorities. 
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Chart. 1.2 
The European Systemic Risk Board 
The responsibilities of the ESRB are related mainly to making decisions on 
regulatory policy at the macro-level, providing an early warning system in the EU, 
monitoring and analysis of macroeconomic events and generating suggestions for 
their management. 
The role of the ESRB is to: collect and analyze all relevant information for 
monitoring and assessing potential threats to financial stability arising from the 
macro-economic situation and from changes within the financial system as a whole; 
identify and categorize such risks; issue risk warnings when the risks appear 
significant; issue recommendations on measures to be taken in response to identified 
risks where necessary; ensure that the necessary action is taken following the 
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warnings and recommendations; cooperate effectively with the IMF, the Financial 
Stability Board under G-20 and third countries. 
The main task of the ESRB is to assess the stability of the financial system in 
the EU in the context of macroeconomic situation and the overall trends in the 
financial markets. When significant stability risks are identified, the ESRB will 
formulate early warnings and, where appropriate, make recommendations for 
remedial action. The issued warnings and recommendations may be of a general 
nature or concern individual Member States, and a time limit will be specified for 
taking the respective political action. These warnings and/or recommendations will 
be disseminated through the ECOFIN Council and/or the new European supervisory 
authorities. The ESRB will be also responsible for monitoring the compliance with its 
recommendations based on reports submitted by the addressees of the 
recommendations. 
The European Systemic Risk Board will be at the centre of the new system, 
despite its having only advisory powers. The predominant presence of 
representatives of Central banks is clearly manifested in the composition of the 
General Board of the ESRB, which comprises: the President and Vice President of 
the ECB, the governors of all twenty-seven Central banks in the EU, a representative 
of the European Commission, the chairmen of the new European supervisory 
authorities in the ESFS, representatives of national supervisory authorities and the 
President of the Economic and Financial Committee. 
The ESRB relies on the ECB for analytical and administrative capacity, and thus 
is controlled by it. The Ministers of Finance have only one representative in the ESRB, 
which shows the leading role of Central bankers in this institution. 
European System of Financial Supervision 
The European System of Financial Supervision becomes an operational 
European network with shared and mutually reinforced responsibilities. At the EU 
level, the three existing Committees of Supervisors are replaced by three new 
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European supervisory authorities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities Authority (ESA), each of them having a legal personality. These new 
European supervisory authorities assume all duties of the previous committees of 
national supervisors, and also have greater responsibilities, defined legal powers and 
greater authority. They also contribute to the development of a single set of 
harmonized rules and standards, improve the supervision of cross-border institutions 
by developing common supervisory requirements and approaches, and help settle 
any disputes between national supervisors. 
The national supervisors continue to be responsible for the daily supervision of 
individual financial institutions. As regards cross-border institutions, the colleges of 
supervisors are the lynchpin of the supervisory system and play an important role in 
ensuring a balanced exchange of information between the authorities of the country 
of origin and those of the accepting country. The European supervisors will 
participate as observers in the meetings of the colleges of supervisors, thus 
contributing to the development of a common supervisory culture and consistent 
supervisory practices. 
Set up in such a way, the ESFS combines the advantages of a common 
European framework for financial supervision with the expertise of local supervisors 
who have the best knowledge on the institutions operating in the different countries. 
In order for the ESFS to perform its functions effectively, certain accompanying 
measures and changes in the sectoral legislation are necessary, to ensure a more 
harmonized set of financial rules. The aim is to achieve a higher degree of 
harmonization of the regulations to be applied by the supervisors, as well as greater 
coherence of the national powers and sanctions available to them. 
According to the decision of the European Commission the three institutions 
within the ESFS should: be independent of political influence; have budgetary 
autonomy; report to the European institutions (European Commission, European 
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Parliament and Council of the EU); observe high standards of transparency of 
operations; support relations with the persons concerned – the users of financial 
services. 
The purpose of these three bodies in broader terms is to: adopt and issue 
obligatory technical standards; carry out legally binding mediation; adopt legally 
regulating technical solutions as regards specific institutions; oversee and coordinate 
the supervisory colleges and interact with the ESRB to ensure adequate supervision 
at the macro level, as well as have an enhanced coordination role in times of crisis. 
Changes in the structure of the European supervisory and regulatory 
process 
The European Systemic Risk Board enhances the role of the ECB in one other 
respect. Through this board, the ECB has access to supervisory information at the 
micro-level. During the financial crisis, ECB representatives criticized the lack of 
access to supervisory information on individual financial institutions. Such 
information is now provided through the database maintained by the three bodies of 
the ESFS, and the information it contains is available in a certain form also to the 
ESRC, after a confidentiality agreement. 
Crisis management is mentioned as a task not of the ESRB, but of the ESFS. 
This is a step forward in the agreement that was reached at a meeting of the 
European Council in October 2008, according to which the President of the European 
Central bank (in accord with the other European Central banks) and the heads of the 
European Commission and the EU Council become part of a unified European 
structure for crisis management. 
Compared to the committees of the third level of the Lamfalussy structure, the 
new authorities in the EFSF experience a considerably larger workflow. Having in 
mind that the third-level committees play a primarily advisory role in the regulatory 
issues, the new authorities have, in addition to that, many supervisory functions as 
well. The working out of a Single rulebook and the ensuring of consistent 
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implementation of EU regulations continue and expand the regulatory tasks of the 
new structures. Besides the control functions, the establishment of a central 
database of supervisory information constitutes an additional and onerous task. This 
includes: coordination of the supervisory analyses of the financial groups; ensuring 
consistency in supervisory results in the financial groups, participation in supervisory 
colleges, supervision of pan-European institutions, developing a uniform training 
program for supervisors. 
The Lisbon Treaty facilitates the implementation of the new framework and in 
particular of the Single rulebook and the harmonized supervisory practices. The 
Lisbon Treaty clarifies the hierarchy of legal norms within the EU regulatory 
framework and makes the distinction between legislative acts, delegated acts and 
implementing acts. They replace the previous "comitology" that the Lamfalussy 
structure was for the financial markets. The delegated act empowers the Commission 
to adopt regulations of general application to supplement or amend certain non-
essential elements of the legislative acts. An implementing act is adopted when a 
uniform application of certain legally binding EU acts is necessary. The implementing 
act can assign implementing powers to the Commission. This makes it possible for the 
decisions of the former committees on the third level of the Lamfalussy structure to 
become obligatory. 
The ESFS bodies retain a relative independence. In its conclusions, the EU 
Council (Council, 2009) reiterates that they must be independent of national 
authorities and the European institutions. They assist the Commission with the 
consistent interpretation and application of the Community law. The decisions they 
take should not affect the fiscal responsibilities of Member States, which somewhat 
limits their powers. Another problem in this regard is the supervision of pan-
European institutions. The latest regulations for credit rating agencies entitle the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) to register a credit rating agency 
in accordance with the new rules and to make decisions on applications for 
registration and to notify the relevant authorities in the Member States. The central 
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counterparties and settlement institutions are another area of responsibility. The 
conclusions of the ECOFIN Council also noted that some Member States disagreed 
with this approach, as it could affect national fiscal responsibilities. The same 
rationale applies to crisis management, where the ESFS authorities have only limited 
responsibility to make emergency regulatory decisions. 
              Chart. 1.3 presents the scheme of interaction between the separate 
institutions: 
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the lowest level of a large group of national supervisory architectures differing in 
structure (47 institutions in 27 countries (before July 2013)) with various rules of 
management, supervisory cultures and regulatory frameworks. 
By including in that framework the ESRB, which will perform analysis for 
maintaining the financial stability, we see that at a higher level the structure 
resembles the so-called "twin peaks" model, where the supervision at the micro- and 
macro-level is split into separate institutions. 
M
a
cro
-p
ru
d
e
n
tia
l 
S
u
p
e
rv
isio
n
 
M
icro
-p
ru
d
e
n
tia
l 
S
u
p
e
rv
isio
n
 
This document is made available in accordance with 
the Creative Commons license "CC BY-NC-ND" 41 
The financial crisis has shown that the supervision of individual institutions 
(supervision at micro-level) is not enough. This possibility must be supplemented by a 
supervision at the macro-level so as to identify imbalances in the development of the 
financial system (Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2009). Furthermore, the macro-level 
supervision is needed to counteract the pro-cyclical nature of capital adequacy rules. 
This task is entrusted to the European Central bank. 
The approach adopted provides a decentralized supervisory process that is 
close to the financial institutions and markets, while the new European supervisory 
authorities ensure a common approach and resolve any disputes between national 
supervisory authorities in respect of certain financial groups. Over time it is possible 
that these European authorities will begin to implement direct supervision of large 
cross-border banks. Thus the supervisory process will be closer to the existing 
structure of the European financial market, where 70 percent of the banking assets 
are controlled by 43 banks with significant international presence. 
The financial crisis has shown that the current structure of the national 
supervisory authorities cannot deal effectively with cross-border financial 
institutions. An example of this is the bank Fortis, whose rescue was carried out at 
the national level, where the Netherlands took care of the Dutch part (acquired by 
ABN Amro), and Belgium and Luxembourg took responsibility for the remaining part 
of the bank. 
Approaches to regulation and supervision of the financial sector in the 
EU 
The framework for banking supervision at the European level developed by 
the European Commission applies approaches relating to the formation of 
decentralized network architecture and an early warning system at the highest level. 
There is a growing consensus in the economic literature for recognition of the 
significant impact of network structures on many social and economic activities. The 
network approach to financial systems is essential for the assessment of financial 
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stability. For example, the resilience of the banking system to shocks can be 
evaluated according to the network structure that connects the financial institutions. 
        The modern networking concepts are created in relation to the possibility 
of applying the advantages of information technology primarily in security systems. 
The development of a network structure of an early warning system at the highest 
level, its combining with the networks of the European regulatory structures and 
specific supervisory authorities at the respective levels, and their linking to the 
networks of banks and other non-bank institutions allows for the implementation of 
the network system. This is practically a system of systems (a network of networks) 
whose characteristics (or properties) are the synergetic effect of the respective 
characteristics (or properties) of their constituents. This furthermore creates an 
opportunity to achieve new states of the integrated (European or global) financial 
system in which the system as a whole acquires qualitatively new properties, 
impossible to be achieved by its individual parts alone. This ensures the viability, 
stability and efficiency of the operation.  
       The need to adopt a network approach and an early warning system is 
outliŶedà iŶà theàdeà Laƌosiğƌeà ƌepoƌtà iŶà seǀeƌalà paƌagƌaphsà aŶdà ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs.à IŶà
this respect the new regulatory system established by the European Commission is 
essentially a decentralized system of systems involved in the supervisory and 
regulatory processes. The individual national supervisory authorities interact on a 
decentralized basis within colleges of supervisors or on the grounds of signed 
memoranda of cooperation. At the same time, the three supervisory authorities at 
the European level which form the ESFS coordinate and facilitate the work of national 
supervisors, while helping to synchronize the financial regulations and supervisory 
practices underlying the integration of financial markets. From another perspective 
the ESRC and the ESFS interact between themselves and with the ECB and the 
European institutions, responding to potential threats to the stability of the banking 
market, thus forming a system of a higher level. This system is essentially a system of 
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systems. The advantage of such network structures with decentralized management 
is that they are more resistant to crisis situations and to violations of their integrity. 
1.6. Development of the financial supervision and regulation in the EU 
Member States in the light of the global financial crisis 
Development of financial architecture in recent years 
In relation to the impact that the introduction of the Euro had on the 
supervisory structures, many central banks that did not supervise individual banks 
(supervision at micro-level), but performed the function of maintaining financial 
stability (supervision at macro-level), lost positions since the ECB took over the 
monetary policy, depriving them of the last mechanism of influencing the financial 
system and of one of the main sources of information. In order to strengthen the 
capacity to preserve the financial stability a number of countries took measures to 
return the banking supervision within the structure of the central bank. In other 
cases, the functions of supervision of the entire financial system were included and 
integrated in the central bank (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ireland, the 
Netherlands). In Germany, the supervisory activity is undertaken by the unified 
supervisory authority BaFin, which is an independent body, but the regulatory and 
monitoring activities are carried out by the central bank. The debates treat the return 
of the old regime, in which the German central bank supervised banks on a 
consolidated basis. The structure of the German banking groups is characterized by 
their high degree of integration with insurance companies. So in essence the German 
central bank will supervise these within the consolidated supervision framework. The 
changes are confirmed by the agreement between the coalition partners announced 
on October 24, 2009, which contains the plan to make the German central bank 
exclusively responsible for banking supervision. 
The current financial situation leads to a reassessment of the changes made 
before the crisis. In recent years there has been a tendency to strengthen the 
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relationship between the Central bank and other supervisory bodies, as well as to 
entrust the Central banks with new responsibilities in the fields of systemic risk and 
financial stability. All these changes are made in accordance and interaction with 
the superǀisory struĐture at the EuropeaŶ leǀel, as set forth iŶ the de Larosière 
Report. 
In Austria in 2008 and in England after the rescue of Northern Rock, debates 
were initiated on the strengthening of the role of the central bank in the 
supervision of banking groups, considering their significance for systemic risk. These 
debates emerged due to the current situation where the Bank of England, although it 
is responsible for maintaining financial stability, virtually lacked information about 
specific banks and instruments for influencing, and this impedes the realization of 
supervision at the macro-level. In 2008, a reform was undertaken in Austria, 
according to which all functions of remote supervision of banks and on-site 
inspections were assigned to the Austrian central bank, which had hitherto been 
responsible for maintaining financial stability. Up till then the supervision at the 
micro-level had been performed by the Financial Market Authority (FMA). So, after 
the changes, the competences of the FMA as regards the banking market consist only 
of the power to impose supervisory measures. 
Germany, Belgium and France also began to reconsider the role and place of 
supervisory powers over credit and financial institutions. It was an opportunity for 
the initiation of such discussions in other countries that remained outside the 
previous round of reforms. The clearest example of this is the U.S., where the 
proposed measures are not aimed at changing the model, but at reducing the large 
number of supervisory institutions. 
In connection with the changes in the European supervisory framework, 
Banque de France announced in July 2009 the intentions of the French government 
to integrate micro-and macro-supervision of banking and insurance institutions in 
France into the structure of the central bank, and leave outside its scope the 
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regulation of the business practices of these same institutions and the supervision of 
securities markets and investment companies. TheàŶeǁàƌegulatoƌǇàďodǇàáutoƌitĠàdeà
ĐoŶtƌƀleàpƌudeŶtielà ;áCPͿà isàuŶdeƌàtheàĐoŶtƌolàofàtheàнƌeŶĐhàcentral bank and is the 
ƌesultàofàtheàŵeƌgeƌàofàCoŵŵissioŶàďaŶĐaiƌe,àáutoƌitĠàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleàdesàassuƌaŶĐesàetà
desàŵutuellesà;áĐaŵͿ,àCoŵitĠàdesàeŶtƌepƌisesàd'assuƌaŶĐeà;CйáͿàaŶdàtheàCoŵitĠàdesà
ĠtaďlisseŵeŶtsàdeàĐƌĠditàetàdesàeŶtƌepƌisesàd'iŶǀestisseŵeŶtà;CйCйIͿ.àThe creators of 
the project hope that ACP, existing under the control of the central bank, will ensure 
stability throughout the French financial sector. Another objective of the reform is to 
strengthen the supervision of the financial products market. It was decided to 
introduce structured cooperation between the ACP and the supervisory authority for 
theàfiŶaŶĐialàŵaƌkets,àáMн.àTheàŶeǁàƌegulatoƌǇàďodǇàáutoƌitĠàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleàpƌudeŶtielà
(ACP) operates from the beginning of 2010. Similar processes occur in Belgium and 
Germany. The strengthening of the role of the central bank in the micro- and macro-
supervision of the banking and insurance institutions is also discussed in Great 
Britain. 
In October 2009 the governors of the Belgian central bank and of the Single 
supervisor (CBFA) announced their mutual intention to bring closer the activities of 
supervision at the micro- and macro-level. It was decided to establish a Committee of 
systemic risk, and to subsequently seek ways to integrate the activities of the two 
institutions. The ultimate goal is for the Belgian central bank to exercise overall 
supervision at the micro-level, while the new CBFA will be responsible for the 
financial markets (supervision of business practices). In this way the "twin-peaks" 
model will be realized. 
The political authorities in Italy and Spain have recently expressed their 
intention to reorganize their supervisory architectures. In 2005, the Spanish 
Parliament discussed the introduction of a hybrid model by which to reform the 
institutions charged with antitrust responsibilities and the involvement of the central 
bank in the supervisory process. In Italy, the government announced its intention to 
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separate the function of financial stability and supervision of business practices, thus 
realizing a horizontal model for allocation of supervisory responsibilities. 
In some countries, the banking supervision function is already integrated into 
the central bank (Austria) and in others the oversight of the entire financial market is 
integrated into the central bank (Ireland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, 
Finland). 
Ireland is in the process of implementing changes to the organizational 
structure of the central bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI). The 
key point is the establishment of a new Irish central bank to supervise financial 
institutions with the aim to ensure the financial stability of each of them and of the 
system as a whole. In June 2009, the Minister of Finance in Ireland announced the 
government agreement for the establishment of a single fully integrated regulatory 
institution called the central bank of Ireland Commission. The new organization 
replaces the former structure central bank and the Financial Services Regulatory 
Authority. The new central bank Commission is chaired by the Governor of the Irish 
central bank and is responsible both for the supervision of individual financial 
institutions and for the maintenance of financial stability. The function of consumer 
protection is set apart into a separate agency (National Consumer Agency), which 
also assumes the antitrust function. 
In the Netherlands, a distinction is made between the supervisory activities for 
which the central bank is responsible, on the one hand, and the supervision of 
business conduct, for which the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(AFM) is responsible, on the other hand. 
The Finnish central bank established in January 2009 a new supervisory 
institution under its governance. It resulted from the merger of the Financial 
Supervision Authority (FSA) and the Insurance Supervision Authority (ISA), which was 
previously under the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
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If it is at all possible to make some assessment of the potential impact of 
different national supervisory models on the manifestation of the current financial 
crisis, it is logical to look at the example of the Member States in the Eurozone (who 
are also countries with mature, highly integrated and complex financial systems). In 
this regard, it can be concluded that despite the lack of direct evidence for a specific 
supervisory model being perfect, the most affected banking systems in Europe are 
those in the UK, Germany, Belgium – the Member States where there is a clear 
separation between micro- and macro-supervisory functions, i.e. where the micro-
supervision of individual credit / financial institutions is outside the central bank, 
which in turn is responsible for maintaining the financial stability at the financial 
system level. 
Guidelines for the development of national supervisory architectures - 
interoperability 
The network of national supervisors is characterized by two dimensions – their 
architecture and their management rules. Although there is no such concept as best 
practices in the area of supervisory architectures, it is obvious that the issue of 
coordination between the supervisors can come to the fore, given their great 
diversity, and especially considering the different management rules pertaining to the 
different architectures. 
In this regard, we can conclude that there is a change in focus from the 
national to the European level and a search for ways to achieve greater 
interoperability between national architectures and the European Supervisory 
Authorities. In this context, the evolution of the supervisory architectures should 
follow the integration of markets, especially in the financial sector, the focus being 
for the supervisors to become ever more global. 
This document is made available in accordance with 
the Creative Commons license "CC BY-NC-ND" 48 
 
 
1.7. EC proposal for the creation of a mechanism for the Eurozone banking 
supervision 
On 09.12.2012, the European Commission published a legislative proposal for 
a Council decision entrusting the European Central bank with specific tasks 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, the 
draft amendment to the existing regulation for the European Banking Authority and 
communication. 
In the EU there will be a single mechanism for banking supervision, officials 
said. The decision was taken in Brussels, finance ministers of the EU countries. One 
supervisory mechanism will be introduced by March 2014 rather than late 2013 as 
planned earlier. Final approval of the resolution will be voted at the meeting of the 
Heads of the EU. 
1.7.1. Nature of the proposal 
The explanatory memorandum to the proposal (EC, 2012) noted that in order to 
restore confidence in banks and the euro to create a bank union that is part of a long-
term vision for economic and fiscal integration. One of the key elements of the of  the  
banking  union  should  be  a  Single  Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)  with direct 
oversight of banks, to enforce prudential rules in a strict and impartial manner and 
perform effective oversight of cross border banking markets. If such a mechanism be 
created for Eurozone banks, including the ECB, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) would after a regular solution to be able to recapitalize banks directly. Ensuring 
that  banking  supervision  across  the  Euro  area  abides  by  high  common  standards  
will contribute to build the necessary trust between Member States, which is a pre-
condition for the introduction of any common backstops. 
It is noted also that the proposal - the ECB is assigned certain important 
supervisory tasks related to supervision of credit institutions, all tasks that are not 
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defined in the regulation will be the responsibility of national supervisors. The  
proposal  confers  certain  key  supervisory  tasks  necessary  for  the  supervision  of  
credit institutions  on  the  ECB,  while  all  tasks  not  spelt  out  in  the  regulation  
will  remain  the competence of national supervisors. The proposal also provides for 
the ECB to supervise financial conglomerates, the ECB will be responsible only for 
performing the tasks on the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates at 
group level, while prudential supervision of individual insurance companies will be 
conducted by competent national authorities. The project provides for the ECB to play 
a central supervisory responsibilities associated with granting and withdrawal of 
licenses of credit institutions, evaluation and authorization for the acquisition of an 
equity interest in a credit institution the right to request and collect information, the 
right to conduct inspections for compliance with regulatory requirements including 
checks "in place", the right to impose individual capital measures relating to the risks 
and measures for the implementation of early intervention and the right to supervise 
financial conglomerates Specific supervisory tasks of the ECB and to impose 
sanctions. 
1.7.2. Specific supervisory tasks of the ECB 
As indicated in the detailed description of the proposal after a transition 
period the ECB is responsible for implementation of key supervisory tasks to all credit 
institutions established in the participating Member States, regardless of their 
business model or size. The ECB will be receiving supervisor for credit institutions 
established in the participating Member States, when they open a branch or provide 
cross-border services in a participating Member State. ECB will carry out its tasks 
within the European System of Financial Supervisors and will collaborate closely with 
the three European Supervisory Authorities. EBA will retain its powers and duties in 
connection with the further development of uniform regulations and ensuring 
consistency and convergence of supervisory practices. 
ECB (EC, 2012) will have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of important 
supervisory tasks whose execution is necessary to identify the risks to the economic 
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viability of banks and require them to take appropriate action. ECB, inter alia, will be 
the competent authority for the licensing of credit institutions, assessment of the 
qualifying holding, to ensure compliance with the minimum capital requirements to 
ensure the adequacy of internal capital depending on the risk profile of the credit 
institution (Pillar 2 measures ) to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis and 
execution of supervisory tasks in relation to financial conglomerates. In addition, it 
will ensure compliance with regulations on leverage and liquidity, capital buffers will 
apply and shall, in coordination with the resolution authorities, early intervention 
measures when a bank has breached, or is about to violate regulatory capital 
requirements. For questions related to the above tasks, the ECB will coordinate and 
express the common position of the representatives in the Board of Supervisors and 
the EBA Board of the competent authorities of the Member States participating. 
It is envisaged that the ECB is a special Board of Supervisors (Supervisory 
Board), which will operate independently of the Governing Council and the key 
decisions relating to the supervision of credit institutions. It is recommended that the 
following members: four representatives of the ECB, plus one representative from 
each member state of the euro zone. The ECB has been proposed to coordinate the 
presentation of common positions in the governing bodies of the European Banking 
Authority on behalf of the member states of the Eurozone, and decisions by the 
Board of Supervisors to specify an additional internal rules. Available supervisory 
activities of the ECB to be co-financed through the charging of credit institutions, 
which will cover the costs incurred. 
1.7.3. The role of national supervisors 
Under the proposal (EC, 2012) after the establishment of a single supervisory 
mechanism national supervisors would continue to perform all the tasks not 
conferred on the ECB. For example, national supervisors will remain in charge of 
consumer protection and the fight against money laundering, and of the supervision 
of third country credit institutions establishing branches or providing cross-border 
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services within a Member State. National  supervisors  will  continue  to  play  an  
important  role  with  the  creation  of  a  Single Supervisory Mechanism.   
Also in connection with the tasks assigned to the ECB, most of the daily 
inspections and other oversight activities necessary for the preparation and execution 
of the acts of the ECB could be implemented by national supervisory authorities, 
acting as part of a supervisory mechanism. SSM covering all banks participating 
Member States, can work only on the basis of a model that combines great expertise 
at the national level. The proposal was reported that national supervisory authorities 
within the ENM in many cases are better prepared to engage in such activities 
because they are familiar with national, regional and local banking markets with local 
characteristics, have significant resources and master language and thus the ECB can 
largely rely on national authorities. Moreover, national authorities will retain some of 
its operational functions related to the verification of the received information and 
operational status monitoring of credit institutions and the preparation of proposals 
to the ECB for approval of internal models for risk assessment. 
From here these basic activities in a fixed proposal (EC, 2012), shows the 
objective necessity of accelerating the operation of supervisory processes and the 
realization of highly efficient single supervisory mechanism. 
1.7.4. Opportunities for Bulgaria's participation in a supervisory 
mechanism 
Bulgaria supports the idea of creating a single European banking supervision 
mechanism, said (Djankov, 2012) Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Simeon 
Djankov. "This is a big step in and correct the single financial market and the 
development of the single market Only the Eurozone." He stressed, however, that the 
realization of the idea still needs to be cleaned much controversy. To enter into force, 
the Commission's proposal must be approved by all 27 member states (before July 
2013), and 17 countries of the Eurozone will be required, and the remaining 10 
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countries, among which Bulgaria will be able to choose whether to join. Among the 
EU countries is still no consensus on the issue, despite the obvious interest of the 
member states for progress. In the words of Minister Djankov evidenced held during 
the two-day informal meeting (September 2012) of finance ministers and central 
bank governors of the EU in Cyprus - a total of 4 formal and informal meetings on this 
topic.  
A serious contradiction cited by the BNB Governor Ivan Iskrov while held on 
June 27, 2012 Round Table on "The stability of the banking system - a prerequisite for 
sustainable economic growth," is that non-euro countries have no access to financial 
assistance for banks. The idea is that a single monitoring and increasing the powers of 
the ECB will allow it to directly inject funds permanent Eurozone bailout fund (the 
European stabilization mechanism, ESM) in need of help banks, but which banks 
outside the monetary union no access . In the words of Minister Djankov But for the 
most part the banking system in Bulgaria anyway fall under the general supervision 
because three quarters of the financial institutions are part of a major European 
financial groups that will be included in a single device. According to the Finance 
Minister, "the introduction of the single banking supervision will not be a problem for 
banks in Bulgaria" and the country is in a relatively good position, especially given the 
fact that the Bank has a very positive experience in the past 15 years in dealing with 
crisis situations. 
The EC proposal includes a mechanism Member States outside the euro area 
to cooperate closely (close cooperation) with the supervisory activities of the ECB, 
adopt unilateral application and enforcement of supervisory measures adopted by 
the ECB. For Bulgaria, this possibility does not seem reasonable at this stage as it will 
bind unilateral activity of the supervisory authority in the decisions of the ECB, 
without thereby ensuring sufficient interests of depositors and taxpayers, through 
access to ECB refinancing operations and the total mechanism for capital support 
through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Envisaged in the project attended 
by a representative of the national supervisory authority of the Member State which 
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entered the mechanism of cooperation with the ECB, the Board of Supervisors of the 
ECB does not guarantee sufficient protection of the national interest in making 
collective decisions of this body. Countries outside the Eurozone, that will  join the 
mechanism under the regime of close cooperation, transfer key supervisory powers 
to the ECB but will not have access to the ECB liquidity facility and to ESM. 
1.7.6. Changes in regulation for the European Banking Authority 
EC initiative includes a proposal for changes in the regulation of the activities 
of EBA. In this proposal noted that the creation of the European Banking Authority 
and the European System of Financial Supervisors e help to improve the cooperation 
between national supervisors and the development of a single regulatory framework 
for financial services in the EU. However, since the banking crisis up to now there are 
failures in oversight that led to a significant decline in confidence in the EU banking 
sector and contributed to increasing tensions in the markets for sovereign debt in 
the Eurozone. 
The proposal involves only modification of procedures by which act EBA, to 
reflect the assignment of supervisory tasks of the ECB and to ensure that the EBA can 
continue to fulfill its obligations to protect the integrity, efficiency and orderly 
functioning of the internal market for financial services and to maintain the stability 
of the financial system within the domestic market. It does not change the balance of 
powers between the relevant national authorities and the EBA. The provisions in the 
proposal do not go beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the objectives 
pursued. The proposal therefore complies with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. The most 
important changes are associated with the required voting majority decision by the 
Board of Supervisors. Qualified majority required for a decision by the Board of 
Supervisors for approval EBA technical standards, guidelines and oversight is 
maintained. 
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1.8. General conclusions for the improvement of the regulation and 
supervision of financial markets  
The following conclusions may be drawn from the survey and analysis carried 
out: 
The allocation of supervisory responsibilities is determined mainly by the 
structure of the financial market, the weight of individual sectors, their degree of 
integration and their significance in terms of system stability. 
The integration of supervisions does not necessarily lead to increased 
effectiveness of the supervisory process. Indeed, in the case of the unified 
supervisory structures, the integration of different areas often is superficial. The 
internal separation remains, and this hampers the increase of efficiency and creates 
possibilities for inconsistent policy on the part of the institution as a whole. 
In developed economies, regardless of the adopted supervisory architectures, 
there is no single authority which consolidates all regulatory and supervisory powers. 
In the smaller EU countries we see a consolidation of the regulatory function, 
banking supervision and maintenance of financial stability within the central bank, 
as the bank institutions have a major share of the assets in the financial market. 
As the financial crisis unfolds there seems to be a new trend towards 
strengthening the supervisory powers of the central bank in terms of systemic risk 
and financial stability and in terms of banking supervision. 
The unsuccessful attempts to strengthen the international coordination and 
cooperation through voluntary mechanisms require the establishment of a new 
system of European financial supervision to coordinate and facilitate the activities of 
national supervisory and regulatory authorities. 
With the integration of the financial markets, the focus changes from the 
national to the European level and the evolution of the supervisory architectures 
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should follow this integration. The aim is to achieve greater interoperability 
between national architectures and the European Supervisory Authorities. 
Implications for Bulgaria 
The current structure of supervisory institutions in Bulgaria meets the 
modern requirements for effective financial supervision. The allocation of 
supervisory responsibilities between the BNB and the FSC has a strong justification 
related to the structure of the Bulgarian financial market where banks have a 
leading role with a share of over 90% of the assets in the financial market. An 
additional positive characteristic is that both institutions have the right to issue 
regulations, which ensures the efficiency of the regulatory process. 
The structure of the Bulgarian financial market is not integrated across its 
segments, and is influenced by the dominant presence of large European bank and 
financial groups. From the perspective of maintaining financial stability it is a 
priority that Bulgarian supervisory architecture be synchronized vertically with the 
supervisory structures at the European level.  
The Bulgarian supervisory system gains additional stability through its 
Đoŵpatiďility ǁith the Laŵfalussy ŵodel aŶd ǁith the Ŷeǁ de Larosière struĐture. 
This fact is crucial for the effective interaction of the BNB and the FSC with the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the three supervisors in the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), especially in crisis situations. 
The main conclusion of the study is that regulation and supervision are key for 
achieving the necessary transformation of the banking system in the European Union. 
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Chapter II - NETWORK APPROACH FOR ANALYZING THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
The application of the network approach to the financial system may be the 
key for finding solutions to the global crisis. There is a growing consensus in the 
economic literature for recognition of the impact of network structures on many 
social and financial activities. Using the theory of networks, one can improve the 
functioning of the financial systems. The application of Network approach to the 
financial systems is especially important in assessing financial stability. For example, 
the resilience of a banking system to shocks can be evaluated according to the 
network structure that connects the financial institutions. The European regulatory 
bodies – the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System of Financial 
Supervisors are network elements at the EU level. The inclusion of these structures 
and the banking system in a single framework will form a complex multilevel system, 
called network of networks, where its characteristics are the synergetic result of the 
relevant characteristics of their constituents, so it acquires qualitatively new 
properties impossible to be achieved by its individual parts alone – it achieves greater 
viability and operational efficiency. 
The aim is to achieve effective organizational and operational transformation 
in order to ensure sustainability and viability of the system of financial institutions in 
case of failure of some of its units. 
We already know that the banking system is a highly interconnected and 
complex structure. To reveal its behavior, it is most appropriate to apply a network 
model. We are applying a contagion model simulation, which shows us the reactions 
of the system when a shock is introduced – its resilience and fragility. We find that 
depending on the level of network integrity and the structure of the individual banks, 
a shock could be absorbed or could lead to near collapse of the whole system. 
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2.1 Network simulation approach 
For a better analysis of the financial stability of a system we should first take a 
look at its structure. The financial markets are largely integrated complex network 
stƌuĐtuƌes.à IŶà theàŶeǆtà Đhapteƌàǁeàǁillà Đallà theŵà͞eĐoŶoŵiĐà iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe͟.à “oà ità isà
most appropriate to use a network approach when describing the banking market. 
This market is composed of a number of banks connected by interbank linkages (debt 
or equity exposures). 
For safeguarding and maintaining the stability of this economic infrastructure, 
first we have to find the answer to the question: what is the behavior of the banking 
system in a crisis situation? Theƌeà aƌeàŵaŶǇà faĐtoƌsà affeĐtiŶgà theà ďaŶkiŶgà sǇsteŵ͛sà
behavior but we will focus on one of the main sources for systemic risk – the 
interbank connections. 
There are significant network analyses applied to credit networks (Gatti et al., 
2010; Krznar, 2009; Toivanen, 2009). In this regard, the theory of financial contagion 
has been noted, originally proposed by Allen & Gale (2001) about the network model 
of the interbank market. Further studies on this market include (Freixas et al., 2000; 
Furfine, 2003; Boss et al., 2004; Iori et al., 2006; Nier et al., 2008) and on the 
corporate sector: (Boissay, 2006; Battiston et al, 2007). 
As highlighted in (Nier et al., 2008) the systemic risk has focused the attention 
of the central banks, which are required to protect the overall financial stability. 
A significant research on systemic bank default has been done by Demirguc-
Kunt & Detragiache (2002) and Barth, Caprio & Levine (2006), but relatively little 
research has been done on how the structure of the banking system can influence 
susceptibility to systemic default. 
While exploring this area, Nier, Yorulmazer & Alentorn (2008) focused their 
attention on the role of direct interbank connections as a source of systemic risk and 
explore potential chain defaults caused by these exposures. The study (Nier et al., 
2008) also notes the fact that many authors like Sheldon & Maurer (1998), Furfine 
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(1999), Upper & Worms (2004), Wells (2002), Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner 
(2004) examine the financial stability on the basis of empirical studies on the 
importance of interbank connections. However, these studies fail to take account of 
key parameters such as the capital of the institutions, the size of interbank exposures 
and the connectivity and concentration in terms of the stability of the banking 
system. 
Barre et Al. (2012) focus their attention on the analysis of the destabilizing role 
of interbank network relations through the perspective of the effect of the risk 
management practices like securitization. 
Following Eboli (2004), Nier, Yorulmazer and Alentorn consider the banking 
sǇsteŵàasàaàŶetǁoƌkàofàĐoƌes,àǁheƌeàeaĐhàĐoƌeà isàaàďaŶkàaŶdàeaĐhà liŶkà isà̌à leŶdiŶgà
relationship between two cores. The banking system needs to meet certain 
constraints on the balance sheet indicators, at both the bank and the system levels. 
Following the architectural and structural approach taken in the thesis, we 
apply the above methodology of Nier, Yorulmazer and Alentorn and unfold the 
application of the simulation model describing the network of banks related through 
debt exposures. Initially, to facilitate the model at this stage, we assume the 
existence of a homogeneous banking system, i.e. the banks are randomly connected 
to each other and each bank has an equal chance to be connected to any other bank. 
2.2 Modeling the banking system 
 
We are constructing a random graph with predefined number of nodes (banks) 
N, which have lent to one another with probability of p. So pij is the probability that 
bank i has lent to bank j. So if we use p=0.2 this means that we will have 20% 
interconnected graph with N nodes. The number of connections will be equal to Z = 
N*(N-1)*0.2. 
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Chart 2.1 - Simulation model interface – written on Microsoft Visual C# Express. 
The next thing to do is to fill the balance sheets of all banks. 
We denote the individual bank assets by a. So ai = ei + ii where e is the external 
assets i.e. loans and other investments to non-bank counterparties, and i denotes the 
interbank assets, i.e. exposures to other banks in the system. 
On the other side of the balance sheet we have the liabilities, denoted by li,  
so li = ci + di + bi, where ci is the capital of bank i, di are the deposits (from non-bank 
customers) of bank i, and bi denotes the borrowings (from other banks) of bank i. As 
every balance sheet, ai = li. The interbank assets i of one bank are the borrowings b of 
another – these linkages will be used as a shock transmitting channel. 
WeàgeŶeƌateàtheàďaŶks͛àďalaŶĐeàsheetsàďǇàstaƌtiŶgàǁithàtheàeǆteƌŶalàassetsàofà
the banking system as a whole (E). Then we choose the percentage of the external 
assets in the total assets of the banking system (A). The proportion is E/A. Knowing 
that A = E + I, where I is the total interbank assets in the system and having E and E/A 
as an input, we can find A and I.   A = E / (E/A) and I = A – E. 
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Now, knowing the total size of the interbank exposures, we calculate the 
weight of each link by dividing I to the total number of links: link = Ii / Z. From there 
ǁeàĐaŶàfiŶdàtheàiŶdiǀidualàďaŶk͛sàiŶteƌďaŶkàassetsàaŶdàďoƌƌoǁiŶgsàďǇàŵultiplǇiŶgà link 
to the number of outgoing and incoming connections to each node (bank) in the 
graph. 
To find the external assets e we use a two-step approach. We know that the 
assets side should be equal to the liabilities side: ei + ii = bi + ci + di. So, to have 
positive capital and deposits we need ei + ii  bi. First we take eint + ii = bi, where eint is 
the interim value of the external assets of a bank. On the second step we distribute 
the remaining external assets equally to each bank: ei = eint + (E- eint)/N. 
Theà ďaŶk͛sà Đapitalà c isà setà asà aà peƌĐeŶtageà ofà theà ďaŶk͛sà assetsà ;ci/ai). This 
proportion is an input to the model and it is close to the supervisory capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR): ci = (ei + ii)*(ci/ai). 
The final balance sheet item – deposits – fills the remaining gap in the 
liabilities side: 
di = ei + ii – bi – ci. 
So initially we construct theàŵodel͛sà ďaŶkiŶgà sǇsteŵà ďǇà usiŶgà theà folloǁiŶgà
inputs: 
N – number of banks; 
p – probability of connection (between 0 and 1; 0 means that no bank has 
connections to other banks; 1 means that each bank has connections to all other 
banks); 
E – total external assets of the system; 
E/A – peƌĐeŶtageàofàtheàsǇsteŵ͛sàeǆteƌŶalàassetsàtoàtheàsǇsteŵ͛sàtotalàassets; 
ci/ai – peƌĐeŶtageàofàtheàďaŶk͛sàĐapitalàtoàtheàtotalàďaŶk͛sàassets. 
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2.2.1 Shock simulation 
The shock that we simulate is individual, hitting one bank at a time. Although 
most of the external shocks would affect several or all banks simultaneously (like a 
credit risk), hitting one bank (which is common for operational risks) will give us a 
clear view of the knock-on effect of the shock, transmitted throughout the system. At 
this stage of the model, the shock affects theàďaŶks͛àsolǀeŶĐǇàaŶdàǁeàassuŵeàpeƌfeĐtà
liquidity, i.e. the shocked bank could sell all its remaining assets without any price 
reduction and repay its obligations up to the amount of assets in disposition, as well 
as perfect information symmetry, i.e. excluding the information contagion effect. 
Both liquidity and information effects could amplify the simulated contagion in the 
paper. 
The shock reduces by certain percent the external assets of the bank, showing 
that the initial shock is external to the system. Further, the shock is transmitted 
through the interbank assets and borrowings of the banks, internalizing the shock to 
the system. When the shock is introduced to the banks, the capital is the first to 
absorb the losses: s – c, where s is the size of the shock. If the shock is greater than 
the capital s > c then the bank defaults and the borrowings are the next to absorb the 
losses: s – c – b. If the shock is big enough to wipe out all borrowings, the final 
absorber is the customer deposits: s – c – b – d. The amount of the shock transmitted 
to the banks to which the shocked banks have links is limited to the amount of the 
borrowings (Chart.2.2.). So if the shoĐkàĐouldàďeàaďsoƌďedàďǇàtheàďaŶks͛àďoƌƌoǁiŶgs,à
the transmitted shock would be s – c. If it is bigger than the borrowings, the 
transmitted shock would be the whole amount of b. Theà shoĐkà foƌà theà ďaŶk͛sà
neighbors depends on the link weight (size of each interbank exposure), but since all 
links in the model at this stage have the same weight, we will be calculating the shock 
simply by dividing the shock to be transmitted by the number of incoming links (the 
number of banks which have lent to the shocked bank) snew = (s – c) / k, where snew is 
the shock to be transmitted to one of the creditor banks and k is the number of 
creditor banks. The banks from the second round effect first absorb the shock by 
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their capital and if it is not enough – with their borrowings, and distribute further 
shock along the connecting links. This procedure is repeated until there are no new 
defaulted banks. 
 
Chart 2.2 – Shock absorption and transmission 
For each simulation we change one of the parameters within certain limits. 
When the graph representing the banking system is random, we make 100 runs with 
the same setting but with a newly generated graph and calculate the average number 
of defaults for all the iterations, and then we change the step and make again 100 
iterations and so on. By so doing we avoid a biased result if the randomly generated 
graph isolates the shocked bank by making strange connections pattern. 
First we will see how the size of the shock is affecting the banking system. This 
means to what extend the banking system is resilient to certain amount of shock, 
transmitted through the interbank linkages. The size of the shock is measured by 
percentage of the external assets of the initially shocked bank. 
We use the following fixed values for the model parameters: N = 10; p = 20%; E 
= 100 000; E/A = 70%; c/a = 5%; and we change the shock between 10% and 100%. 
2.2.2 Simulation results 
While increasing the shock, the extent of contagion is also increasing to a 
certain point where the shock is distributed to enough banks so it could be absorbed. 
This mechanism depends on the level of bank interconnectedness. In a more 
connected banking system the contagion effect is greater (Charts 2.3a and 2.3b). 
Nevertheless, the contagion pattern is different: while the shock is relatively small, 
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the more connected network is absorbing the shock better as it is distributing small 
fractions of the shock to many neighbors. But after a certain point the effect of 
contagion is prevailing over the effect of diversification and the contagion sequence 
rolls over. After a certain point of saturation the increase in the size of the shock is 
not provoking additional failures because the shock is distributed to sufficiently many 
nodes in the system. 
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Chart 2.3a – Defaults by size of shock and connection probability 
 
Chart 2.3b – Defaults by size of shock and connection probability 
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The change in the level of concentration in the banking system is giving us a 
similar effect as the increase in its interconnectedness. We compare two systems, 
with 10 and 30 banks. By having more banks we acquire more linkages and greater 
possibility of contagion (Chart 2.3c.). Despite this similarity we have different levels of 
saturation, so when we have more banks in the system, the absolute number of 
banks affected by the contagion effect will be higher, but as a percent of the total 
number of banks we will have lower default levels. 
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Chart 2.3c – Defaults by size of shock and number of banks 
The different capital levels also strongly affect the contagion behavior. When 
the banks have fewer capital buffers they are more prone to contagion (Chart 2.3d). 
This could be due to a riskier business model or due to previous shocks which 
affected certain or all banks in the system. 
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Chart 2.3d – Defaults by size of shock, connection probability and size of capital 
Theà poƌtfolioà stƌuĐtuƌeà ofà theà ďaŶks͛à assetsà alsoà affects their contagion 
sensitivity. A banking system with more interbank exposures and less exposures to 
non-financial entities will have lesser chance for external shock (and initially the 
effect of diversification will be stronger), but the higher weight of the interbank 
linkages allows them to transmit more stress to their neighbors in the system, and in 
a situation with a higher size of the initial shock, the number of defaults will be also 
higher (Chart 2.3e). 
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Chart 2.3e – Defaults by size of shock, connection probability and size of 
external assets 
From Charts 2.4a and 2.4b we can clearly see that the capital buffers play 
ĐƌuĐialàƌoleàiŶàtheàďaŶks͛àstaďilitǇ.àTheàƌelatioŶshipàďetǁeeŶàtheàĐapitalàleǀelsàaŶdàtheà
contagion effect is clearly negative. When the capital is set to 1%, almost all of the 
ďaŶksàfail,àďutàasàtheàĐapitalàiŶĐƌeases,àtheàĐoŶtagioŶàeffeĐtàďeĐoŵesàǁeakeƌ.àáfteƌà̌à
certain level of capital the banks are resilient to interbank contagion because the 
shock is distributed to sufficiently large number of banks, and only the initially 
shocked bank fails. The contagion behavior is affected also by the level of interbank 
connections. A less connected network could initially suffer less damage from an 
external shock as the contagion paths are fewer, but on the other hand, if the shock 
spreads, the system will need more capital to absorb the losses. A highly 
interconnected system has greater chances of contagion but the more links it has, the 
more the effect of diversification is prevailing so the banks could absorb the shock 
with less capital needed. The lower level of capital could be explained by riskier 
business models, by previous shocks which affected certain or all banks in the system, 
or by moral-hazard behavior in a situation where the government has announced 
explicit engagement to bail out any troubled bank. 
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Chart 2.4a – Defaults by size of capital and connection probability 
 
 
Chart 2.4b – Defaults by size of capital and connection probability 
The effect of the portfolio structure is shown on Chart 2.5. Initially, when the 
interbank assets prevail, the effect of diversification is stronger than the effect of 
contagion. By increasing the external assets we increase the size of the potential 
shock and thus the number of defaults goes up. At certain point the level of interbank 
exposure goes low enough, the system is practically disintegrated, the shocked bank 
stays isolated and the contagion mechanism becomes ineffective. 
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Chart 2.5 – Defaults by size of external assets 
The structure of the banking network has an important role in defining the 
contagion behavior. We have a reversed u-turned curve (Charts 2.6a and 2.6b). While 
the system is practically not integrated (the probability of connection is 0%), the 
shock cannot spread and only the shocked bank fails. With the increase of 
interconnectedness the contagion effect also increases to the point where we have 
enough connections so that the diversification effect could outweigh the contagion 
by distributing the shock to sufficiently high number of banks. We can see that a 
complete system (with high enough probability of connection) is capable of absorbing 
the shock and again only the initial bank fails. The threshold (the equilibrium between 
the contagioŶàaŶdàdiǀeƌsifiĐatioŶàeffeĐtsͿàdepeŶdsàoŶàtheàďaŶks͛àpƌofiles.àáàďaŶkiŶgà
system with fewer buffers (for example capital) will suffer higher damage in terms of 
failed banks because a greater amount of shock will be transmitted between the 
banks and the system will need a higher level of interbank linkages to survive and 
absorb the shock. We can draw the conclusion that the lower level of capital or other 
buffers increases the destructive power of the interbank linkages, and in a banking 
system with more capital buffers, the interbank linkages will be more shock-
absorbers and less shock-transmitters, thus improving the system resilience. 
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Chart 2.6a. – Defaults by connection probability and size of capital 
 
Chart 2.6b. – Defaults by connection probability and size of capital 
Mark-to-market accounting 
So far we have made all simulations under the assumption of perfect market 
liquidity. Now we will introduce the liquidity effect described by the elasticity of the 
assets͛à pƌiĐeà toà theà assetsà salesà aŶdà theà ŵaƌk-to-market accounting effect to the 
ďaŶks͛à ďalaŶĐeà sheetà aĐĐouŶts.à UŶdeƌà theà Ŷeǁà fƌaŵeǁoƌkà theà assets͛à pƌiĐeà isà
decreasing with the same proportion as the assets sold on the market compared to 
the total assets in the system. We are introducing a coefficient elasticity, which is 
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affecting the magnitude of the liquidity effect. Value of 0 means no liquidity effect or 
perfectly inelastic asset price (perfect liquidity), and 1 means full liquidity effect or 
unitary elasticity of the asset price. 
% of change in assets price = 1 – elasticity * (asold / A) 
By introducing the mark-to-ŵaƌketàaĐĐouŶtiŶgàpƌiŶĐiple,àtheàďaŶks͛àassetsàaƌeà
revaluated on each simulation cycle, taking into account the current market price of 
the assets. This means that when a bank defaults it sells all its remaining assets and 
exerts pƌessuƌeàoŶà theàassets͛àpƌiĐes.à IŶàpaƌallelàǁithà that,à theàďalaŶĐeàsheetsàofàallà
other remaining banks are revaluated and the amount of assets is decreased in 
accordance with the new prices. The effect of the mark-to-market accounting 
principle is that it brings additional shock to the system, weakening all the banks. This 
shock cumulates over the balance sheet contagion effect and amplifies it. 
The contagion profile with mark-to-market accounting resembles the 
contagion profile of a less capitalized banking system (Chart.2.7.). We have a higher 
number of defaulted banks in any configuration of the network (level of 
interconnectedness of the graph). 
 
 Chart 2.7. – Defaults by probability of connection and liquidity effect 
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Under this effect we are witnessing earlier defaults even when the shock is 
relatively small (Chart.2.8.). The diversification effect starts prevailing on a later 
stage, i.e. the banking system needs more interbank linkages to distribute the shock 
to a sufficiently large number of banks so that the contagion effect could be 
overcome. 
 
Chart 2.8 – Defaults by size of shock, probability of connection and liquidity 
effect 
With the same level of initial shock the banking system needs more capital to 
withstand the contagion sequence. The liquidity effect is causing higher defaults 
levels in equally capitalized banking systems (Chart.2.9.). 
 
 Chart 2.9 – Defaults by probability of connection, size of capital and liquidity 
effect 
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Systemic events 
All the simulations so far have been made by initially shocking one bank. 
Nevertheless, most external shocks would affect several or all banks simultaneously. 
In the model we are introducing the ability to shock several banks at the beginning of 
the simulation. The contagion profile shows how vulnerable and fragile a banking 
system is (Chart.2.10). We see that by increasing the number of initially shocked 
banks we get a stronger contagion effect (wider contagion area). This is mainly due to 
the greater shock, introduced to the system. To withstand a systemic shock the 
banking system needs to be better capitalized and more interconnected. 
 
 Chart 2.10. – Defaults by probability of connection, size of capital and number 
of shocked banks 
To better reveal the behavior of the banking network, we are conducting a 
similar simulation, but this time maintaining a relatively identical size of the shock in 
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the different scenarios i.e. increasing the number of initially shocked banks while 
decreasing the shock size for each bank. We can see a slight increase in the contagion 
area (Chart.2.11) due to the fact that the initial shock is spread to more banks and 
thus we have more contagion channels. By further increasing the number of initially 
shocked banks, the relative size of the shock for each bank is getting smaller and we 
see a new three-staged contagion profile. First, when the banks have lower capital 
buffers, the contagion effect works and we have high number of defaults. At some 
poiŶt,à ďǇà iŶĐƌeasiŶgà theà ďaŶks͛à Đapital,à theàeffeĐtà ofà diǀeƌsifiĐatioŶà staƌtsà pƌeǀailiŶgà
and the number of defaults is limited only to the initially shocked banks. By further 
increasing the capital level, having in mind that with a high number of initially 
shocked banks the size of the shock is relatively small, the banks are getting able to 
withstand the shock and the system scores no defaults. 
 
Chart 2.11 – Defaults by probability of connection, size of capital and number 
of shocked banks, maintaining fixed shock size 
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By introducing the mark-to-market accounting principle we see again a new 
contagion profile. By increasing the number of shocked banks while holding the total 
size of shock identical, this time the contagion area expands rapidly (Chart.2.12). The 
liquidity effect amplifies the contagion effect. With greater number of initially 
shocked banks we do not observe the three-staged profile anymore. Instead of that, 
having lower interconnectivity, the number of defaults increases gradually while the 
banks are getting less capitalized. In a higher interconnected network the transition is 
more rapid – we observe a certain break point where the banks can no longer 
withstand the initial shock and the contagion effect is leading to a rapid system 
breakdown. 
 
Chart 2.12 – Defaults by probability of connection, size of capital and number 
of shocked banks, maintaining fixed shock size and including the liquidity effect 
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2.2.3 Ways for improving the network approach for ensuring stability and 
efficiency of the banking system 
Until recently, the banking system was considered as a set of financial 
institutions competing in a specific market – the banking market. In this respect, their 
role was not considered different from any other market player on the financial and 
non-financial markets. When a bank fails, the law provides protection to the creditors 
and in most cases to those who have entrusted their money to the banks – the 
depositors. But the crisis has shown us that the disturbance occurring in the financial 
market is rapidly transmitted to the rest of the economy. All entities relying on the 
ďaŶks͛àseƌǀiĐesàfoƌàĐoŶduĐtiŶgàtheiƌàďusiŶessesàaƌeàalsoàaffeĐtedàadǀeƌselǇ.àTheàsoĐialà
function of the banks comes into focus - their role as financial intermediaries in the 
economy. The significance of this function is increasing more and more. The banking 
system can be seen as a meta-infrastructure. It is the economic infrastructure 
connecting the market participants in the economy and facilitating the processes of 
financial resources transformation. 
Banks are: regular economic agents  or       key intermediaries in the economy
Banking market is: set of banks                     or             interconnected system
(economic infrastructure)
Protection in creditors, employees        or        all stakeholders, including
bed times: consumers of financial cervices
dependant from the functioning of
the financial network
 
Chart 2.13 – Today’s ďanks 
The financial markets are largely integrated, but the institutions responsible 
for their supervision and safeguarding the financial stability remain divided along the 
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national lines. Banking markets are complex network structures. Studies on the 
stability of financial systems (Allen 2000, Nier 2008) used the assumption that the 
participants are equal, and the distribution of links is a random – Chart 2.14(a). 
Studies on economic networks (as are the banking/financial markets) show that their 
structure is considerably more complex (Lewis, 2009). These networks have the 
characteristics of scale-free networks
10
 and small-world networks
11
. There can be 
observed a higher level of clustering, where some nodes called "hubs" have much 
more connections than others. Hubs in the banking system are the systematically 
important banks. Scale-free networks are networks whose degree of distribution 
follows a power law – the probability of a node to make connection to other nodes 
depends on the number of connections, which it owns. On the other hand the radius 
of the network – the number of hops/links between the two most distant nodes, is 
relatively small (small world effect) – Chart.2.14(b). 
 
  a) Random network      b) scale-free network 
Chart 2.14 - Types of networks 
                                                   
10
 A scale-free network is a connected graph or network with the property that the number of links 
originating from a given node exhibits a power law distribution. A scale-free network can be constructed by 
progressively adding nodes to an existing network and introducing links to existing nodes with preferential 
attachment so that the probability of linking to a given node is proportional to the number of existing links that 
node has. 
11
 Taking a connected graph or network with a high graph diameter and adding a very small number of 
edges randomly, the diameter tends to drop drastically. This is known as the small world phenomenon. It is 
sometimes also known as "six degrees of separation" since, in the social network of the world, any person turns 
out to be linked to any other person by roughly six connections. 
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2.2.4 Network model results using scale-free networks 
In order to bring the simulation closer to reality we modeled a banking system, 
based on a scale-free network. For this purpose we implemented the Barabasi–Albert 
algorithm for generating random scale-free networks using a preferential attachment 
mechanism
12
. The scale-free banking system is prone to stronger contagion effect 
and the number of defaults rises sharply due to the presence of hubs (Chart.2.15.). 
We can observe a less smooth contagion profile reaching higher number of defaults, 
showing us the fragility of the financial networks. On the other hand, while increasing 
the interconnectedness of the system, the defaults are dropping more rapidly than 
those in a random network. 
The overall contagion profile of the scale-free network looks sharper and 
reaches a higher number of defaults in all system configurations in terms of capital 
levels (Chart.2.16.), especially when the network is less connected. Upon increasing 
the interconnectedness of the network, the contagion profile is starting to resemble 
the random network profile, due to the fact that, by increasing the connections, the 
structure of the graph is gradually losing its scale-free characteristics, turning into a 
complete graph at the end. 
                                                   
12
 Preferential attachment means that the more connected a node is, the more likely it is to receive 
new links. Nodes with higher degree have stronger ability to grab links added to the network.  
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Chart 2.15 – Contagion profile – number of defaults by probability of 
connection 
 
 Chart 2.16. - Contagion profile – number of defaults by probability of 
connection and size of capital 
2.2.5. Simulation model results for Network protection strategies 
In our simulation model we introduced and tested three protection strategies: 
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The first consists of proportional allocation of bail-out funds to the banks. This 
strategy resembles a theoretical government bail-outà pƌogƌaŵà ǁheƌeà theà ďaŶks͛à
capital is increased. 
The second one is a derivate of the first, but the bail-out funds are allocated 
only to the biggest banks (the hubs). 
Theà thiƌdà stƌategǇà isà Đalledà ͞toǆiĐà ďaŶk͟à aŶdà ƌeseŵďlesà aà theoƌetiĐalà
government bail-out program, where there is a special institution buying the troubled 
assets from the banks while applying certain discount ratio. For better comparison 
we are using an identical budget amount for all strategies. 
We can see that the different strategies affect the contagion profile in a 
different aspect (Chart.2.17.). Theà ͞pƌopoƌtioŶalà alloĐatioŶ͟à stƌategy reduces 
significantly the number of defaulted banks when the shock to the initial bank is 
ŵodeƌate.àTheà͞huďsàalloĐatioŶ͟àstƌategǇàgiǀesàaŶàoǀeƌallàloǁeƌàŶuŵďeƌàofàdefaultedà
banks. Nevertheless, this strategy is more effective when we have a full-scale shock. 
Theà ͞toǆiĐà ďaŶk͟à stƌategǇà tuƌŶsà outà toà ďeà theà ŵostà effeĐtiǀe.à Ità giǀesà theà loǁestà
number of defaulted banks, independently of the shock size, because this strategy is 
the most flexible – the funds are allocated on a case-by-case basis covering only the 
tƌouďledàďaŶks.àDepeŶdiŶgàoŶàtheàƌegulatoƌs͛àoƌàgoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛sàpoliĐǇàaŶdàtheàďudgetà
limits, a different discount ratio could be applied while buying toxic assets from the 
banks. 
Irrespective of their effectiveness and characteristics, all the strategies are 
bound with the same budget limits and when the shock gets big enough they cannot 
save the system entirely (Chart.2.17.). If the funds limit is not sufficient to cope with 
the shock scale, these strategies can only postpone the system breakdown and give 
enough time for the economists and politicians to engage in more serious reforms. 
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Chart 2.17 – Contagion profile after protection strategies – defaults by size of 
shock. 
Looking at the overall contagion profiles of the different strategies, we can 
ŶotiĐeàthatàtheà͞pƌopoƌtioŶalàalloĐatioŶ͟àstƌategǇàisàŵoƌeàeffeĐtiǀeàǁheŶàtheàsǇsteŵà
is significantly undercapitalized (Chart.2.18.). This is due to the fact that the strategy 
increases directlǇà theà Đapitalà ďaseà ofà theà ďaŶksà iŶà theà sǇsteŵ.à Theà ͞toǆiĐà ďaŶk͟à
strategy is more effective with moderately capitalized banks because it reduces the 
toxic portfolios without affecting their capital. 
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Chart 2.18 - Contagion profile after protection strategies – number of defaults 
by probability of connection and size of capital 
2.3. Conclusions from the use of network models for analysis of the 
banking system 
1) The simulation model developed using graphs and algorithms for economic 
parameters calculation and the propagation wave of the shock in the banking 
system show an adequate behavior in the sense that the simulation results are 
easily explicable in terms of parameters and financial and economic 
dependencies. The model shows that the behavior of a banking network is 
predictable and there are a limited number of influence parameters that are 
measurable and even controllable. The model reveals that the stability of the 
sǇsteŵà depeŶdsà Ŷotà oŶlǇà oŶà theà iŶdiǀidualà ďaŶk͛sà staďilitǇ,à ďutà alsoà oŶà theà
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intensity and the size of interbank linkages, i.e. how integrated the banking 
market is.  
2) The results obtained show that the implementation of the network approach 
to the banking system offers interesting opportunities for reorganizing its 
structure and predicting its response in crisis situations. This would contribute 
toà theà fiŶaŶĐialà sǇsteŵà tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶà ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdedà iŶà ϮϬϬϵà ďǇà theà ͞la 
‘osiğƌe͟à gƌoup,à aŶdà foƌà theà estaďlishment of a new system for European 
financial regulation and strengthening the cooperation and coordination 
between national supervisors. 
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Chapter III - THE PLACE OF BULGARIA IN THE TRANSITION 
TOWARDS THE SINGLE EUROPEAN BANKING MARKET 
Bank assessment is often conducted using information on realized profits, but 
excluding such indicators as efficiency
13
 and quality of the final product/service. The 
most used analytical method is the quantitative analysis of the financial indicators 
and financial ratios analysis (for example the CAMELS
14
 model and others). These 
techniques result in a variety of types of outcomes, which brings the need for further 
calculation and interpretation for deriving an overall assessment indicator. 
For analyzing the development of the banking system it is necessary to take 
into account its efficiency as one of the main indicators. In this process of 
development significant contributions are the privatization, foreign banks entry, 
competition, liberalization, change in legislative environment and institutional rules, 
technologies and new knowledge, changes in the macroeconomic environment and 
others. Computing the efficiency scores for Bulgaria allows us to make comparison 
with other banking systems. 
In the recent years numerous comparative analyses of particular banks and 
banking systems in the EU Member States as well as in the developing countries have 
been carried out. These researches use parametric and non-parametric methods for 
assessment (Daniel Hollo, Marton Nagi, 2002) and Stochastic frontier approach 
(Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002). With these tools one can measure the influence of 
privatization processes on bank performance (Bonin, Hasan and Wachel, 2004a, 
2004b; Athanasoglou et al., 2006) and the influence of foreign banks entry and 
foreign ownership with controlling power on bank efficiency (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 
                                                   
13
 Comparison between the actual and optimal values of input and output parameters. The different 
types of efficiency reflect different definitions of the optimum. 
14
 Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity (CAMELS) - A rating system 
for the bank's overall condition. The CAMELS rating is based on financial statements of the bank and 
conclusions form on-site examinations, conducted by the supervisory authorities. Usually these ratings are not 
public. 
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2006). It is very useful to calculate certain aspects of the banking efficiency, such as: 
operational efficiency (Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Tomova, Nenovsky and Naneva, 
2004; Tomova, 2005), inefficiency (average X-inefficiency
15
, average profit-
inefficiency
16
 or average technological inefficiency
17
), technical efficiency
17
 (Nenkova 
and Tomova, 2003). A significant part of these researches outlines the direct relation 
between the efficiency and the acceleration of the convergence processes in the 
Single European Financial Market. 
In this sense the task here is to analyze the development of the Bulgarian 
banking market, the influence of the entry of the bigger European banks into the 
local market as a form of bank integration, and the comparison of the Bulgarian 
banking system efficiency with the aggregated efficiency of the Single EU financial 
market for determining the degree and the speed of the integration processes. As a 
main instrument we will use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The calculations 
will be performed in two steps - with pre-crisis data and on the second step with data 
up to 2012 year end. The reason is to minimize the distortion effect which the 
different EU and national stimulus packages, activated after the beginning of the 
crisis, could impose on the DEA results, regarding that these stimulus were directed 
mainly to the big financial groups and no Bulgarian banks benefited directly from 
such liquidity or bail-out funds. 
3.1. Analysis of the development of the Bulgarian banking market in 
its transition towards the Single European financial market  
We indicate the main characteristics that play an important role in the 
development of the Bulgarian banking system. 
                                                   
15
 Situation when a unit fails to produce on the lowest possible average and marginal cost curves. The 
X-inefficiency model implies a best-practice technology. No random factor could make a uŶit͛s production 
function better than that best-practice one.  
16
 Comparison between the actual and optimal costs, income, profit or other target indicator. 
17
 The optimum is defined by the production possibility frontier. The technical efficiency gives a 
measure of how managers are able to minimise cost or maximise production by input and output allocation. 
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The transformation of the banking system from one-tier into a two-tier with 
the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) on the first and the commercial banks on the 
second tier was done through the reestablishment of the commercial banks. A new 
legislative framework was adopted to reflect the new market structure. The Law on 
the Bulgarian National Bank (1991) defined the objectives and the powers of the BNB. 
Later the Law on the banks and credit activity (1992) defined the activities banks 
could perform under the license they were granted. Further, almost all banks were 
transformed into universal banks offering deposit and credit services to all customers. 
The branches of the BNB were also transformed into commercial banks (keeping in 
mind that before the transformations the BNB performed almost all of the functions 
in the banking market acting as a commercial bank and a central bank 
simultaneously). Later on a consolidation took place in the sector and many regional 
banks were merged and prepared for privatization. One of the ideas behind these 
activities was to improve the efficiency of the banks. Many state-owned banks were 
deemed to be inefficient as their lending policies were not market driven. They were 
imposed by the government to finance state enterprises, some of which were not in a 
good financial condition. To overcome this situation and lay the market-driven 
fundament of the banking market, a Banking Consolidation Company was established 
in 1992. It was intended to consolidate, restructure and privatize the state-owned 
banks. The low speed of these processes however led to extending the portfolios of 
bad loans and endangering the stability of some of the banks. During that time the 
Central Bank financed largely the affected banks, operating as a lender of first instead 
of last resort. 
Before the crisis, depositors had little interest in monitoring commercial banks 
because of the implicit and explicit prudential guarantees. The interest rates on loans, 
although very high at times, did not reflect true credit risk. An OECD analysis points 
out that until 1996, the commercial credit was expanded to the non-financial sector 
in Bulgaria to a degree that was unprecedented relative to any other European 
transition economy. The structure of these credits was not 'healthy' and led to the 
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accumulation of a large amount of bad loans. State-owned enterprises and banks 
were rescued in several waves by issuing government securities, which led to 
increases in the government's internal debt. The situation deepened in 1996 and 
turned to a full scale financial (twin) crisis. 
The crisis started when in 1996 the BNB took five commercial banks, three of 
which were private, under conservatorship. At that time, Bulgaria was unable to get 
loans in international financial markets because of insufficient foreign currency 
reserves that could be used as collateral. The attempt to stop the banking crisis by 
introducing a deposit insurance scheme was unsuccessful, because it lacked 
credibility due to the low foreign currency reserves. In addition the BNB started to 
pursue a restrictive policy towards banks by increasing minimum reserve 
requirements, raising interest rates and at once selling US dollars to protect the lev 
exchange rate. The sharp increase in interest rates in the second half of 1996 further 
intensified the crisis. Foreign currency was increasingly used as a store of value. In 
February 1997 the lev depreciated by almost 250 per cent. The devaluation was 
accompanied by a short period of hyperinflation. 
 In 1997 a currency board was introduced as a tool for stabilizing the economy. 
New regulations in the banking sphere were adopted and a stricter supervision policy 
was applied. Also the entry of foreign banks was eased. 
In 1996 - 1997, the banking sector was composed of 33 banks including the 
State Savings Bank and branches of foreign banks. Most of these banks were small 
and with private ownership. At the beginning of 1997 there were six state owned 
commercial banks: Bulbank, United Bulgarian Bank (UBB), Expressbank, Bulgarian 
PostBank, Hebros Bank and Biochim Commercial Bank. Their major shareholder was 
the Bank Consolidation Company (BCC), which was in charge of bank privatization. 
Bulbank, the second largest bank in Bulgaria, was acquired in July 2000 by 
ItalǇ͛sàUŶiCƌeditoàǁithàaŶàϴϲ%àstakeàaŶdàGeƌŵaŶǇ͛sàálliaŶzàǁithàaàϱ%àstake.àNatioŶalà
Bank of Greece bought a 99.9% stake in the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB), the 
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ĐouŶtƌǇ͛sàthiƌdàďiggestàďaŶkàiŶàteƌŵsàofàassetsàatàthatàtiŵe.àBulgaƌiaŶàPostàBaŶkàǁasà
originally acquired by Nomura International in 1998, but later was joint-owned by the 
American life-insurer ALICO (AIG group) and the international private bank group 
EFG. In 1999 the French group, “oĐiĠtĠàGĠŶĠƌale bought Express Bank. The banking 
privatization process was completed with the sale of Commercial Bank Biochim (now 
HVB Bank Biochim following its merger with HVB Bank Bulgaria) to Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt (HVB Group) at the end of 2002 and the purchase of DSK Bank (the 
former State Saving Bank) by Hungarian OTP Group in May 2003.  
Nowadays the banking market consists of around 30 universal commercial 
banks where 80% of the assets are foreign owned. There remains only one state bank 
͞BaŶkà foƌà DeǀelopŵeŶt͟à ǁhiĐhà hasà speĐifiĐà fuŶĐtioŶs.à áà distiŶĐtiǀeà featuƌeà ofà theà
banking system is the high credit growth and aggressive expansion of the larger 
banks. This trend was softened by the global credit crunch as the possibilities for easy 
attraction of foreign resources diminished. In the recent years some mergers took 
place consolidating the majority of banking assets in the larger foreign banks. 
Another evidence for the strong competition for bigger market share between the 
banks is the decreasing market concentration (Chart 3.1).  
 
Chart 3.1 – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
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3.2. Measuring banking efficiency using the Data Envelopment 
Analysis 
In the past decade the Bulgarian banking market like the other Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) markets experienced strong development due to variety of 
reasons like foreign bank entry and increasing competition, considerable change in 
ownership structure through the privatization processes, market liberalization, 
change in regulatory environment and other factors. All these processes had 
influenced the bank performance. It is important to analyze whether this 
deǀelopŵeŶtà isàoŶlǇàeǆteŶsiǀe,àdƌiǀeŶàďǇàtheà iŶĐƌeaseàofà theàďaŶks͛àpoƌtfolios,àoƌà isà
also intensive based on efficiency improvement, which is a very important and crucial 
issue especially for transition economies. 
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a methodology for analyzing the 
relative efficiency of different DMUs (decision making units) using different input and 
output variables for the model. Generally as input and output variables are used 
some financial and operating indicators but also indexes and other synthetic 
indicators could be utilized. The efficiency is relative because the best performing 
unit is the benchmark for the others and is determining the efficient frontier. The  
DEA  approach  involves  the  use  of  linear  programming  methods  to  construct  a 
nonparametric piecewise frontier over the data, so as to be able to calculate 
efficiencies relative to this surface (Annex 3). In other words, the purpose of DEA is to 
construct a non-parametric envelopment frontier  over  the  data  points  such  that  
all  observed  points  lie  on  or  are  below  the  production frontier. The value of 
efficiency score obtained for any DMU must be less than or equal to one, with  a  
value  of  1  indicating  a  point  on  the  frontier  and  hence  a  technically  efficient  
DMU, according to the Farrell (1957) definition. 
The model has several advantages and drawbacks. With the DEA approach we 
can calculate an aggregated efficiency score for each bank using a set of input and 
output variables, which is one of its advantages over the traditional accounting 
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approaches. Another advantage of the DEA is that it does not need long time series as 
the equivalent parametric frontier approaches: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and 
Distribution Free Approach (DFA). One of the main positive sides of the model is that 
it does not require an assumption for the form of the production function. This allows 
us to eliminate the risk of wrong specification. Meanwhile the major drawback is that 
while this approach is non-parametrical is does not discriminate between efficiency 
score and random error component. It is also sensitive to extreme values of the 
variables.  
Another main advantage of the DEA in comparison with the traditional 
accounting indicators for efficiency – the operational coefficients ROA, ROE, net 
interest margin, gross profit margin, expenses / income ratio – is that the latter are 
biased by different capital structure, services scope and structure, accounting 
treatment, macro and regulatory environment, etc. In these different conditions, the 
indicators tend to change in a different way and cannot be used easily for comparing 
banks from different markets. Thus the possibility of incorporating multiple variables 
in the DEA model is giving us a single (comparable) measure of efficiency. 
The DEA approach has different modifications according to its purpose and the 
peculiarities of the analyzed units. According to the sensitivity towards the return to 
scale there are two main modifications: CCR model developed by Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (Charnes et al. (1978) and BCC model developed by Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (Banker et al. (1984). The CCR model (called also: CRS model – constant 
return to scale model) compares all the DMUs in the sample ignoring the difference 
in the scale. The BCC model (called also: VRS – variable return to scale model) 
differentiates the DMU according to their return to scale. It tends to give slightly 
higher results. 
The model could be output oriented or input oriented. To know exactly which 
modification should be used, we must take a look at the nature of the analyzed units, 
at the way they are conducting their business. If the unit is trying to maximize the 
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production given the available resources, then we can choose the output oriented 
model. And if the unit is trying to minimize the costs for resources given its fixed 
target for production volume, then we can use the input oriented version of the 
model. 
According to the input and output data, the DEA model has a number of 
variants. Choosing the input and output variables is essential to the analysis. This 
choice is connected with data availability and reliability. That is why the analysis of 
the banking efficiency is a complex task. Relative is the point of view from which the 
banks are analyzed, whether as producers of financial services or mediators of funds 
between savers and investors. Also data availability has its own influence. 
There are several approaches which had been used in different researches: 
production approach, operating approach, intermediation approach, value-added 
approach and others. These approaches are suitable for analyzing different types of 
enterprises. In the literature on banking efficiency the most commonly used are the 
operating approach and the intermediation approach. We consider using the 
intermediation approach for the purpose of this research, as we consider the banks 
as intermediaries reallocating funds, transforming the attracted funds into credits 
and securities while incurring different costs like fixed assets, salaries etc. 
The empirical results from various researches show that there is no significant 
difference between the results obtained using the above mentioned methods (SFA 
and DEA). 
For the calculations in this paper we use the prebuilt software: Efficiency 
Measurement System (EMS) developed by Holger Scheel, Dortmund University. 
3.3. Efficiency of the Bulgarian Banking System 
For the purpose of the current analysis we use balance sheet and income 
statement data for the Bulgarian banks for the period 1999 – 2012. 
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The efficiency assessment is crucial for finding the necessary corrective 
measures when certain deficiencies are found in the functioning of a bank. This leads 
for example to finding ways for minimizing the costs or maximizing the income 
according to the meanings of the target indicators, identified in the process of 
comparative analysis. 
The objects of the analysis are 23 of the banks presented on the Bulgarian 
market in the period 1999 – 2012. An increase in certain banking indicators, like 
assets, loans portfolio, the profit and others, is typical for the given period. Logically, 
the focus should be put on the questions about the quality of this growth, the 
efficiency of each bank, and about the peculiarities of the development of the 
Bulgarian banking sector. 
We will use Output oriented, variable to scale, DEA with inputs and outputs 
matching the intermediary approach. We consider that the banks are driven by 
commercial goals and so they are trying to maximize the output and the profits so we 
will opt for the Output oriented DEA. Further on, taking into accounting the 
differences in the size of the banks, we will use the Variable to Scale (VRS) DEA 
modification. And finally, considering the banks as companies who transform the 
saǀiŶgsàiŶtoàloaŶs,àǁeàǁillàuseàaàdataàsetàŵatĐhiŶgàtheà͚iŶteƌŵediaƌǇàappƌoaĐh͛.àThusà
we will assess the technical efficiency (x-efficiency) of the units analyzed. In 
economics, x-efficiency is the effectiveness with which a given set of inputs are used 
to produce outputs. If a firm is producing the maximum output it can, given the 
resources it employs, such as men and machinery, and the best technology available, 
it is said to be x-efficient. X-inefficiency occurs when x-efficiency is not achieved. The 
efficiency score is measured form 0 to 1 (1 represents the most efficient banks). 
The sample will encompass data for 23 banks for ten years from 1999 to 2012. 
The included banks represent around 90% of the total banking assets in the Bulgarian 
banking system. By excluding the remaining 10% total assets we eliminate from the 
sample some banks with specific structure and policy (including one state-owned 
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bank), smaller banks with specific capital structure (including banks with lower than 
average leverage ratio (assets to equity) and higher Capital Adequacy Ratio), 
branches of foreign banks (which do not have to comply with the local minimum 
capital requirements). As we noted before, the DEA model is vulnerable to extreme 
values, so by eliminating these outliers we are making the sample more 
homogeneous and thus avoiding unnecessary distortion of the efficiency results. 
Each bank from each year will be considered as a separate DMU and will be 
compared with the performance of the other banks from the same time period as 
well as its own performance and the performance of the rest of the banks from the 
other time periods. By this means we can calculate the performance development of 
the banks in the given time horizon.  
As input parameters we use year-end data for: Fixed assets, Deposits, 
Administrative costs; and for output data: Total loans, Securities. 
min max Weighted average 
DEA score
median StDev
1999 0.35       1.00       0.712                  0.68   0.20       
2000 0.36       1.00       0.694                  0.68   0.21       
2001 0.43       1.00       0.713                  0.71   0.16       
2002 0.43       1.00       0.736                  0.71   0.18       
2003 0.35       1.00       0.721                  0.68   0.18       
2004 0.42       1.00       0.755                  0.71   0.19       
2005 0.55       1.00       0.802                  0.77   0.18       
2006 0.40       1.00       0.813                  0.70   0.16       
2007 0.54       1.00       0.886                  0.77   0.12       
2008 0.60       1.00       0.892                  0.80   0.12       
2009 0.64       1.00       0.916                  0.82   0.12       
2010 0.67       1.00       0.920                  0.83   0.11       
2011 0.65       1.00       0.931                  0.83   0.12       
2012 0.65       1.00       0.926                  0.83   0.12        
Table 3.1 – DEA scores 
From the results of the model (Table 3.1) we can see that efficiency score of 
the banking system in 1999 was 0.71. In other words the average bank uses only 71% 
of its inputs (in our case: fixed assets, operating costs and deposits) to produce its 
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current outputs. By comparison, in 2007 the average efficiency of the banks is 0.87, 
which means that 87% of inputs are efficiently used. 
 
 
Chart 3.2 – Average efficiency of the banking system 
As it could be seen from Table 3.1 and Chart 3.2, there is a large heterogeneity 
among the banks concerning their levels of efficiency. There is a distinctive trend for 
increasing the average efficiency of the banking system. Some of the causes for this 
are the new technologies, knowhow and better administrative cost management 
implemented by the foreign banks, which further put pressure on the domestic banks 
and stimulated them to optimize their activities. The temporary slowdown of the 
trend around 2005 and 2006 is a result of the adoption of measures by the Bulgarian 
National Bank for slowing the credit boom and of the rise in the interest and related 
costs of the foreign banks, relying on external financing.  In Table 3.1 and Chart 3.2 it 
could also be seen that the variation of the efficiency scores is decreasing (measured 
by the standard deviation and the difference between the min and max scores) which 
is a result from the homogenization of the market. Regarding the latter years from 
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2004 towards 2008 we see that the average efficiency is shifting upwards in the 
variation band, which could be clearly noted in 2006, 2007 and 2008. This means that 
the bigger banks are improving their efficiency relatively faster than the others. From 
2009 onwards se observe flattening of the trend which could be linked directly to the 
crisis and the worsening of the real economy conditions. 
In order to assess the reliability of the results in Annex 4 we compare the 
calculated DEA trend for the Bulgarian banking system with selected accounting 
ratios showing the efficiency and profitability of the banking system. 
3.4. Does the privatization play a role in the process of integration 
towards the European Financial Market? 
In many researches the privatization of foreign state banks is regarded as a 
form of convergence towards some foreign markets from which the foreign players 
come. We will try to analyse whether in the case of Bulgaria there is a significant 
improvement of the banking efficiency due to the entry of the foreign financial 
institutions, which reorganize and improve the bank processes. To analyze the effect 
of the privatization processes we are constructing an output oriented DEA model, 
with iŶputà aŶdà outputà dataà ŵatĐhiŶgà theà ͞iŶteƌŵediaƌǇà appƌoaĐh͟.à Thisà tiŵeà theà
efficiency estimation will be made for each year separately (on cross-sectional basis). 
By this, we want to eliminate the dependence of a bank performance from its 
performance in the other years and so to compare clearly the different banks in each 
peƌiod.àThisàalsoàŵeaŶsàthatàǁeàǁoŶ͛tàhaǀeàŵuĐhàĐhaŶgeàiŶàtheàsĐaleà;theàtotalàassetsà
of the banking system), so we will use CRS (constant return to scale) model. 
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Chart 3.5 – Average efficiency and variation 
min max Weighted average 
DEA score
median StDev
1999 0.03       1.00       0.894                  0.52   0.28       
2000 0.35       1.00       0.794                  0.67   0.22       
2001 0.21       1.00       0.745                  0.60   0.25       
2002 0.48       1.00       0.875                  0.74   0.15       
2003 0.50       1.00       0.844                  0.75   0.16       
2004 0.46       1.00       0.840                  0.73   0.18       
2005 0.47       1.00       0.884                  0.73   0.18       
2006 0.62       1.00       0.916                  0.81   0.13       
2007 0.66       1.00       0.927                  0.83   0.11       
2008 0.75       1.00       0.955                  0.87   0.09       
2009 0.78       1.00       0.954                  0.89   0.06       
2010 0.76       1.00       0.954                  0.88   0.08       
2011 0.74       1.00       0.944                  0.87   0.07       
2012 0.75       1.00       0.951                  0.87   0.08        
Table 3.3 – Average efficiency 
The results (Chart 3.5 and Table 3.3) confirm our finding that the 
heterogeneity in the market is diminishing (i.e. the efficiency scores of the different 
banks are getting closer – Standard deviation dropping rapidly) and also that the 
bigger banks are becoming more efficient than the small and mid-sized (the shift in 
the trend towards the upper side of the band). 
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By using the DEA model separately for each year we are eliminating the 
efficiency growth tƌeŶdà iŶà theà peƌiodà aŶdà ĐaŶà ĐleaƌlǇà Đoŵpaƌeà theà ďaŶks͛à ƌelatiǀeà
positions. 
To find the effect of the privatization we are regrouping the banks in three 
mutually-excluding groups: Privatized banks, Bulgarian banks, Foreign (green field) 
banks. Each of these groups has fixed numbers of banks in it. The idea is to assess the 
change in the efficiency levels of the differeŶtàgƌoups.àTheà͞BulgaƌiaŶàďaŶks͟àgƌoupà
consists of banks, which were established by local owners or were bought by 
Bulgarian investors during the privatization.àIŶàtheà͞PƌiǀatizedàďaŶks͟àgƌoupàtheàďaŶksà
are former foreign owned banks, which were sold to foreign owners mostly during 
the period 1998 – 2002. Furthermore, the group of the privatized banks includes two 
Bulgarian banks (one of them not-state owned), which were sold in 2006. This 
exception is made because the main idea is to analyse the foreign penetration into 
the banking sectors. The group of the Foreign (green field) banks comprises banks on 
the local market, founded by foreign investors. 
 
Chart 3.6 – DEA scores by groups 
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The efficiency scores for the three groups can be seen on Chart 3.6. The 
average efficiency of the Privatized banks is the highest (0.90), followed closely by the 
foreign (green field) banks (0.89). And the local banks are lagging behind (0.85). 
Nevertheless the results are very close. At the beginning of the period least efficient 
have been the green field foreign banks, as they have had limited expertise for the 
local market, small scale, limited scope of activities and smaller client base. The 
BulgaƌiaŶà ďaŶksà aŶdà Pƌiǀatizedà ;͞toà ďeà pƌiǀatized͟à atà thatà tiŵeͿà haǀeà ďeeŶà ŵoƌeà
efficient due to their past experience and resources. But as the green field banks 
acquire experience on the market they get ahead of the other two groups, mainly 
because of the foreign know how, technologies and image. During the years of 
privatization 1999 – 2003 we can see that the group of the privatized banks also 
definitively gets ahead of the Bulgarian banks. In this period the foreign owners 
reorganize the activities and finalize the transition processes, so after 2002 they are 
permanently more efficient than the Bulgarian banks. In the recent years we can 
witness that the strong competition has stimulated the Bulgarian banks to optimize 
their activities so as to keep in pace with the market. Especially in 2007 and 2008 they 
are closing the efficiency gap between them and foreign (privatized and green field) 
ďaŶks.àálsoàtheà iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶtàofà theàfoƌeigŶà;gƌeeŶàfieldͿàďaŶks͛àeffiĐieŶĐǇàhasàďeeŶà
more apparent (we should consider that they also have a lower starting base), 
whereas the efficiency trend of the Bulgarian banks and of the privatized banks is 
more stable. From 2008 to 2011 the three groups are moving more or less parallel 
but in 2012 we observe a separation of the trends. The green-field and privatized 
banks are slightly improving their efficiency while the Bulgarian ones are slightly 
decreasing in terms of efficiency. This result could probably be attributed to the 
already stagnated funding market where the Bulgarian banks find resourced more 
difficult, while the privatized and green-field banks (which are part of larger cross-
border groups) have an easy access to funding by their groups and parent banks. 
To assess the statistical significance of these results we have conducted a 
hypothesis testing (Annex 4). The results confirm our conclusion, that the 
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privatization played its role as a form of integration towards the Single European 
Market. The foreign penetration on the local market has brought new technologies, 
knowhow and better administrative cost management. Also the access to foreign 
funds from the parent companies played significant role in the credit boom. All these 
faĐtoƌsà haǀeà iŶĐƌeasedà theà foƌeigŶà ďaŶks͛à effiĐieŶĐǇà ǁhiĐhà oŶà theà otheƌà haŶdà hadà
forced the local banks to optimize their operations and as a result we can see an 
increased efficiency, strong competition and slight market de-concentration. 
3.5. The Bulgarian banking market: is it getting closer to the 
European? 
In order to reveal the level of integration of the Bulgarian Banking Market 
towards the European, we will compare the efficiency trends and test for beta and 
sigma convergence.  We are using an output oriented VRS (variable return to scale) 
Dйáàŵodel,àǁithà iŶputà aŶdà outputà dataàŵatĐhiŶgà theà ͞iŶteƌŵediaƌǇà appƌoaĐh͟.à Toà
ensure data compatibility we will use the following parameters as inputs: Total Fixed 
Assets, Total Liabilities and Administrative Costs, and for outputs: Total Net Loans 
(Total Gross Loans deducted by the Loan Loss Provisions) and Other Earning Assets 
(securities). The analysis will be conducted with data for 23 Bulgarian banks (around 
90% of the total banking assets in the Bulgarian banking system) for the period 1999 
to 2012 and 19 of the largest European banking groups (over 50% of the total EU 
banking market) for the period 2003 - 2012. The data used are on consolidated level. 
The initial idea was to cover around 90% of the EU market and to use data on solo 
level. This could have allowed us to compare the average efficiency levels of the 
different countries in EU and to search also for regional convergence. However, due 
to some data constraints the scope was lowered to 50% of the EU banking total 
assets and data on consolidated level. This still enables us to demonstrate the 
concept without getting into much detail about the efficiency structure of the EU 
market, assuming it as a peer financial market for the purpose of the comparison.  
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To examine the simultaneous presence of beta and sigma convergence we will 
use data for the BG and EU banks together. So the best performing bank in a certain 
year from the given period will serve as benchmark. Thus we will analyze the 
development in the efficiency trends, which will help us to search for the presence of 
beta convergence (the output of the relatively underdeveloped banking systems 
tends to grow faster than that of the developed ones) and also will help us to see 
whether the (cross-sectional) dispersion between the performances of the two 
groups is diminishing, which is a sign for sigma convergence. 
 
Chart 3.7 – Efficiency trends by groups 
The results show (Chart 3.7) clearly that the efficiency of the Bulgarian banks is 
improving at a higher rate than that of the EU banks. Also the dispersion is 
diminishing over time. This confirms the presence of the two types of convergence.  
Nevertheless we can see that the average efficiency (Chart 3.7) of the 
Bulgarian market is considerably lower than the average EU efficiency. The 
hypothesis testing confirms these results (Annex 4). This can be explained by the fact 
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that in order to maintain their profitability for a long time the banks on the Bulgarian 
market could afford maintaining greater margins due to the relatively 
underdeveloped market and lower saturation. This gave them less stimulus for 
striving for further optimization of their processes. But because of the growing 
competition on the local market in the recent years, the banks are improving their 
performance and in terms of technical efficiency they are catching up to the levels of 
the European market. 
In the pre-crisis years the efficiency of the Bulgarian banks is catching to the 
European ones, but is still somewhat lower. It is interesting to notice that the trend of 
the EU banks starts decreasing after 2007 which could be clearly attributed to the 
recent financial crisis. On the other hand the efficiency of the Bulgarian banks 
improves till 2010, which is the turning point. At first glance this lag may seem 
strange, but it confirms the difference in the structures and business strategies 
between the two groups. The banks in Bulgaria had almost no exposure to such sub-
prime instruments. Their business models are mainly traditional ones, focused on 
ĐoƌpoƌateàaŶdàƌetailàdepositàtakiŶgàaŶdàleŶdiŶg.àBulgaƌiaŶàǁasŶ͛tàhitàďǇàtheàfiƌstàǁaǀe,à
but the crisis came through the real economy. The European economy slowdown 
affected Bulgarian exporters and the Bulgarian economy as a whole. Repaying credit 
become more difficult and the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) start rising in 
theàďaŶks͛àďalaŶĐeàsheets,àǁhiĐhàiŵpaĐtedàtheiƌàeffiĐieŶĐǇ.àнƌoŵàϮϬϬϵàtheàBulgaƌiaŶà
efficiency trend started slowing down and the turning point is 2010 when the 
efficiency trend started decreasing. 
Looking at the recent years, the EU efficiency score for 2012 is slightly higher 
than the one from 2011. This is a sign of a slow revival of the lending activities due to 
demand from the economy or a consequence of the recent ECB long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) from December 2011 and February 2012, which provided low 
interest rate funding to banks from the Eurozone. 
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3.7. Conclusion from the application of the DEA approach 
We use the Data Envelopment Analysis to analyze the level of integration of 
the Bulgarian banking market towards the European Single Market, by comparing the 
technical efficiency levels. The DEA has become popular in analyzing different 
national banking industries. The segmentation of the Bulgarian banking market was 
made by the criteria for ownership to assess the role of the foreign capital 
penetration. We have utilized data on Bulgarian banks for the years 1999 through 
2012. This isà theà peƌiodà foƌà ǁhiĐhà ƌelatiǀelǇà ƌeliaďleà ďaŶks͛à dataà aƌeà aǀailaďle.à Toà
construct the European efficiency frontier we have used consolidated data for 19 
banks for the period 2003 – 2012. 
In general, the analysis leads to the conclusion that the Bulgarian banking 
system is consequently improving its average technical efficiency which is mainly due 
to the stable macroeconomic environment, increased competition and the entering 
of foreign players on the local market. It is visible that on the one hand the 
heterogeneity between the market participants is diminishing but on the other, the 
bigger banks are gaining speed in terms of higher efficiency coefficients. 
The banks with significant foreign participation were and are on average more 
efficient than the domestic ones. The foreign penetration on the local market 
contributed to these processes with the establishment of new technologies, 
knowhow, better administrative and cost management and access to foreign funds 
from the parent companies. All these factors haǀeà iŶĐƌeasedà theà foƌeigŶà ďaŶks͛à
efficiency which on the other hand has stimulated the local banks to optimize their 
operations and to be able to keep in pace with the market development. The biggest 
improvement in terms of efficiency in the given period was experienced by the green-
field foreign banks regardless of their initially limited expertise on the local market, 
small scale and limited portfolio. Because of their foreign know how, technologies 
and image, they have become the most effective players on the market. The local 
(Bulgarian and to-be-privatized) banks have been more efficient at the beginning due 
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to their past experience and resources. After the years of privatization 1999 – 2003 
the group of privatized banks also becomes more efficient in comparison with 
Bulgarian banks due to the reorganization of their activities and access to the group 
resources. In the recent years we are witnessing that the local banks are already 
closing the efficiency gap. 
Upon comparing the performance of the Bulgarian market with that of the 
European market, we can conclude that the difference in the technical efficiency 
levels remains substantial, which supposes that the locally presented banks are 
utilizing their resources less optimally than the European ones. However, we can note 
that a clear trend of integration is in place, confirmed by the presence of beta and 
sigma convergence in the average efficiency levels. 
Further evidence for the remaining heterogeneity in the characteristics 
between the banking markets of different EU Member States is their different 
reaction to the recent crisis in terms of changes in their efficiency scores. 
Research in this area shows the possibility to use innovative ways to analyze 
the structures that influence operational decisions. 
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Chapter IV - THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. INNOVATIVE 
APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE 
SINGLE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN THE GLOBAL CRISIS - 
NETWORK-CENTRIC MODEL OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
The recent global experience highlights the need to monitor systemic risks 
arising from both the macroeconomic developments in the economy and from the 
global financial markets. Integration of economies and modern technology opens up 
new challenges to the global stability. This requires new concepts, methodologies and 
models for financial system transformation and network crisis management. 
The network approach can be an effective tool for solving problems posed by 
the global crisis. It is associated with the introduction of the paradigm of security and 
stability in the financial system, including key elements such as bodies for banking 
and financial supervision and regulation. A paradigm is seen as a key model or 
method for achieving certain type of goals. The aim is to achieve effective 
organizational and operational transformation. This transformation offers new 
opportunities for prevention based on new approaches for ensuring sustainability 
and viability of Single European Financial System in times of crisis. 
Using the theory of networks, one can improve the functioning of the financial 
systems. The application of Network approach to the financial systems is especially 
important in assessing the financial stability. For example, the resilience of a banking 
system to shocks can be evaluated according to the network structure that connects 
the financial institutions. 
The adopted framework introduces: surveillance at macro-level (surveillance 
on financial stability), through the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board in 
the European Central Bank, and supervision at micro-level, implemented by the 
European System of Financial Supervisors. 
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We propose the adoption of the banking system as a separate critical 
infrastructure and the inclusion of the banking and financial supervisory authorities 
as key elements in a decentralized network for financial regulation on a supranational 
level. The goal is to coordinate and facilitate the work of national supervisors and to 
synchronize financial regulation and supervisory practices that are the basis for the 
integration of financial markets. 
The need for transformation of the financial institutions during the current 
crisis requires seeking and implementing new approaches for ensuring stability and 
efficiency of the financial system. 
The purpose is to describe the need for enhanced transformation of 
supervision and regulation of the banking system of the European Union, but also to 
show the possibility of achieving a decisive efficiency and stability through the 
introduction of concepts related to the network approach and treating the system as 
a critical infrastructure. On the basis of means related to the construction of high 
operational safety systems it is possible to outlines ways to transform the financial 
(banking) system, from a structure with subsequent (delayed) regulation and 
management, into an operational self-regulating system (system of systems) 
operating in near real-time. This transformation would allow sharp increase in 
stability and operability of the system. 
The issue about the structure of the supervisory process is always escalated 
during crises moreover this is the time when most of the reallocation of supervisory 
responsibilities is carried out at an institutional level. At this stage, in contrast to 
previous financial crises, the discussion has a global nature. Coordination at 
international level rises as a priority as internationally active financial institutions 
(mainly banks) have a global reach with their subsidiaries and international branch 
network.  
The development of supervisory processes at European level is directly related 
to the priorities for development of the European single financial market placed in 
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1999. The financial crisis forced a reconsideration of the structure of financial 
supervision and regulation, and boosts their improvement initiatives. Leaders of the 
G-20 meeting in Mexico agreed on the need to transform the financial institutions 
and in particular for increased regulation of the financial system. EU leaders 
expressed their satisfaction that the group of 20 has confirmed its commitment to 
"fully and quickly place a financial reform to build a strong and responsible 
international financial sector". This transformation will open up new opportunities for 
prevention and will ensure sustainability and viability of the system of financial 
institutions. In this respect the possibility to search and implement new approaches 
to ensure stability and efficiency of this system is presented. Such a possibility could 
occur with the use of innovative tools from the scope of network-centric systems, 
typical of the area of national and international security. 
The experience from the current financial crisis highlights the need to monitor 
systemic risks arising from both the macroeconomic developments in the economy 
and from the global financial markets. Integration of economies and modern 
technology opens up new challenges to the global security. This requires new 
concepts, methodologies and models for transformation of the financial system and 
network crisis management. 
4.1. The need for transformation of the financial system 
A number of papers of the European Commission (EC, 2012), (COM (2012) 511 
final) (EC, 2012) etc. underline the need to bring up to date the financial sector 
through the establishment of a European Banking Union. The political vision for 
further EU integration based on the latest important measures for tighter regulation 
of the banking sector, has also been stated in the said papers. 
The general framework of the EU for instruments for recovery and resolution 
of the banks offers in the first place means to prevent emerging crises and to deal 
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with them in the early stages. These instruments will be proposed to the banking 
sector by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
At the summit in June 2012 the European Union agreed to create a new 
centralized European banking supervisor (step towards establishing a European 
Banking Union) to supervise and recapitalize banks in Europe. It will provide direct 
assistance to banks, not through the governments, so as to not further increase the 
national ineptness. Thus creating goals and a new management framework, providing 
national supervisors additional powers for closer monitoring of banks, and to take 
any restrictive-up of risks. 
In connection with the above, measures have been prescribed in the medium 
term to introduce a more integrated and immediate banking supervision at the EU 
level and a common deposit guarantee fund for recovery of banks, where these 
measures have been based on the political guidelines of the European Union. 
The following elements of the general framework are of major importance: 
- integrated system of supervision of cross-border banks, overcoming the 
existing fragmentation of the supervision; 
- a unified deposit guarantee scheme, combined with the recovery fund into a 
single general framework; 
- EU resolution fund for resolving troubled banks. 
The idea that the European Financial Stability Mechanism may provide aid to 
banks is also promising. 
The European Commission envisages the setting out of a common framework 
of rules which will help Member States and national regulatory authorities to take 
fast and effective action to deal with the banking crisis, such as: 
- give public authorities greater powers in order to prevent bank failures; 
- make it obligatory for all major banks to have a recovery plan; 
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- ensure early intervention, when the capital reserves of a given bank fall 
below a certain level and the bank must carry out major reforms to restructure its 
debt, if necessary; 
- allow national authorities to take control over a failing bank; 
- ensure a more effective cooperation between national authorities with 
respect to the support for a cross-border bank experiencing difficulties - in such cases 
the European Banking Authority will play a major role. 
From the above it follows that it is appropriate to: 
1. Provide in a timely manner (near real time) the centralized European 
Banking Supervision with current operational information on bank restructurings and 
recapitalization needs. 
2. Provide opportunity for the centralized European Banking Supervision to 
realize the network performance of its functions in response to the dynamically 
changing network structure of the supervised interdependent banks. 
For the realization of these opportunities we propose: 
1. The inclusion of the banking structure in a suitable simulation model which 
should provide supervisory authorities and bank managements with the necessary 
information on possible failures (collapse) in the system. 
2. The realization of the centralized European banking supervision as an 
influence network ensuring the operability of the entire banking system based on 
shared information. 
3. Integrating the simulation structure and the influence network into a 
network-centric architecture, ensuring the operability and stability of the banking 
critical infrastructure. 
The overall objective is to achieve greater financial stability. 
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In order to perform the specific tasks presented here and to achieve effective 
transformation of the financial sector in the EU it is appropriate to analyze the nature 
of the financial and banking system in terms of: 
- Network architecture; 
- Critical interdependent infrastructure; 
- Complex adaptive system. 
These characteristics of the financial system could allow, through the 
application of innovative approaches and tools, its building up as a network-centric 
multi-agent architecture. 
The realization of this opportunity would secure high operability and stability 
of the financial system. For this purpose, we examine the appropriate innovative 
approaches and tools, and their ability to model and analyze the complex financial 
system. 
4.2. The network approach and paradigm on security and stability of 
the financial system 
A possible new approach for resolving the fundamental problems, connected 
with the global crisis, is the implementation of paradigm for security and stability of 
the financial system, including the financial regulatory and supervisory authorities as 
key role players. 
We see this paradigm as a key model, standard or method (for achieving 
certain goals). The aim is an effective organizational and functional transformation. 
This transformation gives new opportunities for prevention, based on early warning 
systems, as well as quicker seizure of financial contagion, and ensuring a stable and 
viable system of financial institutions in case of partial system disintegration (when 
some part of the system is not functional any more – defaults, systemic risk, etc). 
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There is an increasing consensus in the economic literature to recognize that 
network structures significantly influence the outcomes of many social and economic 
activities. The use of network theories can enrich our understanding of financial 
systems. We review the recent developments in financial networks, highlighting the 
synergies created from applying network theory to answer financial questions. A 
network approach to financial systems is particularly important for assessing financial 
stability. For instance, the resilience of a banking system to contagion can be 
evaluated depending on the network structure that connects financial institutions. 
The main goal is to make effective organizational and functional 
transformation, so the system could achieve greater sustainability and efficiency. 
Such a possibility seems to be the adoption of the banking system as a separate 
critical infrastructure (Mirchev, 2009) and the inclusion of banking and financial 
supervisors as key elements in a self-synchronizing network for financial supervision 
and regulation at a supranational level. The critical infrastructure in this area is 
important to national and international security and the efficiency and accuracy of 
decisions in critical situations are crucial for the stability of the financial system. 
The goal is to coordinate and facilitate the work of national supervisors and to 
synchronize financial regulation and supervisory practices that are the basis for the 
integration of financial markets. 
This system is actually a system of systems. The advantage of such network 
structures with decentralized management is that they are more resistant to crisis 
situations and to disruption of their integrity. Based on this concept we can be outline 
a four- layer network architecture for financial supervision and crisis management. 
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Chart 4.1 - Four-layer network model for financial supervision and crisis 
management 
The network approach presumes the development of concepts, methods, 
practices and new organizational structures for financial processes transformation 
and in particular for improved regulation of the financial industry. A network, linking 
the hierarchically or geographically spread organizational structures, provides 
opportunity for exchange of operational information, cooperation, and establishes a 
centralized shared awareness. This in turn leads to synchronization of the system as a 
whole. The result is increased efficiency, improved resistance to destructive 
influences and viability in crisis situations. 
The need of network implementations in the financial domain arises from the 
Memorandum of understanding on cross-border financial stability, signed in June 
2008 by the financial supervisory institutions, central banks and finance ministers 
from the EU, and from the general practical guidelines for crisis management. 
The recommendations set forth in these documents create opportunities for 
the application of network approach for transformation of the financial system. 
Through ESRB, the ECB will have access to supervisory information at micro-level. 
With the implementation of a modern model of a network for crisis management and 
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with the cooperation at the international level, effective mechanisms for resolution 
of crisis situations could be created. Information will be exchanged in real time and 
will provide relevant data for decision making in crisis situations. 
The European regulatory bodies - the European Systemic Risk Board and the 
European System of Financial Supervisors are network elements at the EU level. The 
inclusion of these structures and the banking system in a single framework form 
complex multilayer system, ie network of networks. This system is actually a system 
of systems. Based on this concept we can be outline four layer network architecture 
for financial supervision and crisis management (Chart. 4.1). 
Institutional development of the supervisory architecture in the European 
Union (a relatively short period of time) with models "Lamfalussy", "Larosiere" and 
the introduction of a Single supervisory mechanism outlined the importance of 
supervisory processes for solving problems of the EU Single financial market. 
Complex multilayer structures, shown in Chart 4.1, as well as very large 
dimensions make the operational functioning of the system difficult.  
In the methodological prerequisites for the introduction of innovative tools - 
basic requirement is to reduce the number of organizational levels, creating a direct 
link to the source of information and increase the pace of operational performance. 
For this purpose, we present ideas for network approach and two-layer network-
centric architecture as prerequisites for achieving supervision and regulation in 
network-centric environment for the transformation of the banking system of the 
European Union (Mirchev, 2012). 
We propose the inclusion and development of these opportunities as 
necessary basic elements of a common network model for transformation, stability 
and efficiency of the financial system. 
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4.3. Models and practices for the identification, designation and 
protection of critical banking and financial infrastructures 
Protection of critical infrastructure is widely used in control theory, economics, 
and especially in research on security issues. The term "infrastructure" was originally 
introduced in the military over the past century, but gradually its orientation is mainly 
to systems of national and international security (ˈ̌д̛̙тодо̬о̏,àϮϬϬϳ). 
U.S. experience 
First we will study the U.S. experience in the financial field in light of its rather 
direct engagement with problems of the overall system of security and stability. The 
U.S. Department of the Treasury and several other agencies make efforts to ensure 
the financial stability of the economy upon destructive physical and economic impact 
(Weiss, 2009). The regulatory bodies in the financial sector have developed 
regulations to overcome the physical and economic shocks. Many of the measures to 
protect the financial institutions against attacks are part of a broader national 
security effort in the United States (Weiss, 2005). 
As stated in the aforementioned sources, the financial institutions, including 
banks and other depositories, securities dealers, insurance and investment 
companies, are a part of the critical structure of the country. 
Financial institutions face two categories of emergencies that could impair 
their functioning. 
 The first is directly financial: a sudden drop in the value of financial assets, 
whether originating domestically or elsewhere in the world, that could cause a 
national or even global financial crisis.  
The second is operational: the failure of the support structures that underlie 
the financial system. йitheƌà Đouldà disƌuptà theà ŶatioŶ͛sà aďilitǇà toà supplǇà goodsà aŶdà
services. They could reduce the pace of economic activity, or at an extreme, cause an 
actual contraction of economic activity. Regulators generally address financial 
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problems through deposit insurance and other sources of liquidity (such as 
emergency loans) for distressed institutions, through safety and soundness 
regulation, and via direct intervention. One approach is to create special purpose 
responses to financial stress, such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Fund (TALF). These approaches relate to the 
remedial effects against operational risks through corrective actions, redundancy, 
regulation, auditing, and other physical security. Under the worst case scenarios, the 
Federal Reserve (Fed) attempts to limit economic damage by supplying liquidity to 
the financial system and employing monetary policy to expand domestic demand (as 
it did following the 2001 terrorist attacks). In the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
;T‘IáͿ,à CoŶgƌessà eǆpaŶdedà theà нed͛sà aďilitǇà toà aĐtà asà leŶdeƌà ofà lastà ƌesoƌtà toà theà
financial and real economies (Weiss, 2009). 
In connection with the foregoing, it should be noted that U.S. experts (Moteff, 
2004) point to financial services as a critical and financial information structure and 
banks and finance as a critical structure of a general nature. 
 In relation to the number of documents (Moteff, 2004) in the United States is 
prepared National Banking and Finance Sector specific plan - SSP (DoHS, 2007), which 
is part of the overall National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP provides 
the structure for integration of this SSP and the SSPs of the other 16 critical 
infrastructures and key resources. To achieve this interaction one relies on public-
private partnership under which programs are developed for protection and crisis 
management, as well as sector-specific plan (SSP), which provides the Banking and 
Finance Sector's strategy. This sector plan has been prepared in close collaboration 
with the Financial Banking Information Infrastructure Committee, (the Financial and 
Banking Information Infrastructure Committee - FBIIC). 
The study of the U.S. experience presented above sector is directly related to 
the establishment of the Single European Banking Supervisors. Future features of this 
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surveillance can be supported by the authorities to protect European critical 
infrastructure. 
Essential for banking and financial sector is the structure of federal and state 
regulators and self-regulatory organizations. Financial regulators work through FBIIC, 
to coordinate efforts to address critical issues for infrastructure protection. Private 
sector pillar of security (DoHS, 2007) is organized by the financial sector of the 
Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
and Homeland Security - FSSCC. This organization includes the Financial Services 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center - FS-ISAC with regional coalitions. With direct 
assistance FBIIC financial regulators assess the banking and financial sector, 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in the domestic financial system, and also 
determine which institutions play an important role in the systematic sector. 
Despite initial activity in implementing the Action Plan for Critical structure of 
the banking and financial sector in the U.S. - (DoHS, 2007) in the summer of 2007 
financial crisis unfolded, starting from a small part of the U.S. market for high-risk 
mortgages. The described model for the protection of critical structure sector 
"Banking and Finance" in the U.S. has hardly been able to account for the network 
nature of the spread of the crisis. So the crisis spread, affecting other markets around 
the world and caused extremely social harm. 
Experience in the European Union 
The EU policy on critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is coordinated by the 
Directorate General "Justice, freedom and security" of the European Commission. In 
2005, a special "Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection" was published, containing a recommended list of sectors of the critical 
infrastructure. The authors of this paper also offer definitions of the terms "national 
critical infrastructure" and "European critical infrastructure." 
On the basis of this Green Paper, in 2006 was launched the European Program 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). 
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A following EU document was the Proposal for a Council Directive of 2006 on 
the identification and protection of European critical infrastructure and the 
assessment of the need to improve the protection of such infrastructure. 
This document defines basic terms like "vulnerability", "risk", "threat" and 
contains a recommended list of sectors of the critical infrastructure. One of these 
sectors is "Financial sphere". This list is subject to update. The national specifics may 
modify the scope of the term "critical infrastructure" in the respective legislation, but 
the review of models and practices for critical infrastructures protection in several 
leading countries in the EU and elsewhere shows that the sector "Banking and 
Finance" is invariably present in the lists of sectors designated as critical 
infrastructure. 
Upon implementation of the EPCIP the EU member states are required to 
develop a respective National program for critical infrastructure protection. The 
review and analysis of these programs show that the sector lists and the relevant EU 
legislation concern actions to protect mainly technical structures in the event of 
disasters. 
Considering the financial structures as an element of the critical infrastructure, 
according to the Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 April 2007 on a proposal 
for Council directive on the identification and designation of European Critical 
Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (ECB, 
2007), allows the application of network systems methodology with all their 
opportunities to achieve viability, stability and efficiency of operation and prevention, 
preparedness and response to threats involving critical infrastructures and 
interdependencies between sectors. 
The proposed Directive (ECB, 2007) establishes the procedure for identification 
and designation of European critical infrastructures, disruption or destruction of 
which would significantly affect two or more Member States or one Member State if 
the critical infrastructure is located in another Member State. 
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The ECB has concluded that particular attention in this regard should be given 
of the operation and supervision of infrastructure and systems for clearing and 
settlement of payments and securities by the central banks of the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB) and the contribution of central banks to the stability of the 
financial system.  
In the legislative Resolution of the European Parliament on April 22, 2009 on 
the proposal for a Council decision for Critical Infrastructure Warning Information 
Network (CIWIN) (European Parliament, 2010) is recorded that: The Council 
supported the Commission's plan to propose a European Program for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and approved the establishment of CIWIN by the 
Commission. This Decision establishes a secure system of information and 
communications - Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) to 
assist Member States to exchange information on vulnerabilities and appropriate 
measures and strategies to reduce risks associated with the critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP).  
The legislative Resolution of the European Parliament on April 22, 2009 gives a 
contemporary definition of a "Critical infrastructure": those assets, systems or parts 
thereof located in Member States which are essential for the maintenance of vital 
societal functions, health, safety, security, supply chain, economic or social well-being 
of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact 
in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.    
The analysis of the current state of protection of the financial critical 
infrastructure shows that the protection is activated only when it is necessary to 
reinforce the measures for protection. This protection is not systemic in nature and 
there is no integrated effect of its interaction within the EU. It relies heavily on 
organizational activities, and the necessary information for timely and appropriate 
response to the new threats is still not being provided.  
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The guidelines for solving this problem are related to the opportunity to build 
effective protection for the financial critical infrastructure within the EU, so as to 
create conditions for a sharp increase in its stability and operability. The 
implementation of a network-centric approach is one of the latest opportunities in 
this area. 
The efficiency of a network structure is much greater than the sum of the 
individual efficiencies of its elements, which is provided by the synchronization and 
synergy between the activities of these elements achieved through information 
sharing in a network-centric environment. This provision is one of the most effective 
approaches as it does not require significant additional costs and resources. 
Moreover, reducing the risk for the financial critical infrastructure to the desired level 
is possible without radically changing the basic principles for structuring the system 
managing this infrastructure. Such "network" concept allows the formulation of 
requirements for new capabilities of the financial system with a constant awareness 
of the situation in all its aspects. 
Legal basis in Bulgaria 
The term "critical infrastructure" appeared in the Bulgarian legislation in 2005 
with the adoption of the Crisis Management Act. Under this Act, the Council of 
Ministers adopts the National Programme and the Annual National Plan for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. 
In the process of planning the policies and activities for protection of the 
critical infrastructure of special importance is the creation of a legal framework for 
the realizations of efficient public-private partnerships. The U.S. experience in this 
regard is quite indicative. Most of the components of the critical infrastructure, 
including banking institutions, are now privately owned. Therefore, their protection 
can only be achieved in close cooperation with their owners and operators. 
The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria No. 18 
(Council of Ministers, 2011) identifies and designates European critical infrastructures 
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in Bulgaria and sets measures for their protection. A potential European Critical 
Infrastructure (ECI) is designated as such after agreement with Member States that 
may be significantly affected. The above decree stipulates the procedure for the 
identification and designation of ECI located on the territory of Bulgaria and the 
measures for their protection in the energy and transport sectors. Decree No. 181 of 
the Council of Ministers of 20.07.2009 identifies objects and activities that are 
important for national security and are part of the critical infrastructure. The list 
appended to this Decree contains the following strategic activities for sector 
"Finance": 
- Payment services; 
- Banking and insurance services. 
These activities for the "Finance" sector are mostly of technological nature. 
Directive 2008/114/EC (Council, 2008) on the identification and designation of 
European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their 
protection states that the Directive is the first step in a phased approach for the 
identification and designation of ECI and the respective actions for their protection. 
In light of all this and of the possibility to overcome crisis events in the banking sector 
– we propose regarding the banking system as a separate, but basic critical 
infrastructure, affecting all other sectors of public activity. 
The concept of banking critical infrastructure in a global crisis 
Given the vulnerability of the banking system, we propose the application of 
the concept of critical infrastructure so as to ensure better protection of the interests 
of the whole society. We define the banking system as a separate, high-level 
"economic infrastructure", given its important role in the modern economy. 
The need for determining the criticality of a given object and/or infrastructure 
often comes post-factum, i.e. after the disturbance of the functioning of the object or 
system (infrastructure) has occurred. In order to overcome this undesirable effect, it 
is advisable to improve the understanding of criticality. In practice, the systemic 
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concept for understanding the criticality prevails (Tagarev and Pavlov, 2005). This 
approach assumes that an infrastructure or its components are critical due to their 
structural position in the overall system of infrastructures, especially when it comes 
to important links with other sectors or infrastructures. The systemic approach 
focuses on the interdependence between infrastructures and their components. 
The systemic concept for understanding the criticality is directly related to 
issues of national and international security. 
The other approach – the symbolic concept (Tagarev and Pavlov, 2005) for 
understanding the criticality – regards the interdependence as having secondary 
importance; here the symbolic significance of an infrastructure for the society is of 
primary importance. 
For the purpose of this study it is useful to apply suitable methods for 
analyzing the critical infrastructure and supporting the development of measures for 
its protection. More typical opportunities are provided by: modeling networks and 
means of protection; methods and tools for analysis of complex adaptive systems; 
agent-based modeling; expert evaluation and simulation. 
The concept of critical infrastructure protection allows the construction of 
fundamentally new types of models to ensure stability and operability. For a better 
protection of the banking system in this context we further propose (in combination 
with innovative approaches) a framework model to strengthen the stability of the 
banking sector based on greater operability and security. 
4.4. Framework model for building the Single European banking 
market as part of the Security system (critical infrastructure) 
At EU level, stock exchanges and settlement systems have been deemed 
critical infrastructures. Considering the importance of the banking market (which 
dominates over other sectors of the financial market in the EU), we suggest its 
consideration as a separate critical infrastructure (economic network infrastructure). 
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Unlike those critical infrastructures (stock exchanges and settlement systems) which 
are mainly technical infrastructures, the banking market is a higher level 
infrastructure, playing an important role in the development of all sectors in the 
economy. It operates using technical infrastructures, such as: payment systems, 
information systems, etc., building on them through the application of economic 
models and providing financial services to bank customers, thus turning itself into a 
financial infrastructure – a tool for business conduct.  
The protection of this critical infrastructure would allow the construction of a 
fundamentally new type of model for ensuring stability and efficiency of the banking 
market. So the strategy for preserving and strengthening the financial stability will 
exceed national boundaries. This will allow a more flexible approach than the 
currently adopted, which is based on voluntary co-ordination between national 
supervisors and has not been sufficiently effective. 
A model for analyzing and strengthening the stability of the banking market, 
considered as critical infrastructure, would include the following steps:  
(1)  MappiŶgà theà ƌealà topogƌaphǇà ;theà ďaŶks͛à iŶteƌ-connectivity) of the banking 
network.  
(2)  Identification of the hubs in the system – the supervisory efforts could be 
focused on these nodes depending on their importance. 
(3)  Assessing the extent of the threat / possible damage, which a hub brings to 
the system. The risk depeŶdsà oŶà theà huď͛sà sizeà aŶdà ĐoŶŶeĐtiǀitǇàǁithà otheƌà
hubs and nodes in the network. This evaluation is performed through 
siŵulatioŶsàoƌàaŶalǇsisàofàtheàdeǀelopŵeŶtàofàaà͞fault-tƌee͟àfoƌàspƌeadiŶgàtheà
initial shock.  
(4)  Budget analysis – determines the optimum allocation of resources. One 
possible tool is the "network-wide investment" – after assessing the possible 
negative effects of each hub in the system, the investments are allocated in 
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such a way that minimizes the overall negative effect. Priority is given to the 
most important hubs, which have the greatest impact on the network stability.  
For applying such model there could be implemented and refined a few basic 
principles (Lewis, 2006), to which we add specific interpretation for the area of 
banking systems: 
Principle 1: You need a network to fight a network. Applied to the banking 
system, this principle may have the following two meanings:  
(1) The systemic instability in the banking market has a network character, so 
the means to oppose it should also have a network character. It also suggests a new 
type of network supervision with new organization of the supervisory processes 
depending on the topology of the banking system.  
(2) Due to the size of the European and the international banking market only 
the network approach would be effective. It is not economically feasible to protect 
every link in the system. European Commission studies show that the national 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes in the EU would not withstand the shock if several hubs 
(large, systemically important banks) fail.  
Principle 2: Protect the hubs, not the connections. This principle is directly 
related to the preceding because the banking market is built on a network basis. 
Hubs are critical points, therefore they must be protected. Considering the scarcity of 
resources and the fact that such a network could be enormous in size, it is not 
possible to protect each node of the system, so efforts should be focused on the 
critical points.  
Principle 3: Invest 80/20. The capital in the banking system is not equally 
allocated. One could say that the majority of the assets in the banking system are 
held by a small number of banks. This suggests that the 80/20 rule could be applied, 
i.e. 80% of resources should be invested in 20% of the units (which are critical to the 
system). 
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Principle 4: Asymmetric thinking. Innovation in the financial sector often is 
used as a way to avoid certain regulations. In this regard, regulatory approaches must 
evolve, and adapt to the market situation, and anticipate and manage the 
development of the system. 
Principle 5: Dual purpose solutions. The scarcity of government resources 
ƌaisesà theà ƋuestioŶà ofà theà stakeholdeƌs͛à iŶǀolǀeŵeŶtà iŶà theà pƌoĐessà ofà seekiŶgà
solutions for improving the stability of the banking system. For example, the 
establishment of joint entities for electronic or cash payments, the creation of buffer 
funds and other initiatives with purely private capital, would increase the stability of 
the system, but would also help to improve its efficiency. Thus resources optimization 
could be achieved. 
4.5. Innovative approaches and methods for the formation of a 
conceptual model of the banking system as a critical infrastructure 
In accordance with the definition of critical infrastructure (European 
Parliament, 2010) we regard the banking system as a component of the system of 
interdependent critical infrastructures shaping the national and international 
security. In this regard, the study of infrastructural interdependencies is essential. 
The critical infrastructures (CI) can be modeled as self-organizing complex networks 
(Issacharoff et al., 2006). 
Over the past two decades the studies on complex dynamic systems have 
greatly increased (Goldenfeld & Kadanoff, 1999; Oltvai & Barabasi, 2002), including 
the studies on banking networks as such dynamic systems (May et al., 2008). Further 
studies on the need for regulatory reform have pointed out the necessity to apply 
innovative approaches in order to reduce systemic risk. In particular, Haldane (2009) 
regards the financial system as a complex adaptive system (CAS). 
The study of infrastructural interdependencies, combined with simulation 
modeling, is a relatively new field. 
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Below we present the main innovative approaches and methods, and specific 
implementations of complex adaptive systems, enabling the development of a 
conceptual model of the banking system operating as a critical infrastructure. The 
scope of these innovative tools includes also the simulation modeling capabilities of 
research and analysis of strategies for protection of the banking sector in crisis 
situations. 
Another possibility for simulation of failures in networks and in interconnected 
systems is provided by the Petri Nets (Mirchev & Filipova, 2009) as a formal method 
for modeling and analysis – Annex 5 of the dissertation. A conclusion is derived for 
the possibility to include such an analysis in a general model of a Network approach 
to implementing transformation and ensuring the stability and effectiveness of the 
financial and banking system. 
4.5.1. Network-centric approach 
The network-centric concept is based on the experiences of organizations and 
economic sectors that have successfully adapted to the challenges of the information 
age. This concept is applicable to network-structured organizations. A feature of 
systems built on network-centric concept is distributed (decentralized) decision 
making responsibilities in critical situations. Based on the shared common 
operational information field, decisions in critical situations are taken close to real 
time.  
The vision of network-centric enterprise (Alberts et al., 2000) is associated with 
awareness and appropriate information management, creating opportunity for self-
synchronization. As a result of this type of management is the achievement of 
increased efficiency (pace) and responsibilities, reducing risk and costs and achieving 
higher results (profits). Results are due in large part to the opportunities for virtual 
organization, cooperation and integration in network-centric environment.  
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The network-centric concept is based on the principle of self-synchronization 
specific to the theory of complex systems. The essence is that complex phenomena 
and structures are best organize bottom-up. It is necessary that this process stays 
within the accepted standards and regulatory requirements in the financial sector. 
Achieving greater efficiency in network-centric organization can be key in 
solǀiŶgàthеà"нiŶaŶĐialàtƌileŵŵa"à;“ĐhoeŶŵakeƌ,àϮϬϭϭͿ.ààTheàpƌoďleŵàisàƌaisedàďǇàVitoƌà
Constancio - Vice President of the ECB (Constancio, 2012) in relation to the need for a 
European Banking Union. The trilemma illustrates the inability to simultaneously 
achieve three important objectives in an environment of global financial markets.  
These objectives are: financial stability, financial integration and maintenance 
of national financial policies. The logic is that with increasing financial integration, the 
pursuit of national financial policies will not lead to financial stability. National 
policies aim to ensuring national prosperity without taking into account external 
supervisory practices of other countries (Holthausen, Ronde, 2004). This leads to a 
lack of financial stability as a public good (Beck et al., 2010). The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that the measures taken are implemented slowly, leading to 
the accumulation of negative results.  
The proposed by the European Commission new unified organization for 
banking supervision, a new pan-European deposit insurance and a European 
framework for restructuring and reorganization of institutions can be effective only at 
high operability , eliminating the effects of the trilemma. 
The nature of the network-centric approach is the ability to exchange 
information in the composition of the so-called "influence networks". This is essential 
for achieving shared awareness in the executive departments as an opportunity for 
cooperation and synchronization. The influence network theory has numerous and 
significant applications. This theory is based on the theory of stability (Lewis, 2009) . 
Based on the new information technologies it is possible for the information 
from the network structure of interdependent supervised banks to be combined with 
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the information coming from the Single Supervisory Mechanism. This would achieve 
the full awareness and necessary networking capabilities of the system, including 
ensuring interoperability. 
Setting new requirements for the financial system in the EU in relation to new 
structures and new relationships, especially those for adapting the existing 
Regulation of the European Banking Authority to the new regime for banking 
supervision leads to upgrade of the hierarchical system but also to increase of its 
complexity. We must add the fact that the Singe Supervisory Mechanism (in ECB) will 
monitor about 6,000 banks in the euro area. Creating a new strong centralization of 
the management structure, headed by the ECB is likely to result in delayed reactions 
through the hierarchical administrative structure, respectively, downstream 
regulation-supervision. To avoid these undesirable effects is appropriate to introduce 
a modern approach and means to achieve interoperability (speed, pace) in the 
financial system. 
In the existing European banking architecture the influence network is formed 
by autonomous agents - the European Systemic Risk Board and the European and 
national supervisory authorities. Interdependencies between the agents in the 
influence network determine the relationships between the agents form the second 
level (the banking network). The relationships in the influence network form a vision 
for the magnitude of the risk, the necessary regulations, capital adequacy etc. 
The perspective network-centric organization of influence network regulation 
and supervision shows the possibilities for dissemination of information on banking 
transactions on a daily basis, while forming the so-called common awareness. So far, 
this technology has been introduced only for the participants of the stock market. 
The opportunity stems from the fact that each bank calculates their balance 
parameters every day. Practically this allows the supervision and regulation to be 
perform near real time, which transforms the banking system, ensuring its high 
efficiency. Furthermore the decision making process is dynamic, i.e. depending on the 
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size and location of existing problems, different centers of decision-making are 
formed. In the current system (hierarchical structure) most of the important 
decisions must be coordinated with the European supervisory institutions. There are 
certain procedures requiring considerable time, including for appeal. The system is 
far outside the desired efficiency. 
4.5.2. Multi-agent modeling of critical infrastructures in the financial 
system 
A relatively new option is the application of Multi-agent modeling in critical 
infrastructures with Network-centric approach to implementing multi-agent 
simulation of critical infrastructures, combined with the use of network-centric 
approach. Cascading effect is a major source of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure 
systems. The domino effect is a major source of vulnerabilities in critical 
infrastructure systems. There is a view that agent-based simulations arise as the most 
promising technology for modeling infrastructure systems, aiming for anticipate, 
manage and optimize them. 
Agent-based modeling is a powerful simulation modeling technique that has 
seen a number of applications in the last few years, including applications to real-
world business problems. Agent-based simulations (ABS) are applicable to problems 
that can hardly be solved by traditional analytical tools, because these problems can 
hardly be described and / or treated mathematically. ABS provides a method for 
analyzing the possibility of infrastructure interdependencies through multiple agents 
(software systems) and environment to simulate the processes of decision-making 
agents. Agent in the simulation, according to some definitions, is a software 
implementation of the unit, taking decisions with agent-based models (ABM). The 
Agents may be special objects of software engineering, possessing a certain degree 
and intellectual identity.  
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One new goal is modeling with an emphasis on analyzing the impact of 
dependencies between interacting heterogeneous infrastructures. There is agent-
based approach that uses behavioral modeling of such infrastructures to identify 
vulnerabilities (Tolone, 2008). A multidimensional approach (Cougaar, 2012) is used 
to study the relationship between the layers of critical infrastructure.  
We present more characteristic information for specific implementations 
confirming innovation and perspective application in the financial district of complex 
decentralized systems with multiple interacting autonomous decision nodes, or 
agents: 
1. MULTILAYER MODEL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 A development of the above-mentioned approach is the drafting of a 
Multilayer Model of Financial Stability by exploring the integration of system 
dynamics and agent-based models (Martinez-Moyano et al.,2007). In this case 
financial infrastructure modeling is the domain problem that motivated the 
integration of different levels of aggregation in models of complex systems. In a 
project called the Critical Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System 
(CIP/DSS), researchers model different critical infrastructures and their 
interrelationships by using the system dynamics approach. To keep the CIP/DSS 
financial infrastructure system dynamics model simple and integral while, at the 
same time, representing well the complexities of the banking and finance domain, 
they hypothesize that a hybrid model will effectively capture both the aggregate 
finance domain, view of the infrastructure and the detailed indicators that can 
change its behavior abruptly (Bush et al, 2005). 
2. FINANCIAL SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL (FINSIM) 
This is a proof-of-concept approach to the integration problem: a system 
dynamics-centric approach (SD-centric approach). An SD-centric approach means that 
the system dynamics model is the primary, controlling model and that the role of the 
agent-based model is to provide aggregated view of agent details when requested to 
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do so. Similar goals and capabilities has The Financial System Infrastructure (FinSim) 
developed in the US, which is an agent-based model of cash and barter transactions 
that is dependent on contractual relationships and a network at the Federal Reserve 
level. Development started in January 2005 for protection of the physical 
infrastructure payment and trading systems initiated by the events of 9/11. 
FinSim represents the U.S. financial services sector as a complex decentralized 
system with multiple interacting autonomous decision nodes, or agents. Those nodes 
represent different types of real-world agents, such as banks, traders, markets, and 
brokers. Each agent has its own decision-making rules or capabilities, ability to 
retrieve and process information, ability to execute their decisions, and ability to 
interact with other agents or systems (Outkin & Flaim, 2006). 
3. NETWORK–CENTRIC MULTI–AGENT ARCHITECTURE 
The development of the mentioned approaches and current agent 
architectures motivate the appearance of the new Network–Centric Multi–Agent 
Architecture (NCMAA) (Yang etal., 2008), which is purely based on network theory 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002). The system is 
designed on the concept of networks, where each operational entity in the system is 
either a network or a part of a network. NCMAA adopts a two-layer architecture 
(Chart. 4.2.). The top layer, called the influence network, defines the relationship 
types and how one type of relationship influences other types. Each of these 
relationship types is reflected in the bottom layer by a set of agents who interact 
using that relationship. The influence of vision on communication would form a 
connection in the top layer.  
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Chart.4.2. – Two-layer architecture in NCMAA 
We can conclude that this approach reflected in Chart. 4.2. can help for 
successful transformation of the model presented to Chart. 4.1. On those two levels 
the building structures-European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (first level) and the 
European Supervisory Authorities (second level) can be regarded in influence 
network with centers of critical importance for the stability of financial and banking 
system in Europe. The top layer, called the influence network, will reflect in the 
bottom layer by a set of agents who interact using that relationship. Developed 
models for agent-based simulations may provide cascading effect, which is a major 
source of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems. So for example the 
desirability of mergers or divisions of certain banks can be foreseen. 
Influence network theory is numerous and  very  important applications. This 
theory is based on the theory of stability (Lewis, 2009). 
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4.6. Applying the concept of critical infrastructure to banking markets 
– Conceptual model of network-centric multi-agent architecture for 
interdependent critical banking infrastructures 
To build a conceptual model we accept the views of Agent-based modeling of 
interdependent complex systems (Galli, 2010), the definition of agent describing the 
agent as a combination of location and memory capabilities, and opportunities for 
critical federal structure as federated (complex) agent-based model. 
 A critical infrastructure is characterized by its location, its behavior, 
interaction capabilities and its internal state. Then a critical infrastructure can be 
modeled as an autonomous agent and the system composed of interdependent 
critical infrastructures can be modeled as interacting agents which cooperate and/or 
compete to realize a common or an individual goal (Galli, 2010). 
In the federated (complex) agent-based model, the agent is described by the 
combination (Va, Sa, Xa), these values refer to three types of autonomous agents: 
banks (agent type "a"), national supervisory authorities (agent type "b") and 
supervisors at EU level (agent type "c"). These agents form a functional network of 
the banking system, presented in Chart. 4.3. 
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Chart. 4.3 – Functional network of the banking system 
The top layer - An influence network is formed by autonomous agents - the 
structures of the European Systemic Risk Board and the European and national 
supervisors. 
The interdependencies (between the agents in this influence network) form 
the relationships between the agents at the second level (network of banks). The 
relationships in the influence network form a vision for the magnitude of the risk, the 
necessary regulations, capital adequacy etc. 
To achieve the desired security and operability we describe the influence 
network in terms of Network Centric Multi-Agent Architecture - NCMAA). 
Functions of the influence network: 
The dissemination of information requires a robust communication network. 
The decision-making process has the following components: 
Influence network 
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- the financial information component—retrieving information from the 
banking system; 
- the communication component—communicating the financial 
information to the national supervisors and the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and communicating the decisions from the EBA to the 
supervisors and to the banks; 
- the simulation component—interpreting the gathered information 
through stress-tests, simulations, early warning system etc. 
- the decision-making component – defining the type of decision and the 
target banks; 
Architecture of the perspective network-centric system for regulation and 
supervision. 
Regarding the conceptual model of the banking system, the architecture of the 
influence network can be represented by the following conceptual networks 
describing the relationships between agents: 
 The decision-making network defines the decision-making hierarchy within the 
network structure. Each national banking system has one supervisor. The 
national supervisors are dependent on the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
in their decisions or can take decisions independently. The decisions are 
influenced by the current knowledge about the state of the banking network. 
This knowledge is derived from the information about the topology of the 
network (interaction network) and the financial information (communication 
network). 
 The interaction network—if bank A has an exposure to bank B, then there is a 
link from Agent A to Agent B. The interaction network is also a directed graph. 
 The communication network—could carry 2 types of information: financial 
information (situation information) and supervisory decisions. In a traditional 
network structure the situation information typically flows from a bank to the 
supervisor and from the supervisor to the EBA. Under the network-centric 
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structure, the situation information is distributed across the whole network. 
TheàiŶfoƌŵatioŶàisà͞Ŷeaƌàƌeal-tiŵe͟.àUŶdeƌàtheàtƌaditioŶalàstƌuĐtuƌe,àthe 
decision information is generated at the top level (from EBA), while under the 
network-centric structure the decisions are generated across the network, 
depending on the location and scale of the problem. The communication 
network is a directed graph. 
 The operational network— defines whether a bank will form a connection with 
aŶotheƌàďaŶk,àďasedàoŶàtheàďaŶk͛sàĐuƌƌeŶtàkŶoǁledgeàaďoutàtheàotheƌàďaŶks,à
and is influenced by the decisions of the supervisors (the decision-making 
network). Shared knowledge – this network is based on information received 
from the interacting and communication network. 
 The "shared knowledge" network – enables the visualization of analytical 
information regarding the risks in the system. It is appropriate that this 
information be available to the supervisory authorities – the European 
Systemic Risk Board and the European System of Financial Supervisors. For the 
ESFS authorities the analytical information is appropriate for the specific 
authorities according to the particular type of supervision. 
Through selected parameters it is possible to monitor the overall condition of 
the financial system, and the introduction of network analyses could help identify 
risks and emerging vulnerabilities of the financial system in the EU. 
At the highest level in the European Systemic Risk Board it is appropriate to 
obtain more general information on the individual sectors, but also on the efficiency 
of the banking system as one of the key indicators of its development. For this 
purpose, Chapter IV of the dissertation presents the possibility of applying the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, which is a non-parametric frontier method. 
This method increases the range of tools for measuring the technological and 
financial efficiency of banks and provides a new opportunity to visualize the 
information necessary for the purposes of the regulatory analysis. 
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The network simulation analysis presented in Chapter III is essentially an 
innovative approach and a necessary complement to the traditional tools of assessing 
systemic risk, such as stress-tests, key risk indicators (solvency, profitability and 
efficiency, asset quality and structure of the balance sheet) and qualitative and 
quantitative assessments of cross-border banking groups. 
This network simulation analysis seeks a further study of the shock on the 
banking system, while it provides very effective opportunities for visualization and 
operational impact by regulators after the analysis has been carried out. 
Another valuable opportunity for obtaining operational information and for its 
visualization is the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN), 
which can be regarded and implemented as an addition to the communication 
network. 
The possibilities for implementation of the influence network are shown in 
Chart 4.4 and 4.5. Chart 4.4 presents the traditional implementation of the influence 
network for regulation and supervision. The approach taken is the "top-down 
approach" in which information flows follow the hierarchy of the system, moving 
from bottom to top, and the decision making is from top to bottom. This strategy can 
also be called "hierarchical". 
The perspective network-centric organization of the influence network for 
regulation and supervision shown in Chart 4.5 reflects the possibilities for 
disseminating information on bank transactions on a daily basis, the so-called shared 
knowledge. So far, this technology has been introduced only for participants on the 
stock exchange. The possibility stems from the fact that each bank calculates its 
balance parameters every day. In practice this allows the influence and control to be 
performed near real time, which transforms the banking system, ensuring its high 
operability. Furthermore, decision-making is dynamic, and different centers of 
decision-making are formed, depending on the size and location of an existing 
problem. In the current system (hierarchical strategy) most of the important 
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decisions must be coordinated with the European Banking Authority. There are 
certain procedures requiring considerable time, including time for appeal. The system 
is presently lacking the desired efficiency. 
The perspective network-centric organization of the influence network for 
regulation and supervision shown in Chart 4.5 can be a successful solution of the 
views set forth in the Proposal for a Council decision entrusting the European Central 
Bank with specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions (Council, 2012). We are referring to the possibility of early 
intervention measures by the ECB, when a bank has violated, or is about to violate 
regulatory capital requirements. This early intervention can be based both on daily 
on-site checks by national supervisory authorities and on current daily assessments of 
such bank, experiencing serious difficulties. The national supervisory authority 
informs the ECB on the current assessment and acts as an integral part of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. 
In connection with the proposed structuring of the conceptual model of 
influence network, of great importance is to determine precisely the timeframe of 
the process of influence and control discussed above. These timeframes (the steps of 
the models) of the processes are shown in Chart 4.4 and 4.5. The advantage is clearly 
in favour of the version applying network-centric approach and ensuring high 
operability and security of the banking system, seen as a critical infrastructure. 
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Chart 4.4 - Traditional implementation of the influence network for regulation 
and supervision 
 
Chart 4.5 - Network-centric implementation of the influence network for 
regulation and supervision 
Chart 4.6 presents the hierarchy of the financial (including the banking) system 
of influence and control in the EU. The main idea is to build a joint analytical 
framework of the complex system (which includes all levels). On the second stage, 
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the idea is to show that with different organization of the players (the two alternative 
strategies), the system could be made more stable and operable. 
 
Chart 4.6 - Hierarchy of the system of influence and control 
Functional network: 
 áà͞tǇpeàa͟àageŶtà;ďaŶkͿàa is described by the vectors (Va, Sa, Xa) where: 
 is an agent attribute, like: capital adequacy. 
 is the set of the outputs. These outputs are exposures to 
other nodes in the banking network (loans to other agents).  
 is the set of the inputs. The inputs are resources attracted 
from other agents in the banking network. 
áàshoĐkàisàaŶàuŶpƌediĐtaďleàeǀeŶtàthatàŵodiﬁesàtheàageŶtàstateàaŶdàalteƌsàtheà
behavior of agent a, reducing its capabilities to provide assets and repay liabilities. 
ESRB 
ESMA 
National 
Supervisory 
Authorities 
EIOPA 
Heterogeneou
s banking 
systems 
EBA 
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A shock is present when the capitalàadeƋuaĐǇàfallsàďeloǁà̌àĐeƌtaiŶàthƌeshold,à
for example: . 
A default is present when the capital buffer is exhausted: . 
A liability is characterized by  where x is the value of the liability 
and tx the time at which the value x is available. 
The agent state (stability) is modeled by the agent attribute Va. 
Sa and Xa model the capability of the agent to interact with other agents by 
providing assets and attracting liabilities. 
 
Agents’ interdependencies: 
The relationship among agent attributes, outputs and inputs: 
The agent state Va is function of the time and of the agent outputs Sa. 
Assuming that the time is discrete, and that each agent attribute v
a
i depends on a 
subset of the agent outputs  we have: 
 
t denotes the clock steps. 
Two agents: a1 and a2 interact if exist at least one output provided by a1 that 
is an input for a2:  
 
for some  and  
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Furthermore the output activities depend on the capital levels of the bank and 
on the regulatory environment (limits, restrictions): 
 
A bank chooses to which bank to lend in a semi-random process. The more 
capitalized the target bank is, the higher the chance is to be chosen. The bank limits 
its lending activities when it is close to 8% capital adequacy. A second option is: the 
more interconnected the target bank, the higher the chance to be chosen. This is in 
line with the idea for scale-free network with hubs. 
National supervisors: 
áŶàageŶtà͞tǇpeàb͟à;ŶatioŶalàsupeƌǀisoƌͿàisàdesĐƌiďedàďǇàtheàǀeĐtoƌsà(Vb, Sb, Xb) 
where: 
 is a set of the agent attribute – budget (bail-out-ready funds). 
 is the set of the outputs. These outputs could be regulations 
(limits), individual restrictions, bail-outs. 
 is the set of the inputs. The inputs could the stability 
(attributes) of all the agent type a in a particular jurisdiction, decisions and actions of 
other agents type b, etc. 
 
Agents’ interdependencies: 
The relationship among agent attributes, outputs and inputs: 
The agent output is function of the agent type b inputs, and the outputs of the 
agents type c (the behavior of the national supervisor depends on the stability 
(attributes) of the local banks and the decisions made by the EU level supervisors) 
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The agent state Vb is function of the time, of the agent type b outputs. 
 
Agents inputs depend on the agents type a attributes (the stability of the 
banks: the capital buffers of the banks):  
 
 
EU level supervisor: 
áŶàageŶtà͞tǇpeàc͟à;йUàleǀelàsupeƌǀisoƌͿàisàdesĐƌiďedàďǇàtheàǀeĐtoƌsà(Vc, Sc, Xc) 
where: 
 is a set of the agent attribute, like: bail-out-ready funds, credibility. 
 is the set of the outputs. These outputs could be regulations, 
bail-outs, decisions concerning individual agents type b. 
 is the set of the inputs. The inputs could the stability 
(attributes) the EU banking system and the attributes of agents type b. 
 
Agents’ interdependencies: 
The relationship among agent attributes, outputs and inputs: 
The agent output is function of the agent type c inputs (the decision of the 
agent type c depends on the stability of the banks and the performance of the 
national supervisors): 
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The agent state Vc is function of the time, of the agent type c outputs. 
 
ágeŶtsàiŶputsàdepeŶdàoŶàtheàageŶts͛àtype a and type b attributes (stability and 
performance of the banks and national supervisors): 
 
 
It is appropriate to upgrade the specific heterogeneous structure of the 
banking system (network), described and developed in Chapter III of the dissertation, 
with the influence system of supervision realized as network-centric multi-agent 
architecture.  
The resulting combination is proposed as a conceptual model of the banking 
critical infrastructure, realized through the network-centric approach. 
4.7. Methodological prerequisites for the implementation of the 
network-centric approach 
The new organization for unified banking supervision, a new pan-European 
deposit guarantee scheme and the single European framework for restructuring and 
recovery of the institutions proposed by the European Commission can be effective 
only at high operability, the achievement of which requires appropriate 
methodological prerequisites for implementing the network -centric approach. 
The setting of new requirements, new structures and new relationships, in 
particular those for adapting the existing EBA regulation to the new regime for 
banking supervision upgrades the hierarchical system, but also increases its 
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complexity. To this we have to add the need for the Single supervisory mechanism to 
monitor nearly 6 000 banks in the Euro zone. The establishment of a new strong 
centralization of the control (command) structure, headed by the ECB, is likely to 
result in delayed reactions along the hierarchical administrative structure, and 
respectively, along the regulation-supervision chain. In order to avoid such 
undesirable effects it is appropriate to introduce a modern approach and tools to 
achieve interoperability (operability, pace) in the unified financial (banking) system. 
The effective implementation of the above plans and proposals under the 
European Commission will obviously require a new methodology for the intended 
activities. Here the operability becomes of prime importance. Accordingly, a new 
model is needed for the hierarchical system, corresponding to other operating 
systems, for example in the field of security, in particular the military systems. 
In this regard, we examine the applicability of basic methodological aspects of 
the network-centric approach (Ahvenainen, 2003), typical for highly operative and 
responsive systems, including business systems operating in near real time. We pay 
attention to specific aspects concerning applications in the financial (banking) 
structure, to which our interpretation is directed. 
Most network organizations reduce the number of organizational levels and 
create a direct link to the source of information, increasing the pace of operations. 
The pace (time) is central to success, in this way most network organizations 
become better adapted to the complex and dynamic situations. Operability is crucial 
to success, especially if the organization has room for competition. The network 
allows for increasing the pace when the level of management and control is low 
(insufficient). In this case, the information disseminated throughout the network 
compensates for the lack of administrative guidance. The management is 
transformed into dissemination of necessary information and thus the information is 
substitute for other resources. 
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The interaction within the network and the cooperation at the horizontal level 
is a basic requirement. The cooperation forms a concentrated effect of distributed 
power (Ahvenainen, 2003). At the horizontal level there is opportunity for 
management and control, information exchange, congruent goals of the agents (in 
winning situations), division of labor and responsibilities. 
 The network-centric approach involves primarily the application of new 
information and communication technologies, as well as a new doctrine and new 
ideas for operation. New organizations using these technologies and doctrines are 
being created. The modern complex and dynamic systems require more information 
and knowledge, and the process of transformation requires the necessary self-
organization and operability. 
The network-centric approach works primarily bottom-up, while the 
hierarchical system works in the reverse order. The information comes from the 
bottom or from the neighbors with a possibility for self-synchronization between 
them. The possibility to share information is key to achieving shared knowledge 
based on advanced technologies in communications. This approach is essentially an 
integrated communication, integrated interaction and appropriate management and 
control, enabling distributed interactions in the system. "Distributed" means the 
distribution of management and control over the entire network and an integrated 
use of resources. 
The essence of the network-centric approach is the possibility to exchange 
information in the composition of the so-called "influence networks". This is of key 
importance for the achievement of shared knowledge in the executive departments 
as an opportunity for cooperation and synchronization. 
Based on the modern information technologies it is necessary that the 
information from the operational level is combined with the information coming from 
the hierarchy. This gives full awareness and the necessary networking capabilities of 
the system, and secures operational compatibility. 
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In summary, we should point out that the required operability is achieved by: 
- reducing the levels of management; 
- increasing the network activity; 
- self-synchronization, in terms of achieving the objectives of the hierarchy by 
reducing the number of levels of interaction; 
- self-synchronization requires the presence of advance information and 
achievement of higher quality of the operations. 
4.8. Network supervision - a new organization of supervisory 
processes in a network-centric environment 
The new type of organization of the influence and control processes is a 
prerequisite for a network-centric supervision and regulation. It is a promising 
alternative to the institutional, functional and targeted supervision models.  
4.8.1. How to structure the network supervision? 
The issues concerning the structuring of the network supervision can be 
summarized in the following categories: 
- Participating countries; 
- Categories of financial institutions included in the network supervision; 
- Institution responsible for the supervision activities; 
- Institution responsible for the restructuring of distressed banks; 
- Degree of centralization of the financial resources for the network 
supervision; 
- Sources of financial resources for the network supervision; 
- Structure and management framework of the network supervision. 
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According to the authors (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2012), the main purpose of the 
banking policies is to ensure the proper functioning of the financial intermediation 
exercised by the banking sector. To achieve effective prevention and crisis 
management, the banking policies rely on four pillars: regulation, supervision, deposit 
guarantee and bank restructuring. 
The regulations aim at strengthening the banks' resilience to shocks and 
reducing the secondary effects resulting from a bank failure with a significant impact 
on the economy and society. 
The Supervision allows monitoring the banking activity and the risk-taking in 
order to ensure that they are managed in the best way. 
The Deposit guarantee is intended to counter the threat of bank run by 
protecting the value of deposits. 
The Bank restructuring allows reorganization or restructuring of a bank 
without significant negative consequences for the system and ideally without the use 
of taxpayers' money. 
In the European context the bank policy is highly integrated (Pisani-Ferry et al., 
2012) in comparison with other regional unions; however, most of the policy 
instruments are currently at the national level. Banking regulations are highly 
harmonized as a result of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), adopted in 1999. 
The undertaken measure to create a single rulebook is also taken into account, but 
presently the supervision, deposit guarantee and bank restructuring remain at the 
national level. As regards the supervision function, coordination mechanisms exist to 
some extent, including via the European Banking Authority established in 2011. In the 
area of Deposi guarantee there is a partial harmonization, the minimum threshold is 
set at 100 000 EUR, but the systems, structures and funding methods themselves 
vary considerably. The Restructuring of banks is also at the national level, and some 
countries have not even adopted regulations in this area. 
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To be effective, the network supervision has to cover the mentioned four 
pillars. The different functions can be allocated to different institutions, but in any 
case they must be at one (supranational) level, which is the network supervision. 
4.8.2. Banking regulations 
At the European level, an initiative was taken to align the implementations of 
EU regulations, and to this end the major projects are now adopted as regulations 
which are directly applicable in the Member States and do not need to be reflected in 
the domestic legislations. In this way are avoided differences in the interpretation 
and implementation of the various requirements. On the other hand, the more 
technical issues are governed by "mandatory standards", the majority of which will 
be issued by the EBA. These standards will again be directly applicable in the Member 
States. 
4.8.3. Fiscal responsibility for the network supervision 
In order for the network supervision to be effective, the institution must have 
a budget for interventions. The means may be provided from a fund established for 
this purpose. These funds may be raised from banks under the deposit guarantee 
scheme or in the form of taxes or fees, or from the countries participating in the 
respective network supervision. Alternatively, the funds may come from the 
subsequent distribution of incurred expenses. In any case, a common financial buffer 
is required for the efficient functioning of the institution. Reliance on local budgets 
would put at risk the effectiveness and the timeliness of response of the network 
supervisor. 
 The establishment of common fund entails other risks (Pisani-Ferry & Wolff, 
2012), which need to be considered. On the one hand, a fair criterion must be 
observed for the allocation of the financial burden to the countries or banks. On the 
other hand, the common fund could lead to moral risk. The aggregation of risk at a 
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supranational level can stimulate individual states to implement less responsible 
policies with regard to the financial system, since the potential losses will be suffered 
by all participants in the network supervision. 
The common fund leads to yet another difficulty (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2012) 
related to the different currencies in the different countries participating in the 
supervising authority, for example when it comes to the inclusion of countries 
outside the euro area. This situation could lead to difficulties in coordinating the 
poliĐiesàofàtheàĐeŶtƌalàďaŶks͛àiŶdiǀidualàliƋuiditǇàpolicies. 
4.8.4. Banking supervision 
The current financial system relies heavily on institutional regulation and 
supervision (Heremans, 2000). Banks, investment firms and insurance companies are 
supervised by different institutions. The situation is getting more complex when 
market participants extend their activities and their interconnectedness. In such case, 
a close coordination of the supervisory requirements is required in order to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage. The network supervision based on consistent prudential 
requirements for the institutions in the network could avoid this drawback of 
institutional oversight. 
The organization and distribution of functions for supervision and restructuring 
of troubled banks are essential to the effectiveness of the network supervision. In this 
regard, the main features of the new organizational framework of the supervisory 
processes in a network-centric environment are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Network segmentation 
Depending on the network structure, the different, relatively independent 
parts of the network could be covered by different supervisors. These segments can 
be built around a hub (large, systemically important banks) or covering a 
concentration of connections without the involvement of a hub. The condition of the 
segmentation is the sub-networks to be relatively autonomous, i.e. the internal 
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borders of the network should be identified – areas with a low concentration of 
connectivity. 
The network segmentation determines also the range of countries that 
participate in the network supervision. If there is more than one sub-network 
(segmented network), a particular country can be covered by two or more network 
supervisors. 
Network dynamics 
Regarding the network dynamics, if the network is volatile, one should be 
looking for the stable connections and trends such that the supervisory 
responsibilities could be allocated according to them. A review of the network 
topology is conducted at specified periods (for example – one year), and the 
allocation of the supervisory responsibility is reviewed accordingly. 
Network approach 
The network approach is close to the functional supervisory approach in which 
the individual networks: payment systems, capital markets, debt markets, investment 
markets, etc. are based on different functions of banks. Since some networks are 
interconnected or are overlapping institutionally, in such case they can be regulated 
by a single network supervisory authority. 
Inclusion of all financial institutions, connected in the network 
All financial institutions involved in the network should be included in the 
scope of the supervision. Extending the network supervision beyond the banks would 
allow coverage of other non-bank financial institutions (insurance, investment 
companies, etc.) involved in the network. Thus a regulatory arbitrage will be avoided 
by market participants by transferring parts of banking activities to non-bank 
institutions. The unification of the supervisory treatment would reduce the value of 
such activities and will deal with the problem "shadow banking". The extending of the 
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scope of the supervision to cover all participants in the network is shown as a 
possibility in Chart 4.7. 
Upon establishing such joint supervisory structures, there is a view that it is 
necessary to supervise only large, systemically important banks, and the rest may be 
dealt with by local supervisors. In the context of network supervision that would 
include only hubs. Such a situation would create differences in the supervisory 
treatment in the individual institutions. On the other hand, the thus defined scope 
would fail to include a banking cluster in which there is strong interconnectedness, 
but no clearly outlined hub. To overcome such situations, we propose the inclusion of 
all institution, connected in the network.  
Institution for bank recovery and restructuring 
The function of recovery and restructuring can be delegated to the network 
supervisor or to another institution established for this purpose. In the second case, 
such institution should have the same scope as the network supervision. To ensure its 
effectiveness, the institution must have at its disposal a fund with which to operate 
when needed. The alternative, where funding is allocated to and collected from the 
member states on a case-by-case basis, would reduce the efficiency and the ability to 
respond rapidly and suppress shocks in the system. This in turn would lead to a 
negative impact on the function of the network supervision. 
Scope of the network supervision 
We consider that the definition of the scope of the network supervision should 
be closely linked with the concept of the interruptibility. It is advisable that the 
supervisory authority cover all financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, 
investment companies, etc.), which are materially interconnected, not depending on 
whether they are part of a group or are connected to each other by exposures or 
otherwise. 
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We can define "material interconnection" as a link between individual 
companies, which could not be broken without causing negative effects on the 
activity of at least one of these companies. 
Upon determining the scope of the network supervisor, the actual topology of 
the network and the essential connections between the financial institutions should 
be analyzed. If we can demonstrate that a connection can be interrupted without 
negative consequences, the company at the end of the connection could be left 
outside the scope of the particular network supervisor. 
The traditional hierarchical systems have limited internal interconnectedness 
and therefore are easily interruptible (Haldane, 2009). Modern financial systems 
evolve in the opposite direction, increasing their internal complexity and 
interconnectedness, and thus reducing their discontinuity. Structured financial 
products also help to enhance the relationship between institutions and sub-
structures in the network, making it virtually non- interruptible. 
Metaphorically, we can say that the scope of the network supervision follows 
the boundaries of the different risk areas, determined by the structure of the 
financial market. 
Structure of the network supervision 
Chart 4.7 presents a sample structure of a network supervisory architecture. 
One of the main characteristics of the network supervision is its close position to the 
network, i.e. knowing its peculiarities and having up-to-date information about its 
condition would allow the supervisor to react promptly on a problem in one of the 
nodes. 
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Chart 4.7 - Structure of a network supervision 
This structure can be applied both domestically and in a cross-border context. 
At the international level (e.g. EU level) the day-to-day oversight of individual 
financial institutions, i.e. operational supervisory activities, could be handled by the 
network supervision authority using the expertise of the local supervisors. This will 
overcome the potential problems arising from the fact that the supranational body 
does not have the most detailed knowledge about the peculiarities of individual 
institutions. 
The network supervisor could overcome the serious problem of coordination 
and distribution of responsibilities between the home and host supervisory 
authorities of the financial institution when there is a case of a cross-border financial 
group. This is possible because the network supervision will cover the essential 
relationships (links) along which a need for coordination in problem solving could 
emerge. 
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At the EU level, for example, if there is more than one supervisory institution, 
it is necessary to coordinate between them. This coordination, however, will be 
mainly in the field of synchronization of supervisory practices specifying the 
supervisory requirements introduced in the EU. The need for coordination upon 
imposing specific prudential measures is unlikely to occur, because the lack of 
material connections between the individual networks, supervised by individual 
network supervisors, determines the absence of such situations. If subsequently such 
material connections do arise, it will be necessary to review the respective network 
supervisions. 
The management and decision-making by the network supervision must 
involve local supervisors responsible for the institutions covered by the network 
supervision. The effective functioning of that supervision requires the establishment 
of effective rules of voting and management. 
The regulatory function should be performed by a separate institution, as the 
scope of network supervision will not match exactly in individual countries or regions. 
In the European context, the European Banking Authority can perform this task. It can 
serve as a platform for coordination between the individual network supervisions (if 
it is necessary to establish more than one). 
Information availability in the network supervision 
Although there is no "universal" supervisory model for each situation and each 
market, the general formula for effective supervision is always to have 
comprehensive and up-to-date information (Masciandaro & Quintyn, 2009). The 
application of this rule is not so easy, though. When markets were relatively static 
and segmented, the information about the status of the system at a point in time, 
collected at certain periods, was sufficient. In such cases the vertical supervisory 
model would logically be the most effective solution. 
A fundamental principle is that the frequency of data collection must conform 
to its dynamics. Nowadays, the dynamics of the financial market requires constant 
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updating of information. Based on the modern information technologies, the 
achievement of shared awareness, using "near real-time" information, would not 
constitute a difficulty. The positive effects of this common knowledge far outweigh 
the cost of achieving it. This information will allow the real-time regulation of the 
system, in a manner similar to the classic critical infrastructures. There is a possibility 
to use a wide range of tools for timely identification of potential risks, such as 
simulations, stress-tests, risk dashboards, etc. If this information is available to the 
market participants (depending on the adopted market structure), this would result 
in the possibility of self-synchronization of the system, enabling proactive responses 
of the market participants in the event of systemic problems. 
In both cases, supervisors and market participants have to invest in new 
analytical tools (Haldane, 2009). The analysis of individual participants as VaR analysis 
does not show clearly the stability of an institution. It is necessary to give 
consideration to the network analysis, for instance analysis of the distribution of 
connections and the average length of the connections. To these static indicators 
must be added dynamic indicators, reflecting the dynamic stability of the system. A 
possible tool for this type of analysis is the simulation of a collapse of a certain core. 
Stress testing should change the focus from individual to systemic risk. 
4.8.5. Alternatives to network supervision 
The proposals for cutting of the "too big to fail" banks would not lead to 
satisfactory results, because the individual institutions will remain interconnected in a 
network, which still poses a systemic risk. Similar ideas for dismantling of big 
institutions are set out iŶà theà "ViĐkeƌsà ƌepoƌt͟à ;ICB,à ϮϬϭϭͿ,à ǁhiĐhà pƌoǀidesà aà
fƌaŵeǁoƌkàfoƌàƌefoƌŵiŶgàtheàfiŶaŶĐialàŵaƌketsàiŶàtheàUы,àaŶdàiŶàtheà"LiikaŶeŶàƌepoƌt͟à
(Liikanen, 2012), which provides a framework for stabilizing the European financial 
market (in parallel with the introduction of the European version of Basel III). The 
"Vickers report" offers the separation of the retail functions of the financial 
institutions from their riskier activities. Similarly, the "Liikanen report" offers the 
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possibility of taking out the risky trading activities from the financial institutions. The 
two proposals are similar in nature, emphasizing on the separation of activities 
important to the economy from those that are highly risky. In fact, the risk is not 
mitigated, because even separated, the individual companies remain in one group 
and the channel for shock transmission (capital ties, mutual exposures, etc.) remains 
active, this is valid also for the reputation risk, which can easily lead to a bank run. 
The interruptibility is an important concept in the analysis of systemic risks. If 
it is possible to interrupt network links that threaten its stability, it would be an 
effective means of stabilizing the economy. The above proposals are aimed at that 
idea. The real question is how interruptible the links are. This crisis has shown for 
example that securitization schemes that were considered effective for breaking the 
liŶkàďetǁeeŶàeǆposuƌeàaŶdàƌisk,àaĐtuallǇàdidŶ͛tàpeƌfoƌŵàthisàfuŶĐtioŶàeffeĐtiǀelǇàaŶdà
required implicit support from their initiators in times of market turmoil. 
4.8.6. Macro-prudential dimension of the network supervision 
Macro-prudential policies are defined as policies using primarily prudential 
tools to limit systemic financial risks (IMF, 2011). Whether the macro-prudential 
policies are considered a new type of function or a reorientation of existing 
regulatory policies, their success depends on two factors: access to information and a 
selection of different tools of impact (Nier et al., 2011). It is not by chance that 
macro-supervision is associated with the central banks as institutions having financial 
information. However, these often have information limited mainly to the banking 
market, not covering other sectors of the financial market. The network supervision 
has the advantage of being an institution that covers various market participants, 
especially as its scope follows the boundaries of the system of different but 
interconnected institutions, thereby facilitating actions to reduce systemic risks. 
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4.8.7. Network supervision and the supervisory and regulatory framework 
in the EU 
In September 2012, the European Commission published a proposal for the 
establishment of a supervisory mechanism as a step towards the creation of Bank 
Union (Council, 2012). The recently adopted supervisory mechanism aims to make 
the transition from the current model of allocated responsibilities with coordination 
mechanisms to a model of centralized bank supervision, covering all banks in the 
euro area, and later throughout the EU. It is envisaged that the ECB will take on the 
role of this single supervisory authority. 
The EC proposal is somewhat compatible with the concept of network 
supervision, to the extent that the intention to transfer the basic supervisory rights 
and responsibilities from the national to the EU level has been clearly expressed. This 
confirms the view that coordination is an insufficient mechanism to deal with the 
problems of the financial system. 
The differences between the network supervision model and the newly 
adopted role of the ECB are essential at this stage. It has been shown that the 
centralization of supervisory functions often does not lead to greater efficiency and 
often increases administration. In addition, the vertical supervisory model remains 
active, where the ECB will have responsibilities only for the banking sector. For the 
other sectors of the financial market the new EU framework does not provide the 
establishment of such structures. The inefficiency stems from the fact that the 
supervision mechanism builds on the current "Lamfalussy" model. The European 
Banking Authority (EBA), one of the "Lamfalussy" structures, is a collective body and 
every major decision should be adopted by its Board of Supervisors, in which 
participate representatives of all banking supervisory authorities in the EU. That, and 
the way the body works, determines the relatively slow process of decision making. 
The involvement of the ECB in the supervision framework adds an additional layer of 
coordination and administration, as the ECB assumes the rights of national 
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supervisors involved in EBA, and any decision by the ECB in this area is also subject to 
a final vote by the Governing Council of the ECB, in which almost the same 
representatives of national supervisory authorities participate. The overlapping of 
administrative procedures, response times and coordination mechanisms determine 
the slow performance of the new structure. 
4.8.8. Advantages of the network supervision 
One of the main advantages of the network supervision architecture is that it 
would be particularly effective in a highly integrated market and in the presence of 
various institutions, groups and conglomerates operating in various sectors of the 
market, while not requiring the presence of multiple regulatory and supervisory 
institutions. 
By regarding the financial system as a complex adaptive system, we can apply 
some of the analytical techniques from other network disciplines such as ecology, 
epidemiology, biology and engineering. (Haldane,2009). Using a network perspective, 
we see from a different angle the structural defects accumulating in the financial 
system, and can offer means to improve the stability of the system. Using the 
network theory, we can explain the emergence of two main characteristics of the 
financial system – its complexity and homogeneity. Together, they make the system 
both susceptible and resistant – a feature common to other complex adaptive 
systems. As seen from the analysis in Chapter III, the network system has a definite 
turning point. Up to a certain point the network links serve to absorb shock by 
allocating small part of it to the participants, thus diluting it. But after a certain point 
the behavior of the system turns and the links begin to help spread the shock, instead 
of mitigating it. Often the systemic effect is not proportional to the initial shock. 
The structure of the network is also asymmetric (Haldane, 2009). A random 
network is expected to have a normal distribution of interconnectivity, as measured 
by the number of links to various cores. But the financial system has, like many other 
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systems such as epidemiological networks, food chains and internet networks, 
asymmetric distribution of links. There are a number of cores with lower and higher 
number of links than the average for the network. Researchers demonstrate that 
networks with such "scale free" distribution are more resistant to random attacks, 
but are vulnerable to targeted attacks (Porterie et al., 2008). This characteristic of the 
financial networks is evident also from the analysis that we made in Chapter III. 
Targeted attacks are more dangerous because if the target is a hub, this could easily 
lead to system crash. The "small-world" effect inherent to these networks also 
influences the susceptibility. These types of networks are more likely experience local 
problems in the system (Porterie et al., 2008). 
The stress in the system increases its vulnerability, as in the spreading of 
certain diseases (Haldane, 2009). The size and complexity of the system increase the 
uncertainty and make it difficult to evaluate the assets. The financial innovations in 
the form of a structured product increase further the complexity and uncertainty of 
the network. On the other hand, the diversification of the system is undermined by 
the marketàpaƌtiĐipaŶts͛àďusiŶessàstƌategiesàaŶdàƌiskàŵaŶageŵeŶtàteĐhŶiƋues,àŵakiŶgà
the system more fragile to shocks – resembling the marine eco-systems whose 
diversity decreases and this increases their susceptibility to failures. The evolution of 
the network topology suggests that the occurrence of sudden interruptions (shocks) 
is a matter of time. From this viewpoint, the current crisis is the materialization of 
this type of event. 
We believe that the network supervisory architecture is best suited to respond 
to the evolution of the financial system and prevent system failures, because the 
focus is on the interaction between market participants, not only on their individual 
stability. From this perspective, it is possible to take a complex approach treating 
both the causes for and the consequences of the shock. 
The idea of implementing a network-centric approach in the financial sector is 
an attempt to address the need to develop techniques for transformation of the 
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financial (banking) system from a structure with a consequent (delayed in time) 
management and regulation, into an operational self-regulating system (system of 
systems) operating near real-time. In the case of the financial system, this 
transformation aims at transition from a system where supervisors take action 
against certain problems after their identification and analysis, which requires 
considerable time. The goal is the response of supervisors and market participants to 
follow immediately the appearance of a specific problem and depending on the scale 
and nature of this problem, different cores are dynamically formed, which allows 
swift response. This rapid response in the network would be possible because of the 
availability of timely and adequate information. This would achieve the 
transformation, allowing substantial increase of the stability and the efficiency of the 
entire system. 
4.8.9. Opportunities for practical implementation of network-centric 
supervision 
The idea is to extend the scope and the means for action in Crisis response 
operations (CRO). These techniques have proven their effectiveness in practice with 
the operation of joint multinational structures in basic areas of security (military and 
humanitarian). In times of financial crisis, the operations for stabilizing the banking 
system could be performed by the establishment of integrated (internationally) joint 
financial supervisory structures (Mirchev, 2013). This joint structure is appropriate to 
have the following functions:  
- regulation and supervision of financial activities in specific emerging crisis; 
- restructuring of financial structures; 
-centralization and distribution of financial resources required for network 
supervision refinancing operations. 
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The possible joint integrated supervisory structures (JISS), assigned to a 
particular network or network segment, must be authorized by senior management 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that determines the necessary financing. 
On this basis, in the normal situation the different joint supervisory structures 
(banking, insurance, securities, etc.) should be trained through a cross-
border/domestic financial crisis simulation exercises for the simulation of possible 
scenarios for crisis management and implementation of contingency plans. 
The JISS will be reinforced when there is a need for real action on crisis 
management. A supervisory crisis center is created. These structures act essentially 
decentralized in that given network or network segment based on the powers and 
responsibilities delegated by the central European authority (the SSM for example). 
Thus emerges also possibilities for managing of cross-border financial crises when 
there is an interaction of financial institutions from countries with significant banking 
interrelationships. 
After completion of the crisis management, in the supervisory crisis center will 
remain surveillance team and the other experts will return to their usual 
assignments. 
On the basis of the implemented activities, an after action review, and lessons 
learned analysis and recommendations are elaborated for responding to such 
situations and for providing the necessary financial stability. 
4.9. Aim of a Network-centric approach application 
The aim is to develop a methodology for a comprehensive assessment of a 
critical infrastructure. The proposed methodology for assessing the elements of a 
critical infrastructure (CI) is based on the following principles: 
For an aggregated measure of the criticality could be taken the risk assessment 
of an object/system.  
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       The risk Рn is defined as:   Рn = f ;thƌeat * pƌoďaďility * ĐonseƋuenĐesͿ  
       Рn = f ;T * Р * CͿ 
      The threat T to the critical object could be driven by cascade effects. A 
measure of the threat is its intensity/force. 
  The probability P for occurrence of the above-mentioned threat is the second 
factor. 
  The consequences C are the direct losses, which the object provokes by its 
disfunctioning. 
The risk assessment for a given object or system can be regarded as an 
aggƌegateà ŵeasuƌeà ofà theà iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe͛sà Đƌiticality. For our method, this formula 
could be modified. First of all, to meet the essence of the CI, we add another 
element, which takes into account the network-centric structure/technology. 
The Network-centric influence Nc is assessed as a factor reducing the level of 
anticipated losses. 
 Рn = f ;T * Р * ;C – Nc)) 
4.10. Conclusions from the application of the critical infrastructure 
concept and network-centric approach to banking markets 
The application of the critical infrastructure paradigm in estimating the 
vulnerability of the banking system and the introduction of the here developed 
simulation modeling directed to network-centric multi-agent architecture for 
interdependent critical banking structures allows achieving high operability and 
security of the banking system. 
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The development of the proposed conceptual dynamic model of the banking 
system allows its improvement as a reliable component of the joint system of security 
and stability. 
The network supervisory architecture is best suited to meet the evolution of 
the financial system and prevent system failures, because the focus is on the 
interaction between market participants, not only on their individual stability.  
The new type of organization of the influence and management processes 
necessitates the network-centric supervision and regulation. It is a promising 
alternative to the institutional, functional and targeted supervision. 
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General conclusions 
This study is an attempt to respond to the need to develop and propose 
ways for transformation of the current banking system structure that operates 
with delayed-in-time management and impact, into a self-regulating operating 
system that works in near real time. This change would allow a significant 
increase in the stability and efficiency of the system. Thus, this study is an 
attempt to generate interest in the possibility for the application of innovative 
approaches and tools for transformation of the banking system. 
The new unified organization of banking supervision, proposed by the 
European Commission, the new pan-European deposit insurance and the 
common European framework for the restructuring and resolution of financial 
institutions can be effective only in high operability. To achieve the necessary 
transformation of banking system it would be appropriate to provide near real-
time operational information to the centralized European Banking Supervision, 
which will allow them to decide on banking measures, resolutions and needs of 
recapitalization. It would also be appropriate to allow the centralized European 
Banking Supervision to perform its duties in a network manner in response to 
the dynamically changing network structure of interconnected banks. 
In order to contribute to the solution of the main challenges in front of 
the European banking system, the following steps could be outlined: 
1) The application of a decentralized network approach on EU level by 
enforcing the proposed network supervision model, which in fact will 
significantly improve the cooperation and coordination between the national 
supervisory authorities. 
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2) Analyzing and understanding the functioning of the banking system as 
a whole by treating it as complex network structure. While thinking about the 
banking market and the supervisory institutions as a set of different players 
and their behavior, we miss an important characteristic which is defined by 
their interaction between each other in the system. When thinking about the 
financial market as a system in which different sub-systems are interacting: 
banking system, national supervisory systems, EU supervisory system, etc, we 
can see that this is a complex multilayer network of networks. Such structures 
possess characteristics, not common to its components. A simulation model is 
presented, showing the bank system behavior in times of crisis. The model 
reveals that the stability of the system depends not only on the individual 
ďaŶk͛sàstaďilitǇ,àďutàalsoàoŶàtheàiŶteŶsitǇàaŶdàtheàsizeàofàiŶteƌďaŶkàĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs,à
i.e. how integrated the banking market is. 
3) Enhancing the development of the European program for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) by defining the banking system as a high-level 
economic infrastructure, given its fragility and its important role in the 
economy. By using the CIP paradigm we can outline a framework model which 
gives a new angle to the approaches for ensuring financial stability. 
This document is made available in accordance with 
the Creative Commons license "CC BY-NC-ND" 164 
Conclusions générales 
CeàtƌaǀailàestàuŶeàteŶtatiǀeàdeàƌĠpoŶdƌeàăà laàŶĠĐessitĠàdeàpƌoposeƌàdesà
moyens de transformation de la structure du sǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌeàƋuiàfoŶĐtioŶŶeà
aǀeĐà effetà diffĠƌĠà ;età gestioŶà diffĠƌĠeͿ,à eŶà uŶà sǇstğŵeà d'autoƌĠgulatioŶà
opĠƌatioŶŶelleà ;sǇstğŵeàdeà sǇstğŵesͿà foŶĐtioŶŶaŶtàƋuasiŵeŶtàeŶà teŵpsà ƌĠel.à
CetteàtƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶàaĐĐƌoŠtƌaitàlaàstaďilitĠàetàl͛effiĐaĐitĠàduàsǇstğŵe.àCe travail 
ǀiseà aiŶsià ăà pƌoŵouǀoiƌà l'appliĐatioŶà d͛appƌoĐhesà età d͛outilsà Ŷoǀateuƌsà pouƌà
tƌaŶsfoƌŵeƌàleàsǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌe. 
LaàŶouǀelleàoƌgaŶisatioŶàuŶifiĠeàdeàsupeƌǀisioŶàďaŶĐaiƌe,àpƌoposĠeàpaƌàlaà
CoŵŵissioŶà йuƌopĠeŶŶe,à leà Ŷouǀeauà sǇstğŵeà d͛assurance-dĠpƀtsà
paŶeuƌopĠeŶà età leà Đadƌeà euƌopĠeŶà ĐoŵŵuŶà pouƌà laà ƌestƌuĐtuƌatioŶà età laà
ƌĠoƌgaŶisatioŶà desà iŶstitutioŶsà peuvent ġtƌeà effiĐaĐes seuleŵeŶtà ăà hautà
ƌeŶdeŵeŶt.àPouƌàƌĠaliseƌà laàtƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶàŶĠĐessaiƌeàduàsǇstğŵeàďaŶĐaiƌe,à ilà
seƌaità appƌopƌiĠà deà fouƌŶiƌà pƌesƋueà eŶ teŵpsà ƌĠelà deà l'iŶfoƌŵatioŶà
opĠƌatioŶŶelleà ĐouƌaŶteà ăà l͛iŶstaŶĐeà deà supeƌǀisioŶà ďaŶĐaiƌeà euƌopĠeŶŶeà
ĐeŶtƌalisĠeà suƌà lesàŵesuƌesà ăàpƌeŶdƌeàauàŶiǀeauàdeà l͛architecture bancaire et 
suƌà lesà ďesoiŶsà deà ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶà deà ƌeĐapitalisatioŶ.à Ilà seƌaità ĠgaleŵeŶtà
oppoƌtuŶà deà peƌŵettƌeà ăà laà supeƌǀisioŶà ďaŶĐaiƌeà euƌopĠeŶŶeà ĐeŶtƌalisĠeà
d'exercer ses fonctions d͛uŶà ŵaillageà ƌĠseauà ĐeŶtƌiƋueà eŶà ƌĠpoŶseà auà
ĐhaŶgeaŶtà dǇŶaŵiƋueŵeŶtà deà laà stƌuĐtuƌeà duà ƌĠseauà desà ďaŶƋuesà
iŶteƌdĠpeŶdaŶts. 
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̛ко̦о̸̛̥е̭ќ̛тà̬̭̌те̙,à̏-кàК̌п̛т̌л,ḁ̬̀̌т. 
142. ʿ ̬е̐о̏о̛̬̦à ̐л̛̌̏à ̦̌à ʥ̻л̛̬̐̌́à ̭à ʫˁ,à ʧл̌̏̌à ϯà ͞ʿ̬едо̭т̦̌̏́еà ̦̌ у̭лу̛̐͟,à
www.evroportal.bg. 
143. ʿ ̬е̐о̏о̛̬̦à ̐л̛̌̏à ̦̌à ʥ̻л̛̬̐̌́à ̭à ʫˁ,à ʧл̌̏̌à ϰà ͞ˁ̏о̍од̦оà д̛̙̏е̛̦еà ̦̌à
к̌п̛т̌л̛͟,ààǁǁǁ.eǀƌopoƌtal.ďg. 
144. ˁ л̌̏о̏̌,à ˉ.,à ϮϬϬϱ,à ʫ̬̏опе̜̭к̛теà ̦̍̌к̛à ̭т̌̏̌тà ̭̏еà по-̦е̛̬̦̏,à
ˇеде̶̛̬̌́т̌à ̦̌à е̬̏опе̜̭к̛теà ̦̍̌к̛à ̻̬̏̚опт̌à ̭̬е̺уà д̛̬ект̛̛̏à ̦̌à
е̬̏око̛̛̥̭́т̌,à̏-кàʥ̦̌ке̬̻,à̬̍.àϯϰ. 
145. Т̬̌̐̌е̏,à Т.,à ʿ̌̏ло̏,à ʻ.,à ϮϬϬϱ,à ʺетод̛к̌à ̌̚à оп̬едел̦́еà ̦̌à к̛̬т̸̛̦̌à
̴̛̦̬̭̌т̬укту̬̌à ̛à ̬̬̌̌̍̚от̦̏̌еà ̦̌à ̭т̬̌те̛̐́à ̌̚à ̛̺̌̚т̌,à ʿ̻̬̏̌à
̶̛̦̌о̦̌л̦̌à ̦̌у̸̦о-п̬̌кт̸̛е̭к̌à ко̴̦е̬е̶̛̦́à поà уп̬̌̏ле̛̦еà ̏à
̛̻̦̬̏̚ед̛̦à ̛̭ту̶̛̛̌à̛à ̛̺̌̚т̌à̦̌à̦̭̌еле̛̦ето,à ʥ̻л̬̭̐̌к̌à ̌к̌де̛̥́à̦̌à
̦̌ук̛те,àˁо̴̛́. 
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146. ˈ ̌д̛̙тодо̬о̏,à ˁ.,à ϮϬϬϳ,à ʯ̛̺̌т̌à ̦̌à к̛̬т̸̛̦̌т̌à ̴̛̦̬̭̌т̬укту̬̌à ̏à
̶̛̦̌о̦̌л̦отоà ̌̚ко̦од̌тел̭т̏оà ̦̌à ̬епу̍л̛к̌à ʥ̻л̛̬̐̌́,à ʰ̚д̛̦̌еà ̌̚à
̦̌̌л̛̛̚à- ̥е̙ду̦̬̌од̦̌àпол̛т̛к̌à̛à̛̭̐у̬̦о̭тà– ʫк̭пе̬т. 
147. ˈ е̶̬о̐,à ˇ.,à ϮϬϬϮ,à ʿ̬едло̙е̛̦́ ̌̚à ʫ̬̏опе̜̭ќ̛à п̬̌л̥̌е̦т,à
www.parliament.bg/komisii/ei/. 
148. ˈ олл̛,à ˀ.,à ϮϬϬϱ,à ʿол̭̽к̛̜à ̬̼̦окà ̭т̵̬̌о̛̦̏̌́à ̏à ̴̛̦̦̭̌о̏о̜à ̛̭̭те̥еà
̐о̭уд̬̭̌т̏̌,à̙.à"ˁт̵̬̌о̏̌à̭п̬̌̏̌",àϬϮ.Ϭϯ.ϮϬϬϱ. 
149. Ш̛̏е̬̐е̏̌,à ʺ.,à ϮϬϬϮ,à ˁ̏о̍од̦оà п̬едо̭т̦̌̏́еà ̦̌à ̴̛̦̦̭̌о̛̏à у̭лу̛̐à ̏à
ʥ̻л̛̬̐̌́à– ̭̻̺̦о̭тà̛à̭̻̭то̛̦́еà̦̌àп̬е̐о̏о̛̬̦́àп̬о̶е̭,àˁ. 
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Annex 1 – Review of the supervisory and regulatory structures in 
the EU Member States 
This appendix presents a description of the current supervisory authorities in 
the Member States of the European Union and more specifically focuses on the major 
changes in the supervisory architectures, which came after a similar analysis carried 
out by the ECB in June 2003. 
Austria 
Since 2002, in Austria there are two supervisors: Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank (OeNB) and FinanzmaƌktaufsiĐhtsďehöƌdeà ;нiŶaŶĐialàMaƌketà áuthoƌitǇà
(FMA)), which is an independent institution, established by law and constitutes a 
separate legal entity. Financial Market Authority oversees investment funds, 
investment services providers, insurance companies, funds for labor compensation, 
pension funds, companies traded on the stock exchange and stock markets 
themselves. Since 2008, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) is the entirely 
responsible for banking supervision, performs on-site inspections, provide expertise 
and is responsible for processing the data from supervisory reports on the basis of 
which it regularly assesses the risk profile of banks. 
Supervised entities are required to provide regular information on their 
activities, its profitability and the risks (supervisory statistics) to the OeNB, where the 
data are then processed and reviewed. 
As for the interaction between different institutions, Financial Market 
Committee - an independent institution provides a platform for coordination 
between all institutions responsible for the stability of financial markets. 
Belgium 
áfteƌà theàŵeƌgeƌà ofà theà OffiĐeà deà CoŶtƌƀleà desà ássuƌaŶĐesà /à CoŶtƌoledieŶstà
voor de Verzekeringen (Insurance Control Office) and Commission Bancaire et 
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нiŶaŶĐiğƌeà /à Coŵŵissieà ǀooƌ het Bank - en Financiewezen (Banking and Finance 
Commission), which completed in January 2004, now in Belgium exists a single, 
unified supervisor. Ità isà Đalledà CoŵŵissioŶà ďaŶĐaiƌe,à fiŶaŶĐiğƌeà età desà assuƌaŶĐesà /à
Commissie voor het Bank, Financie en Assurantiewezen (CBFA). 
The Commission has powers to regulate and supervise credit institutions, 
investment firms, securities markets, companies, securities settlement and clearing 
institutions, collective investment schemes (CIS), insurance companies, insurance 
brokers and pension funds. This committee is responsible for overseeing the micro 
leǀel,à ǁhileà NatioŶaleà BaŶkà ǀaŶà Belgiëà /à BaŶƋueà NatioŶaleà deà BelgiƋueà ;NBBͿà isà
entrusted with the supervision of the macro-level. Coordination between the two 
bodies is provided as follows: three members of the Steering Committee of the NBB 
are involved in managing the CBFA. Moreover, according to the Belgian law, there is a 
framework for cooperation between the CBFA and the NBB in the face of the 
Financial Services Authority Supervisory Board. It combines the supervisory board 
and the board of regents (Council of Regency) on CBFA and NBB, and the Financial 
Stability Committee (FSC), including the boards of directors of both institutions. 
In October 2009, the Governors of the Belgian central bank and a single 
supervisor (CBFA) announced their common intention to converge the supervisory 
activities on micro and macro level. Initially it will be created a Committee on 
systemic risk and subsequently will look for ways to integrate the activities of the two 
institutions. The ultimate goal is the Belgian central bank to carry out overall 
supervision of the micro-level, while the new CBFA will be responsible for the 
financial markets (supervising business practices). Thus will be realized "twin-peaks" 
model. 
Cyprus 
Supervisory functions are allocated on the basis of the sectorial model. Central 
Bank of Cyprus (CBC) is the competent authority responsible for banking supervision: 
oversees banks and electronic money, ensures the stability of the banking system, 
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monitor systemic risks and protects depositors. Cooperative credit institutions are 
supervised and regulated by the Cooperative Societies Supervision and Development 
Authority (CSSDA), which is the successor to the Department of Cooperative 
Development, functioning as part of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism. Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) is responsible for the 
supervision of investment firms, the local collective investment schemes (CIS) and the 
supervision of the Cyprus Stock Exchange and issuers. It should be noted that the 
person representing the Governor of the CBC may attend meetings of the board of 
directors of the CySEC with no voting rights, but have the rights to pose questions for 
discussion on the agenda to participate in discussions and express opinions. This 
allows for better coordination and improved exchange of ideas between the CBC and 
the CySEC. Finally, Insurance Companies Control Service is under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Finance and supervised insurance sector. In order to better coordination 
of supervisory activities, national supervisory authorities signed a memorandum of 
cooperation, which entered into force on 1 January 2003 between three of the four 
supervisors. Fourth Supervisor, CSSDA, signed the document on November 10, 2003. 
The purpose of the memorandum is to promote interaction between different 
sectors by organizing frequent meetings of the "high level" and improve the exchange 
of information between supervisory authorities. 
Czech Republic 
On April 1, 2006 came into force framework for unified supervision of financial 
markets, introducing unified model. Supervisors previously existing, i.e. Securities 
Commission (SEC), Office for the Supervision of Insurance and Pension Funds (OSIPF) 
and the Office for Supervision of Cooperative Banks (OSCB) were closed and their 
fuŶĐtioŶsàaŶdàpeƌsoŶŶelàtƌaŶsfeƌƌedàtoàtheàĐeŶtƌalàďaŶk,àČeskĄàŶĄƌodŶşàďaŶkaà;CNBͿ.à
CNB is also responsible for supervising the banking, capital markets, insurance 
industry, pension funds, credit unions and electronic money institutions. As part of 
this reform Committee for the Financial Market (CFM) was established as an advisory 
report to the board of CNB for the supervision of financial markets. Of CFM is given 
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the right to provide comments and recommendations on strategies and approaches 
to the supervision of financial markets and systemic issues relating to financial 
markets. 
Denmark 
In Denmark there is a single supervisor, Finanstilsynet (Danish Financial 
Supervisory Authority - DFSA), which exists under the auspices of the Minister of 
Economic and Business Affairs. This body takes on the role as a regulator and 
supervisor, because it creates a draft regulations, relating to the financial sector and 
issue decisions. Supervisory functions include both supervision of all financial 
institutions (credit institutions, mortgage companies, insurance companies, pension 
funds, insurance brokers, Danish: Labour Market Supplementary Pension, Employees' 
Capital Pension Fund, Labour Market Occupational Diseases Fund, investment 
companies and investment funds) and supervision of the securities markets, including 
companies that are allowed to manage the exchange of securities, securities brokers, 
brokers involved in the money markets, clearing institutions and companies to 
register securities. 
Cooperation between the DFSA and Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB) is carried 
out by Financial Business Council, which decides supervisory general issues as well as 
more specific issues with major implications for individual financial institutions and 
financial holding companies. In addition, he advises DFSA in issuing regulations. The 
Council consists of eight members appointed by the central bank, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs of users and the various economic and financial sectors. The 
Secretariat of the Financial Business Council, and the Danish Securities Council and 
the Danish Pension Market Council, is provided by Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority. 
In 2005, the DFSA has signed two memoranda of cooperation, to improve 
coordination in particular with the DNB. The first memorandum was signed by DNB 
and the Ministry of Finance to support financial stability through information 
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exchange, consultation and interaction through Steering Committee. The second 
memorandum was signed by DNB to improve and expand existing coordination 
practices. It is supplemented by subsequent memoranda in the areas of financial 
stability, clearing and settlement systems and statistics. 
Estonia 
Financial supervision is carried out in a uniform pattern of Finantsinspektsioon 
(Estonian Financial Supervision Authority - EFSA). Estonian Financial Supervision 
Authority has operational independence, despite the fact that an agency at the 
Central Bank - Eesti Pank. Joint action is supported by the involvement of the 
governor and two representatives of Eesti Pank in a six members EFSA Supervisory 
Council. Estonian Financial Supervision Authority fulfills its obligations to maintain the 
security and transparency of the financial sector. Besides these two main objectives 
EFSA is also responsible for monitoring systemic risks and prevent abuses in the 
financial sector. 
Finland 
In Finland, the unified model is applied as the supervision is responsibility of 
the Bank of Finland (Suomen Pankki). This change was imposed in January 2009, 
when Rahoitustarkastus (Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FFSA)), until then in 
charge of banking, and securities sector, merged with Vakuutusvalvontavirasto 
(Insurance Supervision Authority (ISA)), responsible for the insurance sector. The new 
Supervisor oversees both banks and insurance companies and pension institutions. It 
protects the interests of policyholders and depositors, and so promotes safety and 
efficiency of the insurance and banking markets. 
France 
In late October 2009 ended the deadline for public consultation on a draft law 
for the new regulatory body covering the insurance and banking sectors. It is under 
the control of the French central bank. The new body is Đalledà theà áutoƌitĠà deà
ĐoŶtƌƀleàpƌudeŶtielà;áCPͿàaŶdàƌesultàfƌoŵàtheàŵeƌgeƌàofàtheàCoŵŵissioŶàďaŶĐaiƌe,àof 
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the áutoƌitĠà deà ĐoŶtƌƀleà desà assuƌaŶĐesà età desà ŵutuellesà ;áĐaŵͿ,à the CoŵitĠà desà
eŶtƌepƌisesà d'assuƌaŶĐeà ;CйáͿà aŶdà theà CoŵitĠà desà ĠtaďlisseŵeŶtsà de ĐƌĠdità età desà
entreprises d'investissement (CECEI). The objective was that ACP, existing under the 
control of the central bank, could ensure stability throughout the French financial 
sector. Another objective of the reform is to strengthen market surveillance of 
financial products. It was decided to introduce a structured cooperation between the 
áCPàaŶdàtheàsupeƌǀisoƌǇàauthoƌitǇàofàtheàfiŶaŶĐialàŵaƌketsàáMн.àáutoƌitĠàdeàĐoŶtƌƀleà
prudentiel (ACP) has been operational since early 2010. 
The framework for financial supervision in France was renewed in 2003 with 
the aim of improving the efficiency of the national system of financial regulation. This 
framework has been substantially reorganized and simplified. Financial Security Act, 
which entered into force on 1 áugustàϮϬϬϯàoŶàáutoƌitĠàdesàŵaƌĐhĠsàfiŶaŶĐieƌsà;áMнͿ,à
ƌesultiŶgàfƌoŵàtheàŵeƌgeƌàofàtheàCoŵŵissioŶàdesàopĠƌatioŶsàdeàďouƌseà;COBͿ,àCoŶseilà
desàŵaƌĐhĠsà fiŶaŶĐieƌsà ;CMнͿà aŶdà theàCoŶseilà deàdisĐipliŶeàdeà laàgestioŶà fiŶaŶĐiğƌeà
;CDGнͿ.àáutoƌitĠàdesàŵaƌĐhĠsàfiŶanciers, which is an independent public organization, 
entity and have financial independence, is responsible for the protection of deposits 
and orderly functioning of financial markets. In particular, AMF monitors securities 
transactions and collective investment schemes to ensure compliance with the 
provision of information to investors. Representative of the Banque de France, 
appointed by the Governor, isà aà ďoaƌdà ŵeŵďeƌà ofà theà áutoƌitĠà desà ŵaƌĐhĠsà
financiers. 
Germany 
After the changes that occurred in 2002, in Germany there is already a single 
supeƌǀisoƌ,à BuŶdesaŶstaltà füƌà нiŶaŶzdieŶstleistuŶgsaufsiĐhtà ;BaнiŶͿ,à ǁhiĐhà oǀeƌseesà
banks, investment companies and insurance companies, providing both stability and 
normal functioning of the German financial markets and investor protection and 
consumers. However, Deutsche Bundesbank is heavily involved in the supervision of 
banks. Deutsche Bundesbank carries out daily monitoring of institutions, which 
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includes on-site inspection and evaluation of documents, audit reports and annual 
financial statements. Deutsche Bundesbank also audited and evaluated banking 
operations to verify compliance with regulatory capital requirements and the 
adequacy of risk management. To enhance cooperation between the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and BaFin, was established forum for the supervision of financial 
ŵaƌketsà;"нoƌuŵàfüƌàнiŶaŶzŵaƌktaufsiĐht"Ϳ.àIŶàpaƌtiĐulaƌ,àheàĐooƌdiŶatesàtheàaĐtiǀitiesà
of the Deutsche Bundesbank and BaFin and makes recommendations on issues 
related to the overall supervision of financial services, which are important for the 
stability of the financial system. In 2002 an agreement was signed for cooperation on 
theà supeƌǀisioŶà ofà Đƌedità aŶdà fiŶaŶĐialà iŶstitutioŶs.à BuŶdesaŶstaltà füƌà
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht monitor both banks and investment companies in 
cooperation with the Deutsche Bundesbank, and insurance companies, thereby 
ensuring on the one hand, the stability and proper functioning of the entire German 
financial market, and on the other, protecting both investors and users. As for the 
supervision of the insurance sector should be noted that the BaFin supervises the 
cross-border insurance companies operating outside the boundaries of a single 
federal state, while regional supervisors are responsible for the supervision of 
insurance companies operating within the boundaries of a single federal state, and 
those which are not of essential economic importance. 
On October 24, 2009 agreement was reached between the coalition partners 
in Germany, under which is planned only Deutsche Bundesbank to be responsible for 
banking supervision. 
Greece 
In Greece, a sectorial model of supervision is established. Three different 
bodies are responsible for supervision of the financial sector. The Bank of Greece is 
responsible for the supervision of credit and financial institutions, and in particular 
for: banks, leasing and factoring companies and organizations acting as 
intermediaries in money transfers and exchanges. Bank of Greece oversee these 
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organizations monitor their stability, liquidity, adequacy of their internal audit 
systems, and the concentration of risks affecting them. Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission (HCMC) is the supervisor of the securities markets: companies engaged 
in brokerage and investment business firms engaged in the management of collective 
investment schemes (CIS) or investment portfolios of securities and securities 
exchanges and derivatives. Hellenic Capital Market Commission is an independent 
body empowered to take decisions. It is a separate legal entity under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Hellenic Capital Market Commission aims to 
ensure the proper functioning of the markets and at the same time maintaining and 
increasing consumer confidence. Bank of Greece is entitled to appoint one of the 
seven members of the board of HCMC, which is approved by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Finance was 
founded Committee for Private Insurance Supervision (CPIS), which deals with the 
Insurance Supervisory. 
Hungary 
“iŶĐeàϮϬϬϬàiŶàрuŶgaƌǇàopeƌatesàsiŶgleàsupeƌǀisoƌàPĠŶzügǇià“zeƌǀezetekàãllaŵià
нelügǇeleteà /àрuŶgaƌiaŶàнiŶaŶĐialà “upeƌǀisoƌǇàáuthoƌitǇà ;рн“áͿ,àǁhiĐhà isà aà ƌesultàofà
the merger of three entities that existed previously - Hungarian Banking and Capital 
Market Supervision; State Insurance Supervision; and State Pension Supervision. 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority supervises credit institutions, investment 
companies, insurance companies and pension funds. HFSA structure undergo further 
changes in 2003. Till then the President of the HFSA was responsible for the 
management of the organization and its supervisory functions. Now the supervisory 
functions are delegated to the five-member supervisory board. The management 
function is the responsibility of the Director. 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority cooperates with the central bank, 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) and the Ministry of Finance based on the tripartite 
agreement signed in September 2004, this agreement includes the establishment of 
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the Financial Stability Committee needed to better coordination of actions to 
maintain financial stability. The Committee shall meet quarterly to discuss and 
examine important issues relating to financial stability, including: experiences and 
observations of HFSA and MNB on the supervision and inspection issues related to 
payment and settlement systems, deposit insurance and consumer protection; issues 
related to market competition between firms, assessment of the causes that led to 
the crisis, which could be potentially dangerous to the system of financial 
intermediation. The Committee may issue press releases and statements on the 
system of financial intermediation. 
Furthermore, between the HFSA and the central bank there are two additional 
bilateral agreements. More precisely, between them there is a cooperation 
agreement, which entered into force in August 2006, aimed at improving and 
expanding coordination in the event of a financial crisis. 
Ireland 
New supervisory regime was introduced in Ireland in 2003 with the 
restructuring of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI). 
The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) was established as an 
independent body within the CBFSAI. From May 2003 IFSRA was responsible for 
supervising the entire financial services sector in Ireland with the exception of 
pension funds. It also plays an important role in ensuring consumer protection. It is 
important to note that IFSRA cooperate closely with CBFSAI in its task of maintaining 
overall financial stability. Therefore, the manager of CBFSAI has many powers: he 
must consult financial regulator as his consent is necessary regarding questions 
relating to the stability of the Irish financial system, it has the power to authorize 
employees of CBFSAI to investigate (including inspections) licensed credit institutions, 
cooperative institutions specializing in construction lending (building societies), 
savings banks, licensed securities exchanges, licensed investment intermediaries 
(authorised investment business firms) and licensed CIS, he may, according to his 
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appointment, issue guidelines to the IFRSA on the policies and principles, which IFRSA 
should follow in performing the functions of the Financial Services Authority of 
Ireland. 
In June 2009 the minister of finance in Ireland announced the government's 
agreement to establish a single fully integrated regulatory institution called the 
Central Bank of Ireland Commission. The new organization will replace the current 
structure Central Bank and the Financial Services Regulatory Authority. The new 
Central Bank Commission will be chaired by the Governor of the Irish Central Bank 
and will be responsible for the supervision of individual financial institutions and the 
maintenance of financial stability. The work on consumer protection is set up as a 
separate agency (National Consumer Agency), which assumes also the antitrust 
function. 
Italy 
The responsibility for the supervision and regulation of the financial sector in 
Italy is given to four different bodies: Banca d'Italia; Commissione Nazionale per le 
“oĐietăà eà laà Boƌsaà ;“eĐuƌitiesà CoŵŵissioŶà ;CON“OBͿͿ,à Istitutoà peƌà laà ǀigilaŶzaà sulleà
assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo ( Insurance Supervisory Institute (ISVAP)) 
and the Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione (Pension Fund Supervisory 
Commission (COVIP)). This supervisory model is the result of the division of 
responsibilities for the banking sector and that of the securities: Banca d'Italia has 
been given the supervision of credit institutions, investment firms and other financial 
intermediaries; CONSOB is responsible for transparency and business practices of 
investment companies. CONSOB also has supervisory powers with respect to the 
securities markets, the manner of disclosure and completeness of the information 
provided by issuers of financial instruments, market abuse and insider trading. 
However, Banca d'Italia is responsible for the supervision of these markets, such as 
the market for government securities and interbank deposits, in order to ensure the 
overall efficiency of the market and established business practices. Additionally, with 
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the consent of CONSOB, Banca d'Italia regulates and supervises post-trading 
infrastructure (clearing and settlement). Insurance companies are under the 
supervision of ISVAP, aiming to ensure both stability and transparent functioning of 
insurance companies. Pension funds are overseen by COVIP, and Ufficio Italiano 
Cambi (Italian Foreign Exchange Office (UIC)) responsible for the verification of 
financial firms on compliance with laws against money laundering. 
Comitato interministeriale per il credito e il risparmio (Inter-ministerial 
Committee for Credit and Savings (CICR)) should also be mentioned to complete the 
picture of financial supervision in Italy. It is a collective body composed of the 
ministers responsible for finance and economic affairs and chaired by the Minister of 
Economy and Finance. Governor of the Banca d'Italia attend its meetings. Inter-
ministerial Committee for Credit and Savings is responsible for issuing general 
guidelines for supervision in the areas of lending, and the protection of savings. Inter-
ministerial Committee for Credit and Savings may decide on some specific matters 
within its sphere of competence. The Law on the protection of savings and financial 
market regulation, approved in late 2005 requires some changes in the supervisory 
framework. Obligation of the implementation of competition law with regard to the 
banking sector was transferred from BaŶĐaà d'Italiaà toà áutoƌităà gaƌaŶteà dellaà
concorrenza e del mercato (AGCM). Investment products offered by banks are 
subject to the same rules and control (by Consob instead of Banca d'Italia), applicable 
to other intermediaries. Cooperation between supervisors was reinforced by the 
obligation to draw up plans for coordination and exchange of information. 
Latvia 
From 1 July 2001, the supervision of the whole financial market in Latvia is 
ĐaƌƌiedàoutàďǇàaàsiŶgleàiŶdepeŶdeŶtàďodǇ,àнiŶaŶšuàuŶàkapitalaàtiƌgusàkoŵisija (Finance 
and Capital Market Commission (FKTK)), which supervises credit institutions, 
insurance companies and brokers, issuers of financial products investment 
companies, organizers of regulated markets (Riga Stock Exchange), Latvian Central 
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Depositary, companies engaged in investment management and investment funds 
and private pension funds and government-sponsored pension scheme. The main 
objectives of FKTK are twofold: 1) ensuring the protection of investors, depositors 
and policyholders, 2) promoting the development and stability of the market. Finance 
and Capital Market Commission also manages the fund to guarantee bank deposits 
and funds to protect the insured. Finance and Capital Market Commission shall 
cooperate with the Bank of Latvia and Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, FKTK assist 
authorities responsible for the prevention of money laundering (Office for the 
Prevention of Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity). In December 
2003, Bank of Latvia and FKTK signed a cooperation agreement to improve the 
exchange of information, the practice of joint inspections and sharing efforts for 
maintenance of information technology. 
Lithuania 
The objectives of the financial supervision in Lithuania are distributed 
according to the sectoral model. There are three supervisors: Lietuvos bankas (NCB); 
VeƌtǇďiŶiųà popieƌiųà koŵisijaà ;LatǀiaŶà “eĐuƌitiesà CoŵŵissioŶà - Lithuanian Securities 
CoŵŵissioŶͿà aŶdà Dƌaudiŵoà pƌiežiūƌosà koŵisijaà ;“upeƌǀisoƌǇà CoŵŵissioŶà iŶsuƌeƌsà - 
Insurance Supervisory Commission (ISC)). Lietuvos bankas supervises the banking 
sector, issues and revokes licenses of credit institutions, establishes principles and 
formats of financial accounting and reporting. Lithuanian Securities Commission 
oversees the securities market as a whole in order to maintain and increase its 
efficiency, protects the interests of investors and the establishment of fair trade 
practices and competition. The insurance sector is supervised by the Insurance 
Supervisory Commission, renamed as a result of reform, which became in 2004 the 
Insurance Supervisory Commission aims to ensure the reliability, efficiency, safety 
and stability of the insurance system and at the same time protects the interests of 
the insurance industry-related parties. 
This document is made available in accordance with 
the Creative Commons license "CC BY-NC-ND" 189 
In 2000, the Bank of Lithuania, Lithuanian Securities Commission and the 
Insurance Supervisory Commission signed a memorandum of cooperation to improve 
the coordination and exchange of information relating to institutions supervised. 
The Commission for the Regulation of the Business of Financial Institutions and 
Coordination of Supervision was created in 2003 in order to ensure more effective 
cooperation between supervisors. The Commission includes representatives from 
each of the three supervisors, and representatives of the Parliamentary Committee 
on Budget and Finance and the Ministry of Finance. 
Luxembourg 
In Luxembourg there are two supervisors: Commission de Surveillance du 
Secteur Financier (Financial Sector Supervisory Commission (CSSF)) and the 
Commissariat aux Assurances (Insurance Commission (CoA)). Financial Sector 
Supervisory Commission, in operation since 1 January 1999, is a body distinct from 
the Banque centrale du Luxembourg. It acts as a supervisor of the entire financial 
sector, overseeing a wide range of businesses such as banks, investment firms, UCITS, 
electronic money institutions, securitization products, pension funds, investment 
companies, venture capital management companies and securities exchanges. As for 
the supervision of insurance and reinsurance companies, the competent authority is 
the Commissariat aux Assurances (Insurance Commission (CoA)). It is a separate 
public entity and operates under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance. While the 
central bank is not directly involved in the supervision process, it plays a role in 
maintaining financial stability through its membership in the ESCB. 
Malta 
Since 2002 the single supervisory model is used in Malta. Malta Financial 
Services Authority (MFSA), performs functions that were previously performed by the 
Malta Financial Services Centre, it also adopted the regulatory functions that were 
previously the responsibility of the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) and Malta Stock 
Exchange. Malta Financial Services Authority regulates and supervises all banking 
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activities, activities related to securities or insurance, and also acts as the 
administering authority of the national company register. Malta Financial Services 
Authority licenses and oversees securities exchanges. The objectives of the activity of 
the MFSA generally include the protection of investors, fair competitive practices, the 
availability of consumer choice, and encouragement to use the highest possible 
standards of conduct in the financial services industry. In 2003, the MFSA and CBM 
signed a memorandum on cooperation, which aims as improving the exchange of 
information between the two institutions and the creation of an Advisory Committee, 
which meets at frequent intervals or ad-hoc, if necessary, for exchange for different 
perspectives. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands had introduced institutional reform based on the separation 
between the supervisory process and issues related to business practices. De 
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), which in 2004 merged with the Pensions and Insurance 
Supervisory Authority Foundation, Pensioen & Verzekeringskamer (PVK), is 
ƌespoŶsiďleà foƌà theà supeƌǀisioŶà ofà fiŶaŶĐialà iŶstitutioŶs,à ǁhileà áutoƌiteità нiŶaŶĐiëleà
Markten, Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) is responsible for compliance 
with prudent business practices and the transparency and accuracy of information 
available on the market. 
Poland 
Since January 2008, the banking supervision was transferred from the Polish 
Central Bank to the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) - unified financial 
supervisory authority, built in 2006, which was formally responsible with the 
maintenance of financial stability. Officially, the central bank took over the function 
for preserving the financial stability in 2008 after the creation of the Financial 
Stability Committee. Recently there are some discussions on how effective the 
implementation of the unified supervisory architecture is. 
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Portugal 
In Portugal, there are three different supervisors: the Central Bank / Banco de 
Poƌtugalà ;BdPͿ;à CoŵŵissioŶà foƌà seĐuƌitiesà ƌegulatioŶà /à CoŵissĆoà doà MeƌĐadoà de 
Valoƌesà MoďiliĄƌiosà ;CMVMͿà aŶdà theà IŶsuƌaŶĐeà IŶstituteà /à IŶstitutoà deà “eguƌosà deà
Portugal (ISP). Portuguese supervisory structure is organized as a combination of the 
sectoral model (in terms of insurance / pension funds and credit institutions) and 
partially integrated model (with regard to organizations operating on the securities 
markets). 
Supervision of the banking and insurance sectors (including pension funds) is 
assigned to BdP and ISP in that order. Cross-sectoral supervision over the activities of 
financial intermediaries in the securities markets is assigned to the CNMV, and 
oversight on a micro-level is assigned to the central bank (including the supervision of 
investment firms and other financial companies). 
The three supervisors in Portugal cooperate by Conselho Nacional de 
Supervisores Financeiros (National Council of Financial Supervisors). This high-level 
committee was established in 2000 to coordinate national strategies to increase the 
effectiveness of supervision in the areas of banking, capital markets and insurance. 
However, it has no direct powers over financial institutions. Bilateral memoranda of 
cooperation between supervisory authorities provide the framework for the 
coordination of their daily tasks. 
Slovakia 
In Slovakia, in line with the reform came into force on 1 January 2006, the 
ĐeŶtƌalàďaŶk,àNĄƌodŶĄàďaŶkaà“loǀeŶskaà;NB“Ϳ,àisàƌespoŶsiďleàfoƌàoǀeƌseeiŶgàtheàeŶtiƌeà
fiŶaŶĐialàŵaƌketà iŶàtheàĐouŶtƌǇ.àNĄƌodŶĄàďaŶkaà“loǀeŶskaàhasàeǆteŶsiǀeàsupeƌǀisoƌǇà
powers and responsibilities because it performs functions that were previously split 
between two separate supervisors: NB“,àƌespoŶsiďleàfoƌàtheàďaŶkiŶgàseĐtoƌ,àaŶdàÚƌadà
pƌeà fiŶaŶčŶýàtƌh,à“loǀakiaŶàнiŶaŶĐialàMaƌketàáuthoƌitǇà ;“нMáͿ,àďodǇàƌespoŶsiďleà foƌà
supervising theàiŶsuƌaŶĐeàseĐtoƌàaŶdàĐapitalàŵaƌkets.àNĄƌodŶĄàďaŶkaà“loǀeŶskaàhave 
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to maintain the stability of the financial system as a whole, and to ensure safe and 
stable operation of the financial markets, ensuring the protection of their customers 
and the general compliance with competition law. In order to support the functioning 
of the NBS, its board was expanded to include experts on capital markets, insurance 
and pensions. 
Slovenia 
In Slovenia, the financial supervision functions of are carried out by three 
supervisors according to the sectoral model. National central bank, Banka Slovenije, is 
responsible for the supervision of banks and savings banks (including electronic 
money institutions), as well as other persons under the Banking Act (Law on banking). 
Securities Market Agency, Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev (SMA), is responsible 
for overseeing the securities sector (ie companies that perform broking, investment 
funds, pension funds). Insurance Supervision Agency, Agencija za zavarovalni nadzor 
(ISA), responsible for supervising the insurance market (companies engaged in 
insurance and reinsurance, insurance agencies, companies that perform brokerage of 
insurance products and insurance agents and brokers) and of pension companies. 
Three supervisors are legally and organizationally differentiated but are legally 
obliged to cooperate in carrying out their activities and exchange information 
according to the rules for mutual cooperation between the supervisory authorities 
(Pravilnik o medsebojnem sodelovanju nadzornih organov), issued by the Minister of 
Finance. As for financial conglomerates, supervisors may designate a coordinator to 
perform additional supervisory tasks according to the Law on Financial 
Conglomerates (Law on financial conglomerates). 
Spain 
In Spain, three different bodies perform supervisory functions under the 
seĐtoƌalà ŵodel.à NatioŶalà ĐeŶtƌalà ďaŶkà ;BaŶĐoà deà йspañaà - BE) is responsible for 
overseeing all credit institutions and aims to ensure the stability of the banking 
sǇsteŵ;à CoŵisiſŶà NaĐional del Mercado de Valores (National Commission for the 
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Securities Market (CNMV)) is responsible for supervision of the Spanish securities 
markets and intermediaries operating on them. It aims at ensuring market 
transparency and investor protection. Directorate General Insurance and Pension 
Funds, which is part of the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the oversight of 
private insurers and reinsurers, insurance firms and pension funds. 
The legal framework includes agreements on cooperation between 
supervisors. In 2004 BE signed a cooperation agreement with the CNMV and 
Directorate General Insurance and Pension Funds, in order to define the appropriate 
competences and to build frameworks for information exchange and settlement of 
issues concerning all supervisors. 
Agreement for cooperation on financial stability in order to prevent and 
manage crises with potentially systemic consequences was signed by the Ministry of 
Economy and the three supervisors in 2006, this agreement established a Financial 
StabilitǇà Coŵŵitteeà ;CoŵitĠà deà йstaďilidadà нiŶaŶĐieƌaͿ,à Đoŵposedà ofà seŶioƌà
employees of the Ministry and each of supervisors. The committee discusses the 
regulations relating to financial stability and the implementation of the 
abovementioned cooperation agreements. 
Sweden 
Since 1991 Finansinspektionen, Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA) 
is a single integrated regulatory authority responsible for the supervision of the 
banking and insurance sector and securities market in Sweden. The main tasks of the 
SFSA are promoting the stability and efficiency of the financial system and ensure 
effective consumer protection. In June 2005, the Ministry of Finance 
(Regeringskansliet - Finansdepartementet), Finansinspektionen and Sveriges Riksbank 
signed a cooperation agreement on the issues of financial stability and crisis 
management. The agreement includes the issuance of guidelines for consultation and 
exchange of information between the three organizations to improve financial 
stability and leadership in times of crisis. The objective of the agreement is to 
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regulate the contact between the parties (which has existed in informal settings) and 
to improve the exchange of information in order to reduce duplication of activities. 
England 
From 1 December 2001, according to Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA) 2000, Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the only financial supervisory 
authority in the United Kingdom who is responsible for the entire financial sector. 
Financial Services Authority is an independent non-governmental body. It is entirely 
funded by the financial sector, but is accountable to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(HM Treasury), and through him to Parliament. In recent years the FSA expanded its 
powers, took responsibility for mortgage regulation in October 2004 and for the 
regulation of general insurance in January 2005, Bank of England (BofE) is responsible 
for ensuring monetary and financial stability. It oversees the financial infrastructure, 
and in particular payment systems in order to reduce systemic risks. Financial 
Services Authority cooperates with HM Treasury and BofE in maintaining financial 
stability. For this purpose, three bodies have signed a memorandum of cooperation, 
which established a Standing Committee. This committee meets monthly to discuss 
both specific cases of interest, and other events relating to overall financial stability. 
In addition, the Deputy Governor of BofE (who is responsible for financial stability) is 
a non-executive director on the board of the FSA. At the same time the FSA's 
chairman is also a member of the Court of Directors of the Bank of England. 
Romania 
Financial supervision in Romania is organized according to the sectoral model. 
NatioŶalà ĐeŶtƌalà ďaŶk,àBaŶĐaàNaţioŶalăà aà‘oŵąŶieià ;BN‘Ϳ,àǁhiĐhà isà aŶà iŶdepeŶdent 
public institution, also plays the role of the banking supervisor. Some of the key 
features of BNR include licensing, regulation and supervision of credit institutions, as 
well as care for the smooth operation of the payment systems in order to ensure 
financial stability. In 2006, BNR was also assigned the monitoring and supervision of 
financial institutions engaged in lending. 
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‘oŵaŶiaŶà NatioŶalà “eĐuƌitiesà CoŵŵissioŶ,à Coŵisiaà NaţioŶalăà aà Valoƌiloƌà
Mobiliare (CNVM), which is an autonomous administrative body, is responsible for 
the regulation and supervision of capital markets, commodity markets and regulated 
markets of financial derivative instruments and related organizations. 
Romanian Insurance Supervisory Commission, Comisia de Supraveghere a 
ásiguƌăƌilor CSA, which is a specialized autonomous administrative body, is 
responsible for the licensing and supervision of insurance companies, reinsurance 
companies, insurance brokers and reinsurance, and other firms operating in the field 
of insurance and reinsurance business. 
Supervisory Commission of the Private Pensions System, Comisia de 
Supraveghere a Sistemului de Pensii Private (CSSPP), was established in 2005 as an 
autonomous administrative body responsible for the regulation, coordination, 
supervision and control over the activities of the private pension system. Supervisory 
Commission of the Private Pensions System is responsible for the supervision of 
pension funds. On March 10, 2006 BNR, CNVM and CSA signed a new memorandum 
of cooperation to improve the stability of the financial system as a whole and its 
constituent parts. The memorandum includes quarterly tripartite meetings at the 
level of manager of each of the three authorities as Secretariat of the Financial 
Stability Department of the BNR. Memorandum 2006 creates five permanent 
specialized technical committees (Financial Stability Committee, Supervision and 
Control Committee, Regulatory Committee, Payment Systems Committee and 
Financial Statistics Committee). 
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Annex 2: Financial supervision under the Central bank 
Supervision 
in the 
Central 
Bank 
Macro-
pruden
tial 
superv
ision 
Bank
s 
Insuranc
e 
Invest
ment 
compa
nies 
Pension 
funds 
Issuers, 
exchang
es 
(business 
practices
) 
Consumer 
protection 
Additional 
information 
Belgium yes yes Yes yes yes CBFA CBFA  
Germany yes yes yes (on a 
consolida
ted 
basis) 
BAFIN BAFIN or 
the federal 
authorities 
BAFIN BAFIN  
Estonia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes EFSA is an agency in 
the central bank 
Ireland yes yes yes yes yes NCA NCA  
Italy yes yes ISVAP yes COVIP CONSOB 
AGCM 
(for 
banking 
competit
ion) 
yes 
CONSOB 
 
Slovakia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Finland yes yes yes yes yes yes yes FIN-FSA is part of 
the central bank 
France yes yes yes AMF yes AMF yes 
AMF 
ACP is part of the 
central bank 
The 
Netherlands 
yes yes yes yes yes AFM AFM  
Czech 
Republic 
Yes + 
CFM 
yes yes yes yes yes yes CFM is an advisory 
body, which reports 
to the board of the 
central bank 
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Annex 3: DEA Methodology 
That there are n DMUs (banks), each producing s different outputs using r 
different inputs. The efficiency ratio is calculated (Ismail, 2004) by the following way:  
                                     Equation 1  
  
where:  
 El = relative efficiency of the DMU  
s = number of outputs produced by the DMU  
r = number of inputs employed by the DMU  
yi = the i-th output produced by the DMU  
xj = the j-th input employed by the DMU  
u = s x 1 vector of output weights and  
v = r x 1 vector of input weights. 
i runs from 1 to s and j runs from 1 to r.  
 Rewritten in the form of fractional programming and then transformed into a 
linear programming as done by Charnes et al. (1978), we have: 
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                                 Equation 2  
  
subject to: 
 
 
ui, vj ≥à0. u and v are small but positive quantities. The first constraint (vjxjl = 1) 
guarantees that it is possible to move from a linear programming to a fractional 
programming as well as from a fractional programming to a linear programming 
(Bowlin, 2002). Equation 2 is constructed under the assumption of constant returns 
to scale. 
However, the CCR model shown by Equation 2 is only appropriate when all 
decision making units (DMUs) are running at an optimal scale, and this requires the 
DMUs to operate at the flat portion of the long run average cost (LRAC) curve. In 
practice, some factors may prevent a  DMU from operating at optimal scale, such as 
financial and legal constraints, imperfect information etc. Coelli (1996) highlighted 
that the use of the CRS specification when some of the DMUs are not running at 
optimal scale will result in measures of technical efficiency which are mixed up with 
scale efficiency. To overcome this problem, Banker et al (1984) suggested their model 
(known as the BCR model). It improved the CCR model by introducing a variable that 
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represents the returns to scale. The BCR model allows a calculation of technical 
efficiency that is free from the scale efficiency effects. 
  In the BCR model, the problem formulation is written as:  
                                          Equation 3  
 
subject to: 
 
 
The parameter cl is unconstrained in sign. It indicates the various possibilities 
of returns to scale. cl > 0 means increasing returns to scale and cl = 0 implies constant 
returns to scale. Finally, cl < 0 implies decreasing returns to scale. This model forms a 
convex hull of intersecting planes which envelop the data points more tightly than 
the CRS model. Therefore, it enables technical efficiency scores to be greater than or 
equal to those obtained under the CRS model. 
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Annex 4: Reliability and Hypothesis testing 
We use the Cost Income Ratio (Operational Expenses / Gross Income) and the 
Operational Profit Margin (Operational Profit / Gross Income). 
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Chart 3.3 – DEA scores vs. Cost Income ration 
Correlation s
1 -.707* -.855**
.022 .002
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10 10 10
Pearson Correlation
Sig.  (2-tailed)
N
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N
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N
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Cost Income Rat io (op.
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DEA_trend
Cost Income
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ex/gross.
income)
Operat ional
Prof it  Margin
(op/profit/gro
ss.income)
Correlation is signif icant  at  the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is signif icant  at  the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**.  
 
Table 3.2 – Correlations 
From Chart 3.3 and Table 3.2 we see that the DEA score is negatively 
correlated with the Cost Income Ratio. This ratio is one of the most analyzed 
accounting indicators for financial and cost efficiency. It shows the change in the 
operating costs, driven by the change in the volume of production (gross income). 
The decrease means that banks are improving their technical efficiency over the 
years as the operating costs are decreasing relatively in relation to the gross income. 
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This could be an effect of improvement of the cost efficiency by eliminating excessive 
staff expenses and optimising other costs, or increase of the income while the costs 
remain unchanged. 
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Chart 3.4 – DEA scores vs. Operational Profit margin 
We also see that the DEA score is negatively correlated with the Operational 
Profit Margin (Chart 3.4 and Table 3.2). This could question the reliability of our 
results. But we must not forget that the higher interest rate margins are considered 
to be an indicator for a not well developed banking system. Given that the Cost 
Income Ratio and the Operational Profit Margin are both decreasing, this means that 
while the cost efficiency is improving, the interest rate margin is shrinking and the 
gross income is growing more rapidly than the operational profit. This is due to the 
increasing market competition and higher financing costs. This shows that for 
maintaining their profit growth rates the banks could no longer rely on the higher 
interest margins because of the market saturation and are expanding their portfolios 
relying on its scale, which leads to higher interest costs. 
There is a role for privatization? 
By the K-S test, we see that the distributions are normal and we can use a 
parametric test to test the hypothesis. Due to the small sample size we use T-test. 
We test two hypotheses: 
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H0: efficiency of privatized banks = efficiency of Bulgarian banks (no significant 
difference between the effectiveness of local banks and privatized banks). 
H0: efficiency of privatized banks and banks with foreign capital = efficiency of 
Bulgarian banks (no significant difference between the effectiveness of local banks 
and banks with foreign capital). 
 
  Paired Differences t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference       
        Lower Upper       
Pair 
1 
BG_banks - 
Privatized 
-.04787 .07348 .02324 -.10043 .00469 -2.060 9 .069 
Pair 
2 
BG_banks - 
Priv_Green 
-.05080 .08006 .02532 -.10807 .00647 -2.007 9 .076 
 
We can reject both 
null hypotheses (Sig. <0,1 
0).  
   
Is there an 
integration of European 
financial markets? 
One-Sample Kolmogorov -Smirnov  Test
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.8273 .8752 .8781
.06105 .07149 .07107
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Normal Parametersa,b
Absolute
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Most Extreme
Differences
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tai led)
BG_Banks Privatized Priv_Green
Test distribution is Normal.a. 
Calculated from data.b. 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
6 6
.7737 .9428
.10020 .04835
.169 .267
.169 .186
-.160 -.267
.413 .655
.996 .785
N
Mean
Std.  Deviation
Normal Parameters a,b
Absolute
Positive
Negative
Most Extreme
Dif f erences
Kolmogorov -Smirnov Z
Asy mp. Sig. (2-tailed)
BG_DEA_
score
EU_DEA_
core
Test distribution is Normal.a. 
Calculated f rom data.b. 
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By the K-S test, we see that the distributions are normal and we can use a 
parametric approach for testing the hypothesis. Due to the small sample size we use 
T-test. 
  
H0 states that there is no significant difference between the average levels of 
efficiency of Bulgarian and European banking markets. (BG DEA result = EU DEA 
result). 
Considering the results, we may reject the null hypothesis (Sig. <0,05). 
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Annex 5 – Petri nets – tools for modeling and analysis 
Petri nets (PN) are formal and graphical appealing language which is 
appropriate for modeling systems with concurrency and resource sharing. It is the 
first time a general theory for discrete parallel systems was formulated.  
When a PN is being created commonly one of the following methods are used: 
- When a cause-resulting dependency is being modeled the following 
accordances are being used: place - condition; transition - operation (conditions from 
ǁhiĐhàitàdepeŶdsàit͛sàƌealizatioŶàaƌeàiŶputsàaŶdàǁheŶàthey are fulfilled this is indicated 
with according number of marks at the place). The outputs for a transition are equal 
to the number of conditions that can cause the execution of an operation that is 
represented by this transition); activation of transitions – change in the condition. 
- When block-diagram is build in order to obtain a PN the following 
accordances are being used: 
  
  
A/        B/       
- When the table of transitions and outputs of a finite state machine is 
composed there is algorithm for obtaining the PN of the machine. 
- When time sequence is set transition to a PN is shown of the figure below:  
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Properties of the Petri Nets 
- Safety. The position in the net is safe if the number of the marks in it is not 
greater than one. The Petri Net is safe if all positions in the net are safe. The safe nets 
are used for analysis and development of digital schemes build at the base of logical 
elements. 
- Boundedness. The safety is a case of the property boundedness. The position 
kàisàsafeàoƌàkàďouŶdedàifàtheàŶuŵďeƌàofàŵaƌksàiŶàitàĐaŶ͛tàďeàgƌeateƌàthaŶàtheàiŶtegeƌàk.à
The position is bounded if it is k safe and PN is bounded if all its position are 
bounded. 
- Preservation. The Petri Net in which never marks are created or destroyed 
(their count stays constant). 
- Activity. The net can be interlocked when two processes use shared 
resources. The processes use the shared resource and take it, use it and release it. 
Theà sǇsteŵàďloĐksà ifà Ŷoà pƌoĐessà ĐaŶà ďeà eǆeĐuted.à Theà tƌaŶsitioŶà isà aĐtiǀeà ifà ità isŶ͛tà
blocked.  
- Reachability. The problem of reachability examines if a marking is reachable 
or can be reached after a certain sequence of executed transitions from a certain 
initial marking. Also the object of examination can be a test for a presence of a state 
in which a position or a group of positions contain number of marks greater than or 
equal to one.  
- Order of operations. This method for analysis is not based on the content of 
theàpositioŶs.à It͛sàďasedàoŶàtheàoƌdeƌàofàeǆeĐutioŶàofàtheàtƌaŶsitioŶs.àнoƌàeǆaŵpleà ifà
the sequence t2t4 is in the reachability graph of the PN. 
- Simultaneousness and conflict – If in a network there is a place with more 
thaŶà oŶeà outputà tƌaŶsitioŶs,à theà plaĐeà isà Đalledà ĐoŶfliĐtà plaĐe.à It͛sà ŶeĐessaƌǇà toà ďeà
taken a decision of which of this output transitions to be activated.  
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Therefore, the modeling of an operation is sequence of activating the 
transitions, which leads from exact initial marking to desirable reachable marking.  
 
PN analysis 
      The PN origin has to be analyzed in order to ensure correct modeling of the 
system behavior. he characteristic questions which can be asked about PN model are 
the following: 
(1) Are the PN safe? The safe PN are these with no more than 1 token in every 
place in the net. 
(2) Are the PN limited? Nets with limited by K token number in every one place 
are called k-limited. If the net is k-limited for some k and the k value is 
unknown, it is named only limited. The safe net is the 1-limited. 
(3) Is the number of token saved? PN are conservative if the token number in the 
net is  saved. This means  that the number of the input arcs in every active 
transition is equal to the number of the output arcs. If the tokens represent 
resources they have to be saved until resources are created or 
reduced/destroyed. 
(4) Which transition in PN are live and which are non live? The transition is live if it 
is potentially active for some accessible markings. -The transition is non live if 
there is no following activations of transitions, which allow it. 
The analysis of PN was mode by Reachability Graph ( RG ). The basic method 
for PN analysis: 
 Graph which nods are the markings of PN(Mi) and which arcs are the 
transitions, after their activation the result is new marking of the net. 
 Every marking represents the condition of all of the net nods. 
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 The basic nod is marked with start token. 
 The nod X is a tree, additional nods are added to all of the markings, so 
that they are directly accessible to the nod x marking. 
 When in one or more than one nods marks are accumulated, for the 
number of tokens in this condition the special symbol ω is used. 
 ω is a value which can be overbearing big. 
 ω + a = ω. Ω-a = ω, a < ω  for all natural numbers a. 
Conclusion 
1. Our analysis outlines the opportunity for constructing a common model for 
Network approach for realization of the financial transformation and ensuring 
stability and efficiency of the global financial system  
2. Using the PN network as a mathematical model shows advantages related to 
mathematical analysis of critical situations in terms of viability, accessibility and 
narrowness. 
 
